Daley v. Mountain Empire Radiology, P.C.

• Decision Date: 06 November 2019
• Docket Number: No. 2:18-cv-125,2:18-cv-125
• Parties: JAMES DALEY and KRISTEN DALEY, Plaintiffs, v. MOUNTAIN EMPIRE RADIOLOGY, P.C., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

JAMES DALEY and KRISTEN DALEY, Plaintiffs, v. MOUNTAIN EMPIRE RADIOLOGY, P.C., et al., Defendants.

No. 2:18-cv-125

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT GREENEVILLE

November 6, 2019

Judge Phillips

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on defendants MCOT, Inc. ("MCOT") and Timothy D. Hall's motion for judgment on the pleadings [doc. 25] and motion for leave to file supplemental authority [doc. 59]. The motion for judgment on the pleadings has been fully briefed [docs. 26, 52, 54, 58] and is ripe for determination. For the reasons set forth herein, the defendants' motion for leave to file supplemental authority [doc. 59] will be granted, to the extent that the Court has considered the supplemental authority, and defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings [docs. 25] will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Relevant Facts

Mountain Empire Radiology ("MER") is a provider of radiological services and provided medical treatment to plaintiff Kristen Daley. Thus, Mrs. Daley owed MER for the cost of that medical treatment. When that debt went unpaid, MER hired MCOT, a collection agency, to collect the amount. MCOT, by its attorney, Mr. Hall, filed a collection action in the Greene County General Sessions Court. On February 15, 2018, that court entered a judgment against Mr. and Mrs. Daley in the amount of $712.24. Subsequent to the entry of judgment, MER obtained a garnishment of Mrs. Daley's wages in the amount of $996.41. Plaintiffs assert violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., by defendants MCOT and Mr. Hall.¹

II. Standard of Review

Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Motions for judgment on the pleadings are reviewed under the same standard as motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010). That is, "all well-pleaded material allegations of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment." Id. The Court construes the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts all factual allegations as true, and determines whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Albrecht v. Treon, 617 F.3d 890, 893 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1201 (2011) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007)).

Applying the pleading requirements outlined in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550U.S. 544 (2007), and Iqbal to Rule 12(c) motions, plaintiffs must "plead . . . factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Albrecht, 617 F.3d at 893 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see New Albany Tractor, Inc. v. Louisville Tractor, Inc., 650 F.3d 1046, 1050-51 (6th Cir. 2011). When considering a Rule 12(c) motion, the Court "need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences." HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608, 611 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 689 (6th Cir. 2006)). However, "[i]f it is at all plausible (beyond a wing and a prayer) that a plaintiff would succeed if he proved everything in his complaint, the case proceeds." Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 581 (6th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). The Court may consider documents central to the plaintiffs' claims to which the complaint refers and incorporates as exhibits. Amini v. Oberlin College, 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001).

III. Analysis

As an initial matter, this Court has reviewed Defendants' motion for leave to file supplemental authority [doc. 59], in which the Defendants ask the Court to consider this Court's recent decision in Drake et al. v. Greeneville Collection Service, et al., No. 2:19-cv-01 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 16, 2019). Defendants' motion [doc. 59] is GRANTED, to the extent that the Court has reviewed and considered the Drake case.

The FDCPA is an "extraordinarily broad" statute intended to address debt collection abuse by unscrupulous debt collectors. Currier v. First Resolution Inv. Corp., 762 F.3d 529, 533 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Barany-Snyder v. Weiner, 539 F.3d 327, 333 (6th Cir. 2008)). The Act identifies specific conduct that is prohibited, but it also generally prohibitsany harassing, unfair, or deceptive debt collection practice. Id. To determine whether conduct fits within the broad scope of the FDCPA, the conduct is viewed through the eyes of the "least sophisticated consumer." Id. This standard recognizes that the FDCPA protects the gullible and the shrewd alike while simultaneously presuming a basic level of reasonableness and understanding on the part of the debtor, thus preventing liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of debt collection notices. Id.

In the second amended complaint, plaintiffs assert the following violations of the FDCPA:

• defendants falsely represented the character and legal status of the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) by representing that Mr. Daley owed the debt by virtue of his marriage to Mrs. Daley [Doc. 45 at ¶ 71];

• defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) by communicating credit information which is known or should be known to be false [Id.];

• defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) by using a false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect the debt [Id.];

• defendants misrepresented plaintiffs' rights under Tennessee law in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(5), 1692e(10), and used unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f [Id. at ¶ 73];

• defendants attempted to collect a debt from Mr. Daley that he did not owe, thus threatening to take and actually took action that it could not legally take in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5), and also engaged in intentional or negligent conduct to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with collection of a debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692(d) [Id. at ¶ 74]; and

• defendants falsely represented that the civil summons and affidavit of sworn account were communications from an attorney in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3) [Id. at ¶ 79].

1. False Representation of the Character or Legal Status of the Debt

The FDCPA defendants first argue that some of the FDCPA claims should be dismissed as precluded by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. [Doc. 26 at 6-9]. Specifically, the defendants argue that the claims that they attempted to collect a debt that Mr. Daley did not owe and that they falsely represented the character or legal status of the debt are precluded because an adjudication of those claims would require review and rejection of the state court judgment. Plaintiffs assert that they are not attacking the underlying merits of the state court judgment, just the manner in which the defendants attempted to collect the debt. [Doc. 52 at 11].

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine arises out of two Supreme Court cases, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The Supreme Court clarified the Rooker-Feldman doctrine stating that application of the doctrine is "confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Both the plaintiffs in Rooker and Feldman requested the district court "overturn an injurious state-court judgment" but only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review a state court's judgment. Id. at 292.

The Court must look at the source of the plaintiff's injury alleged in the federal complaint to determine whether a claim is one that attacks a state court judgment, and thus is within the Rooker-Feldman scope, or an independent claim over which a district courtmay assert jurisdiction. McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006). "If the source of the injury is the state court decision, then the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would prevent the district court from asserting jurisdiction. If there is some other source of injury, such as a third party's actions, then the plaintiff asserts an independent claim." Id. For a claim to fall within the Rooker-Feldman doctrine's scope, "the source of the injury must be from the state court judgment itself; a claim alleging another source of injury is an independent claim." Id. at 394.

The Court agrees that some of Plaintiffs' FDCPA claims are claims which attack the state court judgment: Plaintiffs' claims that Defendants are attempting to collect a debt from Mr. Daley that he does not owe [doc. 45 at ¶ 74] and the claim that defendants have falsely represented that Mr. Daley owes the debt by virtue of his marriage to Mrs. Daley. [Id. at ¶ 71]. In short, Mr. Daley claims that he does not owe the debt to MER, whereas the state court judgment concludes that he does owe the debt. "To sustain such a claim would require the Court to exercise appellate review of the state court judgment, . . . The plaintiffs in this claim are directly challenging the underlying debt, not the collection efforts." Singleton v. Hospital of Morristown, Nos. 2:15-CV-287; 2:15-CV-290, 2016 WL 7315351, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 14, 2016). Thus, the FDCPA claims premised on finding that Mr. Daley does not owe the debt fall within the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and will be dismissed.

2. Misrepresentation of Plaintiffs' Rights

Plaintiffs next claim that the civil summons form...