Dalton v. Clements

• Decision Date: 02 November 2021
• Docket Number: 8:21-cv-00986-JD-JDA
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Robert C. Dalton, Plaintiff, v. James P. Clements, Tanju Karanfil, Clemson University, South Carolina Department of Agriculture, The State of South Carolina, Defendants.

Robert C. Dalton, Plaintiff,
v.
James P. Clements, Tanju Karanfil, Clemson University, South Carolina Department of Agriculture, The State of South Carolina, Defendants.

No. 8:21-cv-00986-JD-JDA

United States District Court, D. South Carolina

November 2, 2021

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Jacquelyn D. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the Court on motions to dismiss filed by Defendants. [Docs. 18; 22; 23.] Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Titles I and II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the “Rehabilitation Act”), and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. [Doc. 14.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.

Plaintiff filed this action on April 2, 2021, and filed an Amended Complaint on July 22, 2021. [Docs. 1; 14.] On August 5, 2021, Defendants Clemson University (“Clemson”), James P. Clements, and Tanju Karanfil (collectively, the “Clemson Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. [Doc. 18.] The next day, the Court issued an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the summary judgment/dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion. [Doc. 20.] Defendants The State of South Carolina (“the State”) and South Carolina Department of Agriculture (“the Department”) filed motions

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to dismiss on August 6, 2021. [Docs. 22; 23.] On August 9, 2021, the Court issued a second Roseboro Order. [Doc. 26.] The Clerk has filed a response from Plaintiff opposing these three motions to dismiss as well as a supplement, second supplement, and third supplement to the response [Docs. 36; 39; 42; 43], and the State and the Department have filed a reply [Doc. 38]. The three motions are all now ripe for review

BACKGROUND^[1]

Plaintiff is disabled as a result of a traumatic brain injury. [Doc. 14 at 5 ¶ 14, 20 ¶¶ 44-45.] He is the sole representative, member, and stockowner, as well as the managing partner of ESTEC Technology Works, LLC (“ESTEC”). [Id.] In the present lawsuit, Plaintiff alleges that Clemson wrongfully denied his request to form a research partnership in connection with his application for a permit to grow hemp in South Carolina (“a permit”) pursuant to South Carolina's Industrial Hemp Pilot Program (“IHPP”). [Docs. 14; 14-1.] Under the IHPP, which began in 2017, public institutions of higher learning “may conduct research or pilot programs [regarding hemp] as an agricultural commodity and may work with growers located in South Carolina.” S.C. Code Ann. § 46-55-20(2) (2017). “Once the institution of higher education engages in research in industrial hemp, the institution shall work in conjunction with the [Department] to identify solutions for applications, applicants, and new market opportunities for industrial hemp growers.” Id. Under the IHPP, the Department would grant up to 20 permits in the first year and up to 40 for the second and third years. Id. § 46-55-20(3). The permits allowed the permittee

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to grow industrial hemp on up to 20 acres the first year and up to 40 acres in the second and third years. Id. Permits were limited South Carolina residents. Id.

In 2017, Plaintiff applied for a permit, as an individual and as legal representative for ESTEC. [Doc. 14 at 27-28 ¶¶ 72, 75.] He was not a South Carolina resident at the time. [Doc. 14 at 28 ¶ 79.] To be granted a permit, an applicant was required to participate in research with and work with a qualified South Carolina institution of higher education. [Id. at 28 ¶ 76; see also Doc. 14-1 at 18-27.] Plaintiff alleges that he had sought such a partnership with Clemson and identified faculty who were willing to partner with him. [Doc. 14 at 32-33 ¶¶ 88-89, 92-93, 36 ¶¶ 110-11.] However, on September 5, 2017, Defendant Dr. Tanju Karanfil, Clemson's Vice President for Research, informed Plaintiff that Clemson had decided against partnering with him, leaving his permit application incomplete. [Id. at 33 ¶ 94, 36-37 ¶ 112; Doc. 14-1 at 100.] Plaintiff alleges that Clemson's refusal to partner with him or to take other steps to allow him to participate in the IHPP was “motivated primarily by . . . financial” considerations insofar as Plaintiff's research plan would not have provided much money to the Clemson IHPP and because Plaintiff “was in direct competition with [Clemson and Clemson] research parks for research and commercialization funding of innovations.”^[2] [Doc. 14 at 38 ¶¶ 116-17; see Id. at 29-30 ¶ 83.]

Plaintiff further alleges that Dr. Karanfil and Defendant Clements, who is Clemson's president, did not respond to his requests for an explanation as to why Clemson refused

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to enter into a research partnership with him. [Id. at 6, 33-34 ¶¶ 95, 97, 39 ¶ 121.] He also alleges that the Clemson Defendants did not respond to his “repeated request[s] for his preferred method of effective communication” and did not provide written notice of why they could not do so.^[3] [Id. at 16-17 ¶ 35, 25 ¶¶ 63, 66, 39-40 ¶ 121.]

Plaintiff alleges that he suffered significant financial losses as a result of his inability to obtain a permit. [Id. at 37 ¶ 112.]

In his Amended Complaint, he alleges the following causes of action: violations of Titles I and II of the ADA; violations of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; violations of his rights to due process and equal protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; and conspiracy to deprive civil rights. [Id. at 9-10; 25-26 ¶ 68.]

For his remedies, Plaintiff seeks actual and punitive damages, as well as an injunction requiring that all South Carolina state entities “institute an accessibility policy and training with focus on reasonable accommodations and effective communication for individuals suffering from a traumatic brain injury.” [Id. at 41-42 ¶¶ 123-28.]

APPLICABLE LAW

Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint

Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)

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(per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Even under this less stringent standard, however, a pro se complaint is still subject to summary dismissal. Id. at 520-21. The mandated liberal construction means that only if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the complainant could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the complainant's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court “conjure up questions never squarely presented.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

Requirements for a Cause of Action Under § 1983

This action asserts a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Accordingly, a civil action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).

Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

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rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” and (2) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of this constitutional right under color of [State] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.” Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (third alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The under-color-of-state-law element, which is equivalent to the “state action” requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment,

reflects judicial recognition of the fact that most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments. This fundamental limitation on the scope of constitutional guarantees preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.

Id. (quoting Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual” may at times be treated “as if a State has caused it to be performed.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Specifically, “state action may be found...