Daley v. Minn. Loan & Inv. Co.

• Decision Date: 20 June 1890
• Citation: 43 Minn. 517,45 N.W. 1100
• Parties: DALEY ET AL. v MINNESOTA LOAN & INVESTMENT CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

43 Minn. 517

45 N.W. 1100

DALEY ET AL.vMINNESOTA LOAN & INVESTMENT CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 20, 1890.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. Under Gen. St. 1878, c. 40, § 2, where a married woman executes jointly with her husband a deed of her separate real estate, the validity of such deed is not affected by the fact of her minority; and the provisions of that chapter extend to mortgages.

2. A charge made in good faith, and which is found to be reasonable in amount, to cover expenses for examining title and the preparation of the writings necessary to secure a sum loaned to a mortgagor, held not usurious.

3. And where the business is transacted through the mails, and a reasonable time transpires between the date of the execution of the securities which bear interest from their date and their final acceptance, and the delivery to the mortgagor of the sum loaned, and it is found by the trial court that there is no intention to pay or exact an unlawful rate of interest, held, that the securities are not void for usury, because of such intervening lapse of time.

Appeal from district court, Rock county; PERKINS, Judge.

Daniel Rohrer, for appellants.

Geo. W. Wilson and P. E. Brown, for respondent.

VANDERBURGH, J.

1. The mortgage in question here was made by the plaintiffs, husband and wife, jointly, upon the real estate of the wife, she being at the time a minor. By chapter 40, § 2, Gen. St., (Laws 1887, c. 47,) it is expressly provided that the validity of the deed should not in such cases be in any manner affected by the minority of the wife, and the purpose of the statute is very clearly expressed. A mortgage of real estate is a “deed,” within the meaning of that section and chapter. The effect in such case is to remove the disability of infancy. The amendment we have referred to was added to the section in question in 1869, and was doubtless deemed proper for the better security of titles, and in view of the protection of the wife already afforded by the statutory provisions requiring her husband in all cases to join in her deed.

2. The further ground on which the plaintiffs seek to avoid the mortgage is usury. Upon this branch of the case, however, the material facts are all found adversely to them, and there is no doubt of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings. During plaintiffs' negotiations for the loan secured by the mortgage, it was mutually agreed between the parties that the defendant should be allowed $10...