Dalton v. Meister
| Decision Date | 29 June 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 9,9 |
| Citation | 52 Wis.2d 173,188 N.W.2d 494 |
| Parties | LeRoy L. DALTON, Respondent, v. Howard J. MEISTER, Appellant. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
On November 27, 1967, LeRoy L. Dalton commenced this defamation action against Howard J. Meister, alleging acts of libel and slander. The defense is the statements are true and within the range of fair comment of a public official. The case was tried to a jury which returned a verdict in favor of Dalton, assessing $75,000 compensatory damages and $200,000 punitive damages. The trial court affirmed the compensatory damages but applied the Powers rule 1 and reduced the punitive damages to $75,000. Meister appeals and Dalton seeks a review of the trial court's order reducing the amount of punitive damages.
Norman C. Skogstad, Gerald P. Boyle, Milwaukee, for appellant.
Aberg, Bell, Blake & Metzner, Madison, for respondent.
Meister raises two issues on this appeal: (1) That he was prejudiced by the rulings of the trial court which excluded evidence of the details of a John Doe and a grand jury proceedings; and (2) that the damages awarded by the jury and approved by the trial court are excessive. We think there is no merit in either contention.
Dalton at the time of trial was 45 years of age, had been an attorney since 1953, and was an assistant attorney general. In 1963 he became the head of the newly-created criminal-investigation division of the attorney general's office. He has had experience in John Doe investigations, investigations involving election-law violations, and grand juries in various counties.
At the time of trial Meister was a banker with other interests including real estate, insurance, and various businesses. Testimony at the trial showed his wealth by his own admission was between two and two and one-half million dollars. Meister was charged with criminal bribery and also unlawful lobbying. On May 5, 1967, in La Crosse the criminal charges of bribery were dismissed on the ground the state witness, a Miss Dorothy Effinger, was too sick to testify. These charges were a result of a grandjury investigation conducted in Dane county in which Dalton was involved as assistant attorney general. Meister was later tried in Madison on charges of unlawful lobbying which resulted from a secret John Doe proceeding and was acquitted.
Immediately following the dismissal of the criminal charges of bribery in La Crosse, Meister held a meeting in the courtroom with the members of the news media at which he distributed typewritten copies of a typewritten statement which is the basis of the libel in this case. 2 Meister testified the statement was prepared by him personally the evening before trial in anticipation the bribery charges against him would be dismissed. The statement was widely published by the news media. The evidence also showed Meister attempted through influence and political pressure and the spending of large sums of money to have Dalton removed from his job. Meister had meetings with the news media and complained of Dalton. There is a dispute in the testimony concerning the political pressure Meister exerted on the then attorney general Bronson La Follette to remove Dalton from office. La Follette finally removed Dalton but testified that the removal was not the result of the political influence of Meister,--a statement the jury apparently did not believe. The evidence plainly shows a persistent course of conduct on the part of Meister in his retaliation to 'get Dalton.'
The contention the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the John Doe and the grand jury proceedings has no basis in fact. Meister argues he had a right, in order to prove Dalton used 'Gestapo tactics,' to present the question and answer testimony of various witnesses in John Doe and grand jury proceedings. The restrictions upon the admissibility of evidence occurred in the cross-examination of Dalton's witnesses who had been involved in the various John Doe and grand jury proceedings and who had given their opinion on direct examination concerning the manner in which Dalton had conducted himself generally and had treated the witnesses in particular during the secret proceedings. The ruling of the trial court was to the effect that neither the details nor the merits of the proceedings could be inquired into on cross-examination but the conduct of Dalton about which the witnesses had offered their opinions could be.
We think the trial court was right in so limiting the cross-examination. The proceedings were secret and the exact questions and answers were immaterial on the issue of the manner in which Dalton was conducting the proceedings. A witness knows when he is 'brow beaten' by an interrogator. A judge who presides over grand jury hearings knows when an attorney uses Gestapo tactics. In refusing the so-called offer of proof by Meister's counsel, the court stated, 'The court at no stage of the proceeding refused or intimated that it would refuse the reception of evidence pertaining to the quality or manner of handling witnesses by Mr. Dalton in any proceeding.' The offer of proof did not meet this standard.
Meister now asserts the trial court should have reviewed the records of the secret proceedings in camera to determine whether in fact they had any bearing on the issues, but no such request was made to the trial court. The record does disclose that prior to trial Meister attempted to gain access to the files of the attorney general which request was denied by Circuit Judge M. Eugene Baker of the First Judicial Circuit after an in camera review. Judge Baker ordered the secrecy of the proceedings be maintained and Judge Parnell's rulings at trial were consistent.
Meister contends the award of $75,000 in compensatory damages is so excessive and unsupported in the record as to be the result of passion and prejudice. We think not.
In libel actions a successful plaintiff may receive several kinds of damages. Proof of damage in libel as distinguished from some types of slander is not essential to the cause of action. Martin v. Outboard Marine Corp. (1962), 15 Wis.2d 452, 461, 113 N.W.2d 135. In Martin, after discussing the history of defamation, we adopted the common-law rule of libel as stated in Restatement, 3 Torts, Defamation, p. 165, sec. 569. In libel and slander per se the law presumes harm which normally results from the defamation. In many cases the harm wrought by defamation is so subtle and indirect it is difficult of monetary proof. Restatement, 3 Torts, Measure of Damages in Actions for Defamation, p. 314, sec. 621. See Williams v. Hicks Printing Co. (1914), 159 Wis. 90, 100, 150 N.W. 183. But in this case Dalton has proved actual and specific damages resulting from the libel and he is entitled to recover for them. Restatement, 3 Torts, p. 316, sec. 622, also p. 185, sec. 575, and pp. 318, 319, sec. 623. Since the libel by Meister was found by the jury to be activated by express malice, Dalton is also entitled to recover punitive damages. See Malco, Inc. v. Midwest Aluminum Sales (1961), 14 Wis.2d 57, 63, 109 N.W.2d 516.
While Meister claims Dalton suffered no damages to his reputation or in any other way, this argument finds little support in the law or in the record of this case. We think the evidence of specific and special harms sustains the verdict for $75,000 compensatory damages and agree with the trial court when it stated, 'The jury was fully justified in drawing the reasonable inferences that defendant's persuasive and pervasive course of conduct in maliciously issuing false, defamatory and non-privileged liberlous and slanderous statements concerning the plaintiff caused his transfer from high position, the disfavor of the Attorney General, the loss of his reputation as a criminal investigator, the abuse of his character as a lawyer, public contempt, ridicule, disgrace and humiliation as a prominent citizen and as a qualified and accepted lawyer and his consequential and continuing mental suffering and anxiety.' It is true some of these elements may also be considered in assessing general compensatory damages, others constitute only specific harm. 50 Am.Jur.2d, Libel and Slander, p. 881, sec. 356, et seq.
Meister also challenges the amount of punitive damages awarded Dalton was the result of prejudice and passion. The trial court, however, found no prejudice or passion and pursuant to the Powers rule, first applied to punitive damages in Malco Inc. v. Midwest Aluminum Sales, supra, reduced the award of punitive damages as being excessive from $200,000 to $75,000. Dalton exercised the option to accept the reduced award, remitting the excess, and avoided a new trial. He now seeks under sec. 274.12, Stats., a review of the reduction, which he can do under Plesko v. Milwaukee (1963), 19 Wis.2d 210, 220, 120 N.W.2d 130, without waiving the benefits of his acceptance.
The purpose of punitive damages is stated in Malco, 14 Wis.2d at p. 66, 109 N.W.2d at p. 521: See also Gladfelter v. Doemel (1958), 2 Wis.2d 635, 647, 87 N.W.2d 490; Kink v. Combs (1965), 28 Wis.2d 65, 79, 135 N.W.2d 789. The trial court in reducing the punitive damage considered $75,000 would represent a reasonable amount in light of this test and 'the relentless pursuant of defendant's malevolent designs almost to the eve of trial.' Since the trial court considered the wealth of Meister to be...
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