Dallas Fuel Co. v. Horne
| Decision Date | 21 October 1941 |
| Docket Number | 45670. |
| Citation | 300 N.W. 303,230 Iowa 1148 |
| Parties | DALLAS FUEL CO. v. HORNE et al. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Dallas County; Norman R. Hays, Judge.
Appeal from decision of district court reversing a ruling of Iowa Employment Security Commission allowing payment of unemployment benefits. The district court, also, enjoined the commission from making payments.
Affirmed.
Henry E. Sampson, F. H. Mackaman, and Havner, Flick & Powers, all of Des Moines, for plaintiff-appellee.
J Rudolph Hansen and Haemer Wheatcraft, both of Des Moines, for claimants-defendants-appellants.
J Charles Crawley, Homer M. Lyon, and George Finch, all of Des Moines, for commission-defendant-appellant.
The claimants for unemployment compensation involved in this appeal, upon submission of their claim to the Iowa Employment Security Commission, were awarded unemployment benefits. An appeal was taken to the District Court of Dallas County Iowa, for a review of the decision of the commission. Upon submission of this cause the district court reversed the commission upon the record and held that the claimants were disqualified to receive the benefits sought because their unemployment was due to a labor dispute in which they were involved. The district court also enjoined the commission from making payments to the claimants.
The individuals involved in this appeal were, prior to the time for which they claim unemployment benefits, employed by the Dallas Fuel Company. They were all members of the United Mine Workers of America and were under the particular jurisdiction of District No. 13 (Iowa), of that organization. During the spring of 1937, District No. 13 (Iowa), United Mine Workers of America, through its officers entered into a contract with the Iowa Coal Operator's Association, which contract made provision for the wage scale, working conditions, and hours under which coal would be produced in mines owned by companies that belonged to the Iowa Coal Operator's Association for the two year period beginning with April 1, 1937, and ending on March 31, 1939. Contracts of a similar nature between these two groups had been entered into for two year periods for a number of years. These contracts, and their terms as to working conditions, wages, and hours, were substantially the same as the agreements which were negotiated biannually in the Appalachian coal fields, where a large proportion of the coal of the United States is mined. In years past no agreement had been negotiated between the miner's organization, representing the miners of District No. 13, and the Iowa Coal Operator's Association until the basic Appalachian agreement had been concluded. During a part of March, 1939, and for a month or more thereafter, negotiations were carried on in New York City for the purpose of concluding an Appalachian agreement. At these conferences representatives of District No. 13 were present. Representatives of the Iowa Coal Operator's Association have participated in these negotiations in the past, but the record does not disclose that there was a representative of the Iowa Coal Operator's Association present during the 1939 deliberation.
On March 27, 1939, District No. 13 of the United Mine Workers of America and the Iowa Coal Operator's Association, through their respective officials, entered into a work pending agreement which provided that the mines should continue to be operated after April 1, 1939, under the scale of wages and working conditions incorporated in their agreement for the period of 1937-1939, pending the conclusion of the Appalachian Joint Basic Contract, then being negotiated. It was agreed that this work pending agreement could be cancelled on fifteen (15) days notice from either party to the agreement. Similar agreements had been entered into in other parts of the country between the various union district organizations and operators. These work pending agreements were made with the approval of the national officials and the negotiating committees of the miners' union.
On April 19, 1939, John L. Lewis, President of the United Mine Workers of America, sent a communication from New York City, where negotiations were in progress regarding the Appalachian agreement, to the President of District No. 13 of the United Mine Workers of America, which as shown by the record, was in part as follows:
Pursuant to the above communication the President of District No. 13 gave notice to the President of the Iowa Coal Operator's Association that the work pending agreement would be cancelled in fifteen days. No employees of the Dallas Fuel Company reported for work on May 4, 1939, although on May 3, 1939, as shown by the record, the employees were directed by notice on the blackboard maintained at the mine, to " report tomorrow."
The record further shows that the negotiations in regard to the Appalachian Joint Basic Contract started March 14, 1939, and continued until May 11, 1939 when an agreement was reached. Thereafter the representatives of District No. 13 of the United Mine Workers of America and of the Iowa Coal Operator's Association concluded negotiations as to the conditions and terms under which miners would be employed in District No. 13 for the biannual period. The claimants, who had worked in the Dallas Fuel Company mine, filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits covering the period that they were not employed, and upon hearing, the commission's deputy allowed their claims. Upon appeal by the Dallas Fuel Company, the Iowa Employment Security Commission ordered the matter of the appeal to be referred to it for immediate consideration. Upon a final hearing the findings and holdings of the deputy were affirmed by a two to one vote of the commission. There was a majority opinion and decision filed and a minority opinion was also filed by one of the commissioners. As previously stated the Dallas Fuel Company thereafter applied for and secured a temporary injunction in the District Court of Dallas County, Iowa, enjoining the payment of unemployment benefits to the claimants, and upon the submission of the entire issue the district court reversed the commission and found that the claimants were disqualified to receive benefits because their unemployment was due to a stoppage of work caused, as held by that court, by a " labor dispute." The temporary injunction as to the payment of unemployment benefits was made permanent. The claimants have appealed to this court.
The manner in which rulings of the Iowa Employment Security Commission might be reviewed by a court at the time the present claim arose is noted in the Laws of the 47th General Assembly, chapter 102, section 6(h), (i), and (j). In section 6(i), supra, there is found the following statement: " In the absence of fraud the findings of fact made by the commission within its powers shall be conclusive." Section 6(j), which relates to appeals, is as follows:
" Any order or decision of the commission may be modified, reversed, or set aside on one or more of the following grounds and on no other: * * *
3. If the facts found by the commission do not support the order or decree.
4. If there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the order or decision."
We have heretofore held that under the statute above noted each individual case under the unemployment compensation statute must be considered and construed upon the facts as presented and that the court has jurisdiction to rule upon the matters involved, " if the facts found by the commission do not support the order or decree" or " if there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the order or decision." Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 230 Iowa 124, 130, 131, 296 N.W. 791, 795; Woods Brothers Construction Company v. Iowa Unemployment Compensation Commission, 229 Iowa 1171, 1180, 296 N.W. 345.
The particular portion of the statute which necessitates our further consideration is section 5 and 5(d) of chapter 102 of the Laws of the 47th General Assembly which is in part as follows:
The commission found that there was not a labor dispute between the plaintiff and the claimants at the time of the termination of the work pending agreement. The district court held there was not sufficient competent evidence to warrant the making of the order and decision of the commission. It is our conclusion that the court was correct in its ruling.
Under the National Labor Relation Act, Title 29, § 152(9), U.S C.A., the term " labor dispute" is defined as follows: " The term ‘ labor dispute’ includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of...
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