Dallas/Fort Worth Intern. Airport Bd. v. City of Irving
| Decision Date | 31 March 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-92-00559-CV,05-92-00559-CV |
| Parties | DALLAS/FORT WORTH INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT BOARD, A Joint Board of the City of Dallas, Texas, and the City of Fort Worth, Texas; American Airlines, Inc.; Delta Air Lines, Inc.; United Parcel Service Co.; The City of Dallas, Texas; and The City of Fort Worth, Texas, Appellants, v. The CITY OF IRVING, Texas; The City of Euless, Texas; and The City of Grapevine, Texas, Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Eric W. Buether, Richard A. Lempert, Mike McKool, Jr., McKool Smith, P.C., Mike Joplin, David J. LaBree, P. Michael Jung, Strasburger & Price, L.L.P., Dallas, for appellants.
Christopher J. Caso, Robert H. Power, Power & Deatherage, Irving, Perry M. Rosen, Eliot R. Cutler, Cutler & Stanfield, Washington, DC, Bob McFarland, Paul F. Wieneskie, McFarland, Cribbs and Arlington, Clarence Guittard, Guittard, Hyden and Guittard, and Don Rorschach, Irving, for appellees.
Before BAKER, STEPHENS 1 and WHITHAM 2, JJ.
The Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport Board, a joint board of Dallas and Fort Worth, sued Irving, Euless, and Grapevine for requiring the Airport Board to follow the cities' local zoning ordinances. American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, and United Parcel Service Company intervened. Irving, Euless, and Grapevine joined Dallas and Fort Worth as third-party defendants. All parties moved for summary judgment. The plaintiffs and third-party defendants moved the trial court to find that the local ordinances of Irving, Grapevine, and Euless are preempted by federal and state law and that the Airport Board has the power of eminent domain over the defendant cities. The defendants, Irving, Grapevine, and Euless, moved the trial court to find that their local ordinances are not preempted and that the Airport Board has no power of eminent domain over them. The trial court granted summary judgment for Irving, Euless, and Grapevine. In seven points of error, the Airport Board, American, Delta, UPS, Dallas, and Fort Worth contend the trial court erred in granting appellees' summary judgment in part and in denying Plaintiff's, Intervenors', and Third-Party Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment in part. The trial court severed the issues that are before us in this appeal. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
In 1965, Dallas and Fort Worth entered into a Contract and Agreement to construct an international airport to serve the metropolitan area of Dallas/Fort Worth. The Agreement contemplated the creation of a regional airport authority, a special purpose governmental entity separate from each of the cities, that would govern and operate the new airport. In 1966, the Texas Legislature amended the Texas Constitution to provide a mechanism for the creation of regional airport authorities. Following this amendment, the Texas Legislature enacted the North Central Texas Airport Authority. Dallas and Tarrant Counties held a referendum to decide whether to create the new regional airport authority. Dallas County voters rejected the referendum.
Dallas and Fort Worth agreed to construct and operate the proposed airport jointly as a municipal airport. The cities created the Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport Board. The Board has no separate governmental authority. Irving, Euless, and Grapevine agreed to the airport's location within their respective jurisdictions and helped in the planning and construction of the airport. None of the host cities has ever executed any agreement, ordinance, or resolution relinquishing control over any part of their cities to the Airport Board.
In 1971, the Airport Board issued its original Master Plan for the new airport. The Master Plan set up the land uses for the airport through the year 2001. The Airport Board submitted the plan to Irving. The city approved the plan on March 30, 1972. Each of the host cities permitted the airport to expand and construct according to the Master Plan. Airline service began at the airport in January 1974.
In 1988, the Airport Board announced its $3.5 billion redevelopment plan. The improvements the Board proposed include the construction of two new runways, additional taxiways, aircraft holding areas, the extension of existing runways, and the construction of other airport facilities. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) assigned 100 million dollars to the initial phase of the extension plan. On April 7, 1992, the FAA issued a Record of Decision formally approving and authorizing funding for the construction of the new runway on the east side of the airport.
In 1989 and 1990, Irving, Euless, and Grapevine amended their comprehensive zoning ordinances. These amendments are to insure that all structures and land uses that might result in large environmental impacts, including but not limited to airports, are consistent with each city's comprehensive zoning plan. Each of these ordinances requires the Airport Board to submit a site plan, along with information about the environmental impacts of the plan, to get the required special or governmental use permits. The Airport Board promptly sued the host cities to avoid following the ordinances.
D/FW Airport is now the primary airport of the North Texas region. In passengers accommodated, it is also the second busiest airport in the nation.
In the trial court, the Airport Board, American, Delta, UPS, Dallas, and Fort Worth filed a joint motion for summary judgment asserting:
1. The zoning ordinances are preempted by and are in violation of the Texas Municipal Airports Act insofar as they relate to the airport;
2. The zoning ordinances are preempted by and are in violation of federal law insofar as they relate to the airport;
3. Neither the Airport Board nor its constituent cities is impermissibly annexing any property in Irving, Euless, or Grapevine 4. The Airport Board through its constituent cities is authorized to exercise eminent domain power to acquire roads and streets within Irving, Euless, and Grapevine; and
5. The Municipal Airports Act is constitutional.
Irving, Euless, and Grapevine also moved for summary judgment. The cities asserted home rule sovereignty and that the Airport Board is not a separate governing body. They also asserted that the Municipal Airports Act is unconstitutional.
The trial court granted appellants' motions for summary judgment only on ground three above. The trial court granted the host cities' motions except that it denied summary judgment on the annexation of property. The trial court did not reach the question of constitutionality. The Airport Board, American, Delta, UPS, Dallas, and Fort Worth bring seven points of error on appeal contending both federal and state law preempt the local ordinances and complaining the Airport Board has the right of eminent domain over the host cities.
In their first and second points of error, appellants state the trial court erred in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment and not granting appellants'. These points are sufficient to permit appellants to raise every available legal attack on the summary judgment the trial court rendered. See Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex.1970). "Where both parties file motions for summary judgment, and one is granted and one is denied, the denial may be considered by the reviewing court if the appealing party complains of both the granting of the opponent's motion and the denial of its own motion." Utica Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 812 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1991, writ denied). This Court will consider all evidence accompanying the motions in determining whether the trial court should have granted either side's motions. Vest v. Gulf Ins. Co., 809 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1991, writ denied).
A. Standard of Review
Because this is a summary judgment case, we apply the following standards:
1. The movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2. In deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, we must take evidence favorable to the nonmovant as true.
3. We indulge every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant and resolve any doubts in its favor.
See Nixon v. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985).
The summary judgment rule does not provide for a trial by deposition or affidavit. The rule provides a method for summarily ending a case that involves only a question of law and no genuine material fact issue. See Gaines v. Hamman, 163 Tex. 618, 358 S.W.2d 557, 563 (1962). The trial court's duty is to determine if there are any material fact issues to try, not to weigh the evidence or determine its credibility and try the case on affidavits. Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 252 S.W.2d 929, 931 (1952). The purpose of the summary judgment rule is to eliminate patently unmeritorious claims or untenable defenses. The rule is not intended to deprive the litigants of their right to a full hearing on the merits of any real issue of material fact. See Gulbenkian, 151 Tex. at 416, 252 S.W.2d at 931.
A movant must show its entitlement to summary judgment on the issues expressly presented to the trial court by conclusively proving all essential elements of its cause of action or defense as a matter of law. See Swilley v. Hughes, 488 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex.1972). The trial court may not grant summary judgment by default against the nonmovant for failing to respond to the motion when the movant's summary judgment proof is legally insufficient. See City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex.1979).
To show its right to a summary judgment, a defendant must either disprove an essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action as a matter of law or establish all...
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