Dalrymple v. White
| Decision Date | 21 August 1981 |
| Citation | 402 So.2d 968 |
| Parties | Lem DALRYMPLE v. Albert WHITE, Jr. 80-232. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Robert J. Hooton of Hooton & Hooton, Roanoke, for appellant.
John A. Tinney, Roanoke, for appellee.
This appeal arises out of an action to quiet title to real property. The underlying issue presented is whether the trial court erred in reforming certain deeds which, according to their terms, gave rise to conflicting claims in the same tract of realty. The trial judge, after hearing the case ore tenus, reformed the deeds to reflect what he determined to be the clear intent of all the parties, stating that to hold to the contrary "would unjustly enrich the defendant to the gross detriment of the plaintiff."
Upon reviewing the facts and arguments presented on appeal, we deem the order of the trial court to be appropriate and, therefore, affirm its decision.
Joe Henderson and his wife, Frances, at one time owned all the property to which this action pertains. Included in this property was a brick house which the Hendersons occupied as their primary residence and a small block house which was not occupied as a residence.
On or about November 8, 1978, the Hendersons conveyed one acre of this property to Ricky Joe Kimbrell. Evidence was presented that it was the understanding of the Hendersons and Kimbrell that situated upon this one acre of land was the small block house, which was valued at approximately $2,500.
A short time thereafter, the Hendersons conveyed some twenty acres of land, with the brick house thereon, to the appellee, Albert White, Jr. This house was valued at approximately $35,000.
The tendencies of the evidence were that it was the clear intent and understanding of the Hendersons that they had conveyed the brick house located on this property to the appellee, and the block house to Kimbrell.
Kimbrell went into possession of the small block house and the appellee went into possession of the brick house. At a later date, Kimbrell and his wife mortgaged what was understood by all concerned to be the small block house in order to secure a loan.
On or about September 8, 1979, Kimbrell conveyed what he thought to be the small block house to the appellant, Lem Dalrymple, who came to the block house and inspected it. There was evidence that he was shown the boundaries by Kimbrell and understood what he was purchasing was the small block house. Dalrymple then paid off the existing mortgage on the block house and obtained title to it for some $2,500 consideration.
Some time after Dalrymple obtained title, he learned that, according to the description contained in his deed, the brick house rather than the block house had been conveyed to him. At this point, Dalrymple asserted his claim to the brick house. Appellee White then brought the instant action to quiet title, and sought to have the relevant deeds reformed to vest in him the ownership of the brick house and to vest in Dalrymple ownership of the small block house.
The court, in its final decree, ordered the deed from the Hendersons to White to be reformed to convey the property intended, including the brick house, less and except the small block house and one acre. The court also reformed the deed to Dalrymple to convey the small block house and one acre surrounding it as originally intended between Kimbrell and the Hendersons.
Dalrymple's contention that the trial court's reformation of the deeds was inappropriate is grounded on four basic arguments. His initial argument asserts that White, over his objection, was erroneously allowed to amend his complaint after the trial, and, as a result, he was required to defend certain claims of which he was not afforded sufficient notice. We do not agree.
Rule 15(b) A.R.C.P., states:
Applying this rule, we determine that it was well within the court's discretion to allow the complaint to be amended so that it would conform to the evidence presented at trial. We find nothing in the record or in Dalrymple's brief to convince us that he was unduly prejudiced by the...
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