Dallas County v. Gonzales
| Decision Date | 23 January 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-04-01015-CV.,05-04-01015-CV. |
| Parties | DALLAS COUNTY and Mike Dupree, Appellants, v. Armando H. GONZALES, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Cynthia Keely Timms, Chrysta L. Castaneda, William Scott Hastings, Locke Liddell & Sapp LLP, Dallas, for Appellant.
Emil Lippe, Jr., Law Offices of Lippe & Associates, Dallas, for Appellee.
Before Justices WHITTINGTON, RICHTER, and FITZGERALD.
We grant Dallas County and Mike Dupree's motion for rehearing. We withdraw the opinion and vacate the judgment of November 1, 2005.
This case involves two different lawsuits by Armando H. Gonzales against Dallas County and, in one of the lawsuits, Mike Dupree. The County filed pleas to the jurisdiction in both cases, which the trial court denied. Dupree moved for summary judgment asserting official immunity, which the trial court also denied. The County brings interlocutory appeals of the denials of the pleas to the jurisdiction. Dupree also appeals the denial of his motion for summary judgment asserting official immunity. We consolidated the appeals. We affirm the denial of one of the pleas to the jurisdiction and reverse the denial of the other; we affirm the denial of the motion for summary judgment in part and reverse in part.
In Texas, sovereign immunity deprives a trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over lawsuits against the State or other governmental units unless the State consents to suit. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex.2004). Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226; Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex.2002). When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we determine if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to hear the cause. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. If a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised. Id. at 227. If the evidence creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue, then the plea to the jurisdiction must be denied. Id. at 227-28. If the evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, then the trial court rules on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law. Id. at 228. This procedure generally mirrors that of a summary judgment under rule of civil procedure 166a(c), and the burden is on the government to meet the summary judgment standard of proof. Id. This standard "protect[s] the plaintiffs from having to `put on their case simply to establish jurisdiction.'" Id. (quoting Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex.2000)).
Under the rule 166a(c) summary judgment standard, the burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment is to conclusively disprove at least one essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action or to conclusively establish every element of an affirmative defense. Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex.1995); Thomas v. Omar Inv., Inc., 156 S.W.3d 681, 683 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.). Conversely, the plaintiff can bar summary judgment by presenting evidence that creates a fact question on those elements of the plaintiff's case under attack by the defendant or on at least one element of each affirmative defense advanced by the defendant. McAnally v. Friends of WCC, Inc., 113 S.W.3d 875, 879 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). Alternatively, the plaintiff can defeat the motion by conceding that the material facts are undisputed, but convincing the court that the defendant's legal position is unsound. Turner v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 18 S.W.3d 877, 886 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000, pet. denied).
The appeals from the two lawsuits involve different facts, issues, and parties. Accordingly, we address them separately. Cause number 01-080774-F involves appellee's allegations concerning his termination and reinstatement in 1997-1998, and cause number 01-02585-F involves appellee's termination in 2000-2001.
The first issue asserts the trial court erred in denying the plea to the jurisdiction in trial court cause number 01-080774-F.
In 1997, appellee was a deputy constable working under Dallas County Precinct 6 Constable Castillo. Appellee alleged Castillo told him to tell bail bondsmen they would receive assistance in apprehending bond jumpers if they made political contributions to Castillo. Appellee alleged, "In other words, Castillo was soliciting bribes for performance of his duties as an elected official." Appellee questioned the legality of this practice, and in September 1997, he reported it to a Dallas County assistant district attorney. On October 3, 1997, appellee testified against Castillo before a grand jury investigating Castillo. Appellee was terminated from his position as a Dallas County deputy constable on December 11, 1997.
Appellee alleged in his petition and asserted in an affidavit that he filed a grievance the next day, December 12, 1997, complaining of his termination for reporting Castillo's unlawful activities, but the grievance was not file-stamped until December 15, 1997. In this grievance form appellee stated the "results sought" were "backpay — No loss in benef[its]."
On December 31, 1997, appellee was sent a letter from the county personnel and civil service department informing him of the date, time, and place of his hearing before the civil service commission. The letter also stated, "Please submit another grievance form and explicitly outline what you are grieving and the relief sought."
On January 20, 1998, appellee filed a "Supplement to Formal Grievance Form" requesting reinstatement "with all rights and benefits previously held and that he be compensated for reasonable attorney's fees and expenses required to appeal said termination."
The civil service commission held a hearing on appellee's grievance on January 26, 1998. Most of the testimony at the hearing concerned a similarly situated deputy constable who had also been terminated by Castillo. As to both deputies, Castillo failed to follow the Dallas County policies for terminating an employee. Castillo agreed to the reinstatement of the other deputy constable and then agreed to appellee's reinstatement with back pay, benefits, and the same service vehicle. Appellee's attorney then inquired of the commissioners about appellee's other damages:
[Appellee's Counsel]: In the context of the Civil Service Commission, how is it addressed as to monetary loss. This man lost his car, had no Christmas for his daughter, hasn't been able to pay his attorney even.
[Commissioner Jackson]: It's not.
[Appellee's Counsel]: He is out all of those things then.
[Commissioner Price]: Right. Yeah, you can do civilly whatever you need to do with reference to the constable if there is some harm that is derived as a result of his action. All I'm saying is as far as this Commission is concerned and the county is concerned, we can only do the back pay, the benefits, full reinstatement.
Appellee returned to work the next day, and on February 3, 1998, the Commissioners Court officially ordered appellee's reinstatement with back pay, no break in service, and all benefits and "structure adjustments."
After being reinstated by the County, appellee filed suit in federal district court against the County, Castillo, and two other individuals alleging various federal causes of action and violation of the Texas Whistleblower Act. In December 1999, the federal court granted the County's motion for summary judgment on all causes of action except the Texas Whistleblower Act. The court denied the motion for summary judgment filed by the individual defendants asserting qualified immunity, and the individual defendants appealed that ruling. On May 4, 2001, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on appellee's federal claims, and it reversed the district court and remanded the case to it. See Gonzales v. Dallas County, Tex., 249 F.3d 406 (5th Cir.2001). The Fifth Circuit issued its mandate on May 31, 2001. On August 14, 2001, the trial court signed an "Agreed Order of Dismissal" dismissing the suit "in its entirety without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to refile his claim under the Texas Whistleblower Act in the appropriate state forum under Texas law." (Citation omitted.)
Appellee then filed his Whistleblower cause of action and his federal causes of action against the County in state district court. The County moved for summary judgment on appellee's federal causes of action based on res judicata and collateral estoppel from the federal litigation. The County also moved for summary judgment on the Whistleblower cause of action. On April 2, 2003, the trial court granted this first motion for summary judgment as to the federal causes of action but denied it as to the Whistleblower cause of action.
On March 9, 2004, the County filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting the County was immune from suit and moved to dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion on July 2, 2004, and the County filed its notice of appeal on July 19, 2004.
Appellee argues we lack jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal because the County should have appealed the April 2, 2003 denial of its first motion for summary judgment on the Whistleblower cause of action. Appellee asserts that the first motion for summary judgment was a plea to the jurisdiction, and the County's failure to timely appeal that order bars its appeal of the July 2, 2004 order. Having reviewed the first motion for...
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