Dallas v. Haley, CIV.A.02-T-777-N.
| Decision Date | 15 October 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A.02-T-777-N.,CIV.A.02-T-777-N. |
| Citation | 228 F.Supp.2d 1317 |
| Parties | Donald DALLAS, Petitioner, v. Michael HALEY, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Christine A. Freeman, LaJuana S. Davis, Federal Defender Middle District of Alabama, Montgomery, AL, for Petitioner.
Beth Jackson Hughes, Henry Mitchell Hughes, Henry Mitchell Johnson, Office of Atty. General Alabama State House, Montgomery, AL, for Respondents.
ORDER STAYING EXECUTION OF DEATH-ROW INMATE
Petitioner Donald Dallas has been convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. On July 9, 2002, he filed a first petition for writ of habeas corpus. The respondents to Dallas's petition are the Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, the Attorney General of Alabama, and a prison warden.
Dallas is scheduled to be executed by lethal injection at 6:00 p.m. on Thursday, October 17, 2002. On Wednesday, October 9, after having been denied an execution stay by the Alabama Supreme Court a few days earlier, Dallas filed in this court a motion for stay of execution pending resolution of his earlier filed first federal habeas petition. The court held a hearing with counsel for all parties on October 10, 2002, limited to consideration of Dallas's motion for a stay of execution and respondents' earlier filed motion to dismiss. Upon as much consideration of Dallas's and respondents' submissions in the record as is possible within the very short time allowed, as well as the arguments offered at the October 10 hearing, the court determines that a stay of execution must be granted because the court has insufficient time to consider adequately Dallas's habeas-corpus petition on the merits.
The court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2251 (); see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 1651(a) (writs); Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. Section 2251, entitled "Stay of State court proceedings," provides that, "A justice or judge of the United States before whom a habeas corpus proceeding is pending, may, before final judgment or after final judgment of discharge, or pending appeal, stay any proceeding against the person detained in any State court or by or under the authority of any State for any matter involved in the habeas corpus proceeding."
On October 19, 1995, Dallas was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama, of the murder of Hazel Liveoak during the commission of a kidnaping and robbery, in violation of 1975 Ala.Code § 13A-5-40(a)(1) and (a)(2).1 Dallas pleaded not guilty to the charges and did not testify at trial. On November 16, after an 11-1 jury recommendation that he receive the death penalty, the state court adopted the jury's recommendation and sentenced Dallas to death.
Dallas's conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, Dallas v. State, 711 So.2d 1101 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), and the Alabama Supreme Court, Ex Parte Dallas, 711 So.2d 1114 (Ala.1998), and his petition for writ of certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court. Dallas v. Alabama, 525 U.S. 860, 119 S.Ct. 145, 142 L.Ed.2d 118 (1998).
After the Supreme Court denied Dallas's petition, Dallas was left without counsel. On September 23, 1999 (after 352 days had run on the federal-limitations period for filing a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)), Dallas filed a pro se petition in state court, pursuant to Rule 32 of the Alabama rules of Criminal Procedure, seeking state-collateral review of his conviction. After several requests, the trial court appointed counsel for Dallas. On June 21, 2001, the state-trial court held an evidentiary hearing into Dallas's claims, and, on September 25, denied Dallas's Rule 32 petition.
Thirty days later, on October 25, 2001, Dallas filed a motion in the trial court to alter, vacate, or amend judgment. Dallas's motion was denied on October 29. A month after this denial, on November 28, Dallas filed a notice of appeal with the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. On December 3, the State filed a motion with the appeals court, asking that it dismiss Dallas's appeal on the ground that it was untimely. On December 7, the State's motion was granted, and Dallas's appeal was dismissed.
On February 12, 2002, still seeking state-collateral review, Dallas returned to the state-trial court and filed a "motion to have court find that the time for filing notice of appeal was tolled by motion to alter, vacate, and amend judgment." The trial court granted Dallas's motion that same day. On February 15, Dallas filed a second notice of appeal in the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. The State again moved to dismiss that appeal, and the appeals court ordered Dallas's second notice of appeal stricken because his first appeal had been untimely.
On March 13, 2002, Dallas petitioned for a writ of certiorari in the Alabama Supreme Court, and, on June 28, that petition was dismissed.
Ten days later, on July 9, 2002, Dallas filed his first federal petition for writ of habeas corpus with this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244.
On July 17, 2002, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss Dallas's petition as untimely filed. The motion was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration and recommendation. Throughout August and September, the dismissal motion was briefed and, at the request of the magistrate judge, was re-briefed on new issues.
On September 9, 2002, while his first federal habeas petition had been pending for only two months, the Alabama Supreme Court set Dallas's execution for October 17, 2002.
On October 3, 2002, the Alabama Supreme Court denied a motion by Dallas to stay his execution.
On October 8, 2002, the magistrate judge entered a recommendation that the respondents' dismissal motion be denied, with the result that, if the recommendation is adopted by the court, Dallas's federal habeas petition will proceed in this court.
On October 9, 2002, Dallas filed the currently pending motion for this court to stay his execution.
In Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 116 S.Ct. 1293, 134 L.Ed.2d 440 (1996), the Supreme Court set forth the guiding principle in this case: "If the district court cannot dismiss the petition on the merits before the scheduled execution, it is obligated to address the merits and must issue a stay to prevent the case from becoming moot." 517 U.S. at 320, 116 S.Ct. at 1297, 116 S.Ct. 1293. "That is, if the district court lacks authority to directly dispose of the petition on the merits, it would abuse its discretion by attempting to achieve the same result indirectly by denying a stay." Id.; see also Arthur v. Haley, 248 F.3d 1302, 1302-03 (11th Cir.2001) (); Hauser ex rel. Crawford v. Moore, 223 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir.2000) (same); Dobbert v. Strickland, 670 F.2d 938, 940 (11th Cir.1982) (granting stay); Barbour v. Haley, 145 F.Supp.2d 1280 (M.D.Ala.2001) (Thompson, J.) (same).
Under Lonchar, a district court considering a motion for a stay of execution must first ask itself whether it is in a position to dismiss the petitioner's habeas petition on the merits. 517 U.S. at 319-20, 116 S.Ct. at 1296-97. If the court finds itself incapable of an honest disposition of the petition on the merits, or if it cannot decide whether it should dismiss the petition, the court must grant a stay because the effect of a denial of a stay is the equivalent of a denial of the merits of a habeas petition. Id.
Therefore, in order to refuse to grant a stay of execution, this court must be convinced that it can fairly and thoroughly consider and dismiss the petition on its merits. That is not to say that this court may not dismiss the petition and allow the execution to proceed if all of the claims in the petition are patently frivolous or meritless. See Barbour, 145 F.Supp.2d at 1286. However, if even one claim could possibly hold promise, the district court is obligated to impose a stay of execution if it does not have adequate time to dispose of that claim on its merits. Id.
As a preliminary matter, the respondents have filed a motion to dismiss Dallas's habeas petition on the grounds that it is untimely. The parties have briefed and re-briefed this issue, resulting in a recommendation from the magistrate judge that respondents' motion to dismiss be denied. The respondents filed their objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation on October 10, 2002, and, on October 11, Dallas filed a response to their objections.
Without needlessly getting bogged down in the details, suffice it to say that the issue of whether Dallas's habeas petition was timely filed is a very complex question which turns on whether a certain Alabama procedural rule was firmly established and regularly followed. As mentioned above, this issue is complicated enough that the magistrate judge asked the parties to rebrief it. While the magistrate judge had some time to prepare her recommendation on this difficult problem, the court has less than three working days to address the respondents' objections to that recommendation before Dallas's scheduled execution. A resolution of those objections must be resolved before this court can even address Dallas's habeas petition.
The respondents have asked that the court resolve their dismissal motion very quickly. Unfortunately, however, a quick and complete resolution is impossible. Aside from the fact that the court's time has been, and still is, already filled with preparation for a long-scheduled and quite complicated first-amendment establishment-clause case set to begin trial today as well as the need to issue a ruling on a preliminary-injunction...
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Dallas v. Haley.
...District Court DEATH PENALTY Dallas v. Haley, 228 F.Supp.2d 1317 (M.D.Ala 2002). A prisoner convicted of murder and sentenced to death sought a writ of habeas corpus to stay his execution. The district court granted the writ. The court found that the stay of execution was warranted to allow......