Dallas County Appraisal Dist. v. Institute for Aerobics Research, 05-86-00883-CV

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Writing for the Court: McCLUNG
• Citation: 766 S.W.2d 318
• Parties: DALLAS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT and Dallas County Appraisal Review Board, Appellants, v. INSTITUTE FOR AEROBICS RESEARCH, Appellee. Dallas
• Docket Number: No. 05-86-00883-CV,05-86-00883-CV
• Decision Date: 31 January 1989

Page 318

766 S.W.2d 318 DALLAS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT and Dallas County Appraisal
Review Board, Appellants,
v.
INSTITUTE FOR AEROBICS RESEARCH, Appellee. No. 05-86-00883-CV. Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas. Jan. 31, 1989.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 28, 1989.

Page 319

Peter G. Smith, Roy L. Armstrong, Dallas, for appellants.

B. Prater Monning, III, Michael G. Wimer, Dallas, for appellee.

Before STEPHENS, ¹ McCLUNG and LAGARDE, JJ.

OPINION ON REHEARING

McCLUNG, Justice.

Both appellants and appellee filed motions for rehearing and we grant appellants' motion for rehearing. We withdraw our original opinion and the following is now our opinion.

The Dallas County Appraisal District and the Dallas County Appraisal Review Board (collectively referred to as the District) appeal the entry of a summary judgment in favor of the Institute for Aerobics Research (Institute) granting it an exemption from ad valorem taxes for the year 1985. The District claims in points of error one, three, four, five and six that there were issues of material fact on whether the Institute/taxpayer met the criteria for tax exemption under certain statutory and constitutional provisions. In point of error two, it contends that the District's summary judgment should have been granted. In point of error seven, it claims the trial court erred in denying the District's summary judgment because the Institute did not meet the criteria for exemption as a religious organization. In point of error eight, the District asserts the trial court erred in denying the District's summary judgment because the Institute's claim that they were denied due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was frivolous. We agree only with those points of error claiming there were remaining issues of material fact with regard to the entry of the Institute's summary judgment and reverse and remand this matter for trial.

The Institute's summary judgment evidence, an affidavit from its Chief Executive Officer, established the following facts: The Institute purchased the buildings and real property near the intersection of Preston Road and Churchill Way, in 1983 from the Churchill Way Presbyterian Church. The church continued to use the first floor of the building for church services and related church activities until mid-1985 through a "lease arrangement" in which they paid no rent. The Institute used the second floor to conduct biomedical research and education for the public benefit. The Institute filed for and received a tax exemption from ad valorem taxes for the years 1984 and 1986. The District assessed ad valorem taxes for 1985. The Institute protested the assessment and after a hearing before the Dallas County Appraisal Review Board, taxes were assessed. The Institute filed suit and both the District and the Institute filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the Institute's summary judgment now before us.

Since both parties moved for summary judgment, all the evidence accompanying both motions should be considered in deciding whether or not to grant either party's motion. Villarreal v. Laredo National Bank, 677 S.W.2d 600, 605 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Under Rule 166a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment may be rendered only if the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits show (1) that there is no genuine issue as to any

Page 320

material fact and (2) that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See McFadden v. American United Life Ins. Co., 658 S.W.2d 147, 148 (Tex.1983); Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex.1970). As the plaintiff/movant, the Institute had the burden to show that it was entitled to prevail on each element of its cause of action. See Texas International Airlines v. Wits Air Freight, 608 S.W.2d 828, 829 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1980, no writ). The District, as defendant/movant, had the burden to establish as a matter of law that there was no genuine issue of fact as to one or more of the essential elements of the Institute's cause of action. Ridgeline Inc. v. Crow-Gottesman-Shafer # 1, 734 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Tex.App.--Austin 1987, no writ). A fact issue is presented when conflicting inferences may be drawn from uncontroverted summary judgment proof. Id. at 116-17.

In its first, third and fourth points of error, the District claims the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Institute because there was an issue of material fact as to whether the property satisfied the criteria of Section 11.23(h) of the Texas Tax Code ² or Texas Constitution, art. VIII, § 2. In its second point of error, the District contends that its summary judgment should have been granted because there is no issue of material fact which established that the Institute should have been exempt from ad valorem taxes. We consider these related points together.

The District contends that because the Institute allowed the church to use the first floor of the building, it failed to meet the statutory criteria of "uses exclusively for biomedical research and education." The District introduced as its summary judgment proof the Institute's admissions that 50% of the property was leased by the church. Cf. City of Austin v. University Christian Church, --- S.W.2d ----, 33 S.Ct.J. 66 (November 26, 1988) (Church leased its parking lot to a commercial parking company for secular use. The supreme court held that the determination of "primary use" of church property was a fact issue and not a question of law).

Section 11.23(h) specifically provides:

(h) Biomedical Research Corporation. A nonprofit corporation as defined in the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act is entitled to an exemption from taxation of the property it owns and uses exclusively for...