Dallas I.S.D. v. Finlna

Citation27 S.W.3d 220
Decision Date28 August 2000
Docket NumberNo. 05-97-00734-CV,05-97-00734-CV
Parties(Tex.App.-Dallas 2000) DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, SANDY KRESS, CHAD WOOLERY, HOLLIS BRASHEAR, WILLIAM KEEVER, LYNDA M C DOW, KATHLEEN LEOS, DAN PEAVY, YVONNE EWELL, JOSE PLATA, LARRY FRIEDMAN, ALAN RICH, DAVID REESE, FRIEDMAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C., DENNIS EICHELBAUM, and SCHWARTZ & EICHELBAUM, P.C., Appellants/Cross-Appellees v. RICHARD E. FINLAN, ED GRANT, and RONALD HINDS, Appellees/Cross-Appellants v. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, ALAN RICH, and FRIEDMAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. Appellees
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

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[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Whittington and Stewart1

OPINION ON REHEARING

Opinion By Annette Stewart, Justice (Retired)

We partially grant Richard E. Finlan's and Ed Grant's motions for rehearing, which were filed on June 9, 2000. We withdraw our prior opinion and vacate our prior judgment, both dated May 25, 2000. The following is now the opinion of the Court.

This appeal arises from a suit for damages brought by the Dallas Independent School District (DISD), alleging civil conspiracy against four defendants: Richard Finlan, Don Venable, Ronald Hinds, and Ed Grant. Finlan filed a counterclaim, alleging in two separate counts that his civil rights had been violated by DISD, DISD officials, and DISD attorneys; that he was entitled to a writ of mandamus to view the backup documents to campaign finance reports certain named DISD trustees filed pursuant to the Texas Election Code; and that he had been defamed by some of the DISD attorneys. Hinds also filed a claim alleging that some of the DISD attorneys defamed him as well and conspired to defame him. All of the parties except Venable moved for summary judgment.

The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing DISD's civil conspiracy claims, granted Finlan's summary judgment motion seeking the campaign finance report backup documents, granted DISD's, DISD officials' and DISD attorneys' summary judgment motions against Finlan's civil rights claims, and granted DISD attorneys' motion for summary judgment against both Finlan's and Hinds' defamation claims. The trial court did not supply the ground or grounds relied on for any of its rulings.

We affirm in part, reverse and render in part, and reverse and remand in part. In our analysis, we use the following terms to refer to the various parties:

DISD Dallas Independent School District;

DISD Trustees All DISD trustees involved in this case as Appellants/Cross-Appellees because of their affiliation with DISD as former or current DISD trustees (Sandy Kress, Hollis Brashear, William Keever, Lynda McDow, Kathleen Leos, Dan Peavy, Yvonne Ewell, and Jose Plata); Friedman & Associates. All parties affiliated with Friedman & Associates (Friedman & Associates, P.C., Larry Friedman, Alan Rich, and David Reese);

DISD Attorneys All attorneys or law firms that are parties to this action on the basis of their current or former representation of DISD Parties (Friedman & Associates, P.C., Larry Friedman, Alan Rich, David Reese, Schwartz & Eichelbaum, P.C., and Dennis Eichelbaum);

DISD Parties All parties affiliated with the DISD (DISD, DISD Trustees, Superintendent Chad Woolery, and DISD attorneys).

STANDARD OF REVIEW ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The standards for reviewing summary judgment are well settled. See Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co. , 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985). The standards are:

1. The movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2. In deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non- movant will be taken as true.

3. Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and any doubts resolved in its favor.

Id. The provisions of rule 166a, the summary judgment rule, apply to both defendants and plaintiffs who move for summary judgment. Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex. 1970). A defendant who conclusively negates at least one essential element of each theory pleaded by the plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment. Wornick Co. v. Casas , 856 S.W.2d 732, 733 (Tex. 1993); International Union United Auto. Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of America Local 119 v. Johnson Controls, Inc. , 813 S.W.2d 558, 563 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied). A defendant can also prevail by pleading and conclusively establishing every element of an affirmative defense. Swilley v. Hughes , 488 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex. 1972); Johnson Controls , 813 S.W.2d at 563; Deer Creek Ltd. v. North Am. Mortgage Co. , 792 S.W.2d 198, 200 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).

When the plaintiff and defendant both move for summary judgment, each party bears the burden of establishing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Guynes v. Galveston County, 861 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Tex. 1993); American States Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Arnold, 930 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, writ denied). When both sides file motions for summary judgment and one is granted and one is denied, we review all questions presented. Jones v. Strauss, 745 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Tex. 1988); Nationwide Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. McFarland, 887 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied).

When the trial court's order granting summary judgment does not specify the ground or grounds relied on for its ruling, we affirm the judgment if any theory advanced has merit. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S., 858 S.W.2d 374, 380 (Tex. 1993); Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989). To prevail, the appellant must show each of the independent arguments alleged in the motion is insufficient to support summary judgment. Holloway v. Starnes, 840 S.W.2d 14, 18 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Security Ins. Co., 790 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ).

DISD'S and DISD TRUSTEES' POINTS OF ERROR

The DISD Trustees contend the trial court erred by granting a common law writ of mandamus ordering certain DISD trustees to provide Finlan with backup documents to their campaign finance reports. DISD contends the trial court erred by (1) dismissing with prejudice DISD's conspiracy claims against Hinds, Finlan, and Grant; (2) considering the summary judgment evidence tendered by Hinds, Finlan, and Grant on DISD's conspiracy claims; and (3) prohibiting necessary discovery before granting summary judgment. DISD's and the DISD Trustees' first point of error generally asserts the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. No specific error is stated. Accordingly, we address each specific point of error below.

1. Backup Financial Records For DISD Trustees (DISD Trustees' Points of Error Nos. 2 - 5)

In their second point of error, the DISD Trustees contend they need not produce the record of the information upon which their campaign finance reports are based because these backup documents are not "election records" under the Texas Election Code. In their third point, they contend a common law writ of mandamus is not available to obtain these backup documents. In their fourth point, they assert Finlan did not meet the legal requirements to obtain a common law writ of mandamus. In their fifth point, they argue judgment should be rendered in their favor. For the reasons set forth below, we hold backup documents to campaign finance reports are not "election records" subject to disclosure, and we render judgment for the DISD Trustees on this issue.

a. Background

The DISD Trustees, as officeholders, must maintain a record comprised of backup information for the campaign finance reports which they are required to file pursuant to the Texas Election Code. 2 After DISD filed this suit, Finlan added the trustees to the case and filed an action against them for a "common law writ of mandamus," seeking to force the disclosure, to Finlan, of these backup documents. Finlan filed a motion for summary judgment seeking such disclosure, arguing that the backup documents constituted "election records" as that term is used under the public information provision of the code.

b. Applicable Law

i. Mandamus Standard of Review

A common law mandamus action has three requisites: a legal duty to perform a nondiscretionary act, a demand for performance, and a refusal. Stoner v. Massey, 586 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. 1979) (orig. proceeding); Dallas County Appraisal Dist. v. Funds Recovery, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 465, 467 n.5 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, orig. proceeding [leave denied]); Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Gilbreath, 842 S.W.2d 408, 413 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, orig. proceeding). A mandamus will issue only to correct a clear abuse of discretion for which there is no adequate remedy by appeal. See National Med. Enters., Inc. v. Godbey, 924 S.W.2d 123, 128 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). A trial court clearly abuses its discretion if "it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law." Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839 (quoting Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding)). "Atrial court has no 'discretion' in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts." Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840. The trial court abuses its discretion when it does not analyze or apply the law correctly. Id. We defer to the district court's resolution of fact issues, unless it is clear from the record that only one decision could have been reached. GTE Communications Sys. Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725, 729 (Tex. 1993) ...

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