Dallas Co. Medical Soc. v. Ubinas-Brache
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
| Writing for the Court | Rosenberg |
| Citation | Dallas Co. Medical Soc. v. Ubinas-Brache, 68 S.W.3d 31 (Tex. App. 2001) |
| Decision Date | 07 February 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-97-00027-CV.,05-97-00027-CV. |
| Parties | DALLAS COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY and Texas Medical Association, Appellants, v. Emmanuel E. UBIÑAS-BRACHE, M.D., Appellee. |
Scott Patrick Stolley, George C. Chapman, Jane Politz Brandt, Dallas, for appellants.
Joseph O. Collins, Jr., Scott D. Weber, Dallas, for appellee.
Before THOMAS, Chief J., and WRIGHT and ROSENBERG,1 JJ.
This case involves a dispute over the membership of Dr. Emmanuel E. Ubiñas-Brache (Ubiñas) in the Dallas County Medical Society (DCMS). The DCMS expelled Ubiñas. He appealed the expulsion through the appeals process of the Texas Medical Association (TMA). After adverse rulings, he brought this action in district court on the basis of a violation of due process and breach of agreement. After a jury trial challenging the actions of the DCMS and the TMA, the trial court entered judgment on the findings that the DCMS was enjoined from expelling Ubiñas on the issues raised in the complaints that led to the expulsion. In sixteen points of error, the DCMS and TMA appeal the judgment, alleging it was entered erroneously because they were entitled to medical peer review immunity under the Medical Practice Act2 (the Act); the defenses of estoppel and waiver were proved; the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's findings; the trial court improperly excluded their evidence; and the trial court improperly granted an injunction and failed to award attorney's fees. Ubiñas brings two cross-points regarding his entitlement to attorney's fees. Concluding that this suit is barred by medical peer review immunity, we reverse the trial court's judgment and render judgment against Ubiñas on his medical peer review complaints. We remand for further proceedings regarding the requests for attorney's fees.
In 1984, Ubiñas, a Dallas county physician specializing in craniofacial and plastic and reconstructive surgery, joined the DCMS. The DCMS is a private, nonprofit organization of physicians that is dedicated to the promotion and maintenance of high standards of ethical and medical practice. The DCMS is a chartered member of the TMA. Membership in the DCMS is voluntary. Each member must subscribe to the American Medical Association's principles of medical ethics and agree to be bound by the DCMS disciplinary procedures. The DCMS also provides mechanisms to resolve patient complaints against DCMS members.
In May 1991, Sharon Fleming filed a complaint with the DCMS regarding Ubiñas's surgical treatment of her broken finger. Her complaint was forwarded to the Mediations Committee, which referred it to the Fee Dispute Committee. That committee conducted an investigation through a member, Dr. Paul Pin. Then, in September 1991, the complaint was forwarded to the Board of Censors.
In February 1992, while the Board of Censors was still reviewing Fleming's complaint, the DCMS received a second complaint against Ubiñas about his treatment of Kevin Fair. On Fair's behalf, Dr. Michael Maris, a family friend, filed a complaint alleging an outrageously high bill for minor injuries. Because the Fleming complaint was pending and this second complaint was made by a physician, it was referred to the Board of Censors.
In May 1992, the Board of Censors scheduled a closed-door meeting with Ubiñas. Before the meeting, a third complaint was filed against Ubiñas by a patient, Dewayne Randle, who complained about the high amount of the bill for the surgical repair of his lacerated finger. Because of the other complaints, Randle's complaint was referred to the Board of Censors.
Ubiñas received notice of all the complaints and responded to them. He agreed to reduce Randle's bill, claiming a billing error. At the closed-door meeting, Ubiñas and the Board of Censors discussed all three complaints. After the meeting, the Board wrote a letter to Ubiñas outlining concerns and asking him to respond in writing. The Board then engaged experts as consultants.
In December 1992, after reviewing the experts' reports, Ubiñas's response, and other documentation, the Board of Censors issued a report recommending that Ubiñas be expelled from the DCMS and the TMA. In the report, the Board made findings that Ubiñas acted unethically in that he:
(1) failed to deal honestly with all three patients, by providing services that were unnecessary and inconsistent with the clinical findings; and
(2) engaged in deceptive practices by providing all three patients with unnecessary services, resulting in "over treatment" and unnecessary charges.
At Ubiñas's request, the Board of Directors held a ten-hour hearing in which expert evidence was presented, witnesses examined and cross-examined, and attorneys' arguments were made. After Ubiñas submitted his written closing statement, the Board of Directors met in executive session. The Board voted to expel Ubiñas from the DCMS and issued a disciplinary order. The order contained the findings that included the following:
• the repair of one of Fleming's ligaments was considered of questionable value, and charging for the repair would not likely be considered usual and customary.
• it was unnecessary to repair a nerve and an artery in Fair's thumb, and such repairs constituted "over treatment" that is not usual and customary.
• there was no evidence of damage to a nerve and an artery in Randle's finger, there was no evidence that Dr. Ubiñas actually performed repairs on those structures, and unnecessary charging was a deceptive practice.
Ubiñas then appealed to the TMA Board of Councilors. After hearing oral argument and receiving briefs submitted by Ubiñas and DCMS, the Board of Councilors affirmed the expulsion. Ubiñas next appealed to the American Medical Society's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, which affirmed the expulsion.
After the medical organizations' adverse decisions, Ubiñas filed this suit in district court. Ubiñas alleged that he had been denied due process under the disciplinary procedures of the DCMS as set out in the TMA's Hearings Procedures Manual, as well as procedural due process guaranteed by the Texas Constitution, and that his contract with the association was breached. Specifically, his due process claims were that the manual had no prescribed burden of proof, the proceedings were not confidential, and the findings of the DCMS were contrary to the evidence. His breach of contract claim was that the disciplinary proceedings were not conducted as the manual provided. The breach of contract claim involved the same factual issues as the due process claims. Ubiñas sought an injunction only. He claimed that, absent the injunction, he would suffer irreparable harm because the expulsion would result in disciplinary action by the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners, loss of hospital staff privileges, and probable inability to obtain medical malpractice insurance. The DCMS and the TMA answered, claiming that there was no cause of action for the facts alleged and that the medical associations were immune from suit and damages under the federal and state medical practice acts. The case was tried to a jury. The trial court refused to charge the jury under the Act requiring a finding of malice for a suit against a medical peer review committee. The trial court's charge for liability was presented and answered as follows:
Did any of those named below fail to provide Dr. Ubiñas, a member subject to disciplinary action, with fundamental fairness and a fair and good faith proceeding?
Answer "Yes" or "No" as to each of the following:
a. Dallas County Medical Society /Yes/
b. Texas Medical Association /Yes/
The jury also found that the DCMS's and the TMA's failure to provide fundamental fairness and a fair and good faith proceeding caused Ubiñas irreparable harm. The trial court entered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict, enjoining the DCMS from expelling Ubiñas from the DCMS. The DCMS and the TMA appeal the trial court's judgment.
In the sixth point of error, appellants contend that the trial court failed to rule as a matter of law that the DCMS and the TMA are immune from suit under sections 5.06(l) and (m) of the Act. Ubiñas responds that appellants did not plead section 5.06(l), the proceeding did not qualify as a medical peer review action, section 5.06(m) does not preclude an action for injunctive relief, and the exercise of immunity would deny Ubiñas constitutional rights.
Appellants did not plead in their answer section 5.06(l) of the Act, which is the specific section that provides immunity from causes of action. See Former Tex. Rev.Civ. Stat.Ann. arts 4495b, § 5.06(l).3 However, they did assert other immunity provisions under the Act and asserted that Ubiñas had failed to state a cause of action under Texas law. Generally, an affirmative defense is waived if it is not pleaded. Tex.R.Civ.P. 94. Though not specifically mentioned in rule 94, immunity is an affirmative defense that ordinarily must be pleaded to avoid waiver. See, e.g., Davis v. City of San Antonio, 752 S.W.2d 518, 519-20 (Tex.1988) (governmental immunity). However, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that the defense of immunity is not waived by the failure to specifically plead it if it is apparent on the face of the petition and established as a matter of law. Shoemake v. Fogel, Ltd., 826 S.W.2d 933, 937 (Tex.1992) (citing Phillips v. Phillips, 820 S.W.2d 785, 789-90 (Tex.1991)). Thus, rule 94's requirement of pleading is not absolute. Shoemake, 826 S.W.2d at 937. Here, the defensive pleadings raise immunity for medical peer review and state that there is no cause of action for Ubiñas's claims. Therefore, appellants did not waive the immunity defense.
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...peer review. The United States has neither pled nor briefed that affirmative defense. See Dallas County Med. Soc'y v. Ubinas Brache, 68 S.W.3d 31, 38 (Tex.App.— Dallas 2001, pet denied) (§ 160.010 immunity is a defense that ordinarily must be pled); see Keszler v. Mem'l Med. Cent. of E. Tex......
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...omitted issue is essential to recovery, the trial court must render judgment for the defendant. Dallas County Med. Soc'y v. Ubinas-Brache, 68 S.W.3d 31, 40 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied). In the absence of a jury finding or conclusive evidence that the failures were directly caused by ......
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