Dallam v. Cumberland Valley School District
Citation | 391 F. Supp. 358 |
Decision Date | 20 March 1975 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 75-68. |
Parties | George DALLAM, a minor, by William M. Dallam, his guardian, Plaintiff, v. CUMBERLAND VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Robert W. Barton, Killian & Gephart, Harrisburg, Pa., for plaintiff.
William M. Young, Jr., McNees, Wallace & Nurick, Harrisburg, Pa., for defendants.
The instant case requires this court to decide whether the constitutional protection afforded public school students in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975), extends to the extra-curricular activity of interscholastic athletics.
The 15-year-old plaintiff transferred to the Cumberland Valley School District from the neighboring Camp Hill School District. Cumberland Valley is a member of the Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association (P.I.A.A.). The P.I.A.A. is an unincorporated voluntary assocation of approximately 600 public high schools, 600 public junior high schools and 40 to 50 private schools. The Association's function is to develop and enforce uniform rules governing interscholastic athletic competition among member schools. Cumberland Valley is a member of the P.I.A.A. and is consequently obligated to follow P.I.A.A. directives in order to maintain membership.
The minor plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction1 to enjoin enforcement of a rule of the P.I.A.A. The rule automatically bars from interscholastic high school athletic competition for one school year any student who transfers from one school district to another but does not reside in the transferee district with a parent or guardian. Jurisdiction is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U. S.C. § 1983.
The underlying objective of the rule is to prohibit athletically motivated transfers and high school athletic recruiting. The plaintiff has not taken issue with the reasoning behind the regulation. Rather, the plaintiff argues that the automatic ineligibility rule acts as an irrebuttable presumption in violation of his equal protection and due process rights guaranteed under the United States Constitution.2 The defendants concede that no hearing procedure is provided in which a student could establish that he transferred for wholly non-athletic reasons, but following his transfer desired to participate in interscholastic ahtletics.
The issues now before the court are the plaintiff's motion for a permanent injunction and the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of federal jurisdiction.3
The defendants correctly view 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as requiring two jurisdictional elements to be present. The first, state action (or action under color of state law) is admittedly present. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled that the P.I.A.A. is sufficiently tied to the Pennsylvania education system to constitute state action. Harrisburg School District v. P.I.A.A., 453 Pa. 495, 502, 309 A.2d 353 (1973).
The second jurisdictional element of § 1983 is a showing by the plaintiff that the defendant deprived him of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.4 Both sides agreed that the issue at hand in no way qualifies as an "immunity" within the meaning of § 1983. The plaintiff first argued that the right-privilege distinctions of old are no longer relevant to an application of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, as per Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L. Ed.2d 287 (1970). The plaintiff misperceives the issue. It is irrelevant indeed whether the instant plaintiff's participation in interscholastic athletics is either a right or privilege. The defendant P.I.A.A., as moving party on the motion to dismiss, must establish that participation in high school athletics is neither a right nor a privilege protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
The case of Goss v. Lopez figures prominently in the matter of this court's jurisdiction. The plaintiff argues that Goss alone is sufficient to confer jurisdiction, while the defendant contends the decision to be both inapplicable and distinguishable. The majority in Goss noted:
But Goss speaks in two ways. First, the Court repeatedly speaks of the serious damage to the plaintiff's reputation because misconduct was allegedly the basis for the suspension. The suspension was described as a "serious event," which could "seriously damage the student's . . . later opportunities for higher education and employment." 419 U.S. at ___, 95 S.Ct. at 736. Second, the Court speaks in terms of the nature of the interest and not its weight. Id.
Insofar as Goss turns on the magnitude of the injury it clearly is distinguishable from the case at bar. The plaintiff is not seeking instruction, or even participation in a particular area of athletics for neither has been denied him. The record establishes that the plaintiff has both instruction and athletic competition available to him. The only avenue of athletics temporarily closed is the opportunity to compete as a member of a high school team against other high school teams.
The problems raised by the latter theory of the majority in Goss were anticipated by Justice Powell in his dissent wherein he described the "thicket" into which the Court had entered:
419 U.S. 565, at 597, 95 S.Ct. 729 at 747, 42 L.Ed.2d 725.
In speaking of extracurricular activities, such as sports, the dissent observed that "in these and many similar situations claims of impairment of one's educational entitlement identical in principle to those before the Court today can be asserted with equal or greater justification . . .." 419 U.S., at 597, 95 S.Ct. at 748.
Following the Goss decision, the Court ruled on a similar suspension case in Wood v. Strickland, ___ U.S. ___, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975). Although not deviating from Goss on the question of lengthy suspensions, the Court noted that ". . . § 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federal court correction of errors in the exercise of that discretion which do not rise to the level of violations of specific constitutional guarantees. . . ."
Section 1983 comes into play only in the event a right,...
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