Dalton v. Consol. Laundries Corp...

Decision Date11 February 1946
Docket NumberNo. 260,260
Citation45 A.2d 796,134 N.J.L. 27
PartiesDALTON v. CONSOLIDATED LAUNDRIES CORPORATION.
CourtNew Jersey Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Peter M. Dalton, claimant, opposed by the Consolidated Laundries Corporation, employer. A judgment of the Workmen's Compensation Bureau, awarding compensation, was affirmed by the court of common pleas, and the employer brings certiorari.

Writ dismissed.

October term, 1945, before CASE, BODINE and PERSKIE, JJ.

McCarter, English & Egner, of Newark (Verling C. Enteman, of Newark, and Leon R. Ross, of South Orange, of counsel), for prosecutor.

Edwin Jos. O'Brien, of Newark (Thomas J. Brett, of Newark, of counsel), for respondent.

PERSKIE, Justice.

This is a workmen's compensation case. R.S. 34:15-7 et seq., N.J.S.A. It presents for decision the question as to whether the heart injury suffered by the employee was the result of an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment.

In the Bureau, Deputy Commissioner Medinets answered the posed question in the affirmative. He based his answer upon the holding by our Court of Errors and Appeals in the cases of Molnar v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 128 N.J.L. 11, 24 A.2d 392, and Hentz v. Janssen Dairy Corporation, 122 N.J.L. 494, 6 A.2d 409.

On appeal to the Essex County Court of Common Pleas, Judge Flannagan gave the same answer as that which was given in the Bureau and affirmed the judgment of the Bureau in all respects.

On the employer's application for a writ of certiorari, Mr. Justice Parker ordered that the application be made before this court en banc. Counsel at the argument of this cause before us agreed, subject to our approval, that if we concluded to allow the writ that the cause be determined on the record as now submitted. We allow the writ and decide the cause accordingly.

Succinctly stated, prosecutor contends that respondent did not expend any unusual effort or exertion and therefore he suffered no ‘accident’ within the statutory meaning of that term. It makes a sharp distinction between a heart condition which it characterizes as coronary insufficiency and coronary thrombosis. It asserts that respondent suffers from the latter. It concedes that the former may be brought on by exertion or effort because such exertion or effort ‘consumes the reserve supply of blood and makes impossible the proper functioning of the myocardium’; whereas the latter, coronary thrombosis, ‘ensues from a sclerotic condition of the coronary artery and needs no precipitent other than time to cause disability or death.’ Prosecutor argues that it is the failure to have recognized this asserted distinction which led the lower tribunals to their erroneous conclusions just as it assertedly led the Court of Errors and Appeals in erroneously deciding the Molnar and Hentz cases. Respondent, on the other hand, contends that he suffered a compensable accident.

Our independent finding of the facts and determination of the applicable law (Owens v. Bennett Air Service, N.J.L., 45 A.2d 320), discloses that there is no substantial dispute as to the facts save as to those which relate to the opinions of the medical experts for the respective parties and which form the basis for the stated distinction upon which prosecutor disclaims liability.

Our independent findings are as follows:

Respondent, Peter M. Dalton, petitioner below, 48 years of age, had been employed as a route salesman for the past seventeen years, prior to his claimed accident, by the prosecutor here, Consolidated Laundries Corporation, at its Lackawana Division. During that entire period the respondent neither knew of nor gave indication of any heart trouble. Nor is there any proof that he otherwise suffered any serious physical ailment during his entire period of employment.

His work consisted of making deliveries of clean towels and linens to stores, offices and barber shops operated by prosecutor's customers and picking up the soiled linens and of collecting bills from those customers. He was obliged to, and did, load and unload the truck operated and used at the beginning and end of each working day.

On the morning of September 14, 1942, respondent reported for work about 7 a. m. He removed 15 bags of towels from his bin because they did not belong there. He then loaded his truck with supplies for his day's work and drove away to make his usual rounds. He returned to the plant about 5 p. m., and unloaded the soiled linens collected, consisting of about 15 bags, each weighing about 125 pounds, on the Summer Avenue side of the laundry. Each bag was lifted on to a hand truck, about six feet high and three feet wide. This unloading took about 15 minutes. After this he drove the truck to the High Street side of the laundry and unloaded some clean linens which he had in the truck, and promptly commenced to load the truck with linens for the following day's deliveries. The linens were in a hand truck, inside the laundry building, similar to the one in which he had unloaded the soiled linens, and this hand truck and linens weighed about 300 to 350 pounds. He pushed the hand truck about two feet towards the loading platform when he suffered a terrific pain in the center of his chest, the back of his neck became very cold and he had difficulty in breathing, got blue in color and felt ‘as if (he) was going to die.’ He went outside the building to get some air and laid down on the truck. The pain became worse while lying down and he asked the supervisor to help him inside the building. He was assisted and when he got to the third and top step leading into the building, he vomited and became unconscious. He recovered consciousness in the toilet room of the laundry where he found some of his co-workers removing the vomit and effects of an involuntary defecation. A doctor was called who gave him an injection and caused him to be removed to St. Michael's Hospital, where he remained about four weeks. Thereafter he was admitted to the Veterans' Hospital in the Bronx. N. Y., where he remained for five weeks. Upon discharge from the Veterans' Hospital, he was taken home where he has remained ever since. He is unable to work because, as he states, any exertion or excitement brings on pain across his chest, pain under his arms, and he ‘just stiffens up.’

The medical testimony is in dispute. Drs. Block, Kaufman and Olcott testified for the respondent. Dr. Block, a general practitioner, first saw the respondent on November 19, 1942, after he came out of the hospital. Thereafter the doctor saw the respondent eleven times between November 19, 1942 and January 5, 1943, and again saw him on two other occasions, May 19, 1943 and September 28, 1943. The respondent was treated for the ‘clinical appearance of coronary thrombosis' which in the doctor's opinion was ‘due to the work he (respondent) was doing,’ and it was due to the ‘exertion’ of his work.

Dr. Kaufman, a specialist in internal medicine and cardiology, first examined the respondent at his home on December 9, 1942. The doctor made a thorough examination of respondent and took an electrocardiograph. The doctor diagnosed the respondent's ailment as ‘posterior wall infarction as the result of coronary thrombosis.’ Another examination was made on May 20, 1943, another cardiograph was taken and respondent was fluoroscoped. Finding respondent's condition somewhat better as compared with his condition when first examined, the doctor conducted an ...

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4 cases
  • Dwyer v. Ford Motor Co.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • 22 January 1962
    ...See Aromando v. Rubin Bros. Drug Sales Co., 47 N.J.Super. 286, 292, 136 A.2d 11 (App.Div.1957); Dalton v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 134 N.J.L. 27, 45 A.2d 796 (Sup.Ct.1946). It must be remembered that a presumption of fact of the character of the one under discussion is emptied of all p......
  • Aromando v. Rubin Bros. Drug Sales Co., A--482
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • 7 November 1957
    ...Essex, 132 N.J.L. 584, 41 A.2d 890 (Sup.Ct.1945), affirmed 134 N.J.L. 129, 45 A.2d 700 (E. & A.1946); Dalton v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 134 N.J.L. 27, 32, 45 A.2d 796 (Sup.Ct. 1946); Prawatchke v. Sheffield Farms Co. Inc., 134 N.J.L. 92, 46 A.2d 68 (Sup.Ct.1946) (thrombosis); Weisenba......
  • Grassgreen v. Ridgeley Sportswear Mfg. Co.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court
    • 16 March 1949
    ...v. Sheffield Farms Co., Sup.1948, 137 N.J.L. 336, 59 A.2d 811; affirmed Sup.1948, 61 A.2d 502. But note Dalton v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., Sup.1946, 134 N.J.L. 27, 45 A.2d 796, and Tyler v. Atlantic City Sewerage Co., Sup.1948, 137 N.J.L. 16, 57 A.2d 512, in both of which cases there i......
  • Csont v. Brands.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • 19 August 1946
    ...Co-ordinated Transport, 123 N.J.L. 479, 9 A.2d 690; Owens v. Bennett Air Service, 133 N.J.L. 540, 45 A.2d 320; Dalton v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 134 N.J.L. 27, 45 A.2d 796) leads us to the conclusion that the proofs offered for the respondent utterly fail to preponderate the five stat......

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