Daly v. DelPonte
| Decision Date | 04 May 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 14552,14552 |
| Citation | 624 A.2d 876,225 Conn. 499 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 3 NDLR P 374 Edward DALY v. Lawrence F. DelPONTE, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. |
Lawrence W. Berliner, with whom was Catherine E. Cushman, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).
Cornelius F. Tuohy, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, Atty. Gen., for appellee (defendant).
Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BERDON, NORCOTT and KATZ, JJ.
This appeal requires us to determine whether the commissioner of motor vehicles may direct a licensed motor vehicle operator, because of a disability, to submit regular medical reports as a condition of continuing to hold an operator's license. The plaintiff, Edward Daly, who suffers from a seizure disorder, challenges the decision of the defendant, Lawrence DelPonte, commissioner of motor vehicles (commissioner), to condition his holding an operator's license on his compliance with reporting requirements regarding his medical status. Both the Superior Court and the Appellate Court upheld the commissioner's initial suspension of the plaintiff's license and the later imposition of postreinstatement medical reporting requirements. 1 See Daly v. DelPonte, 27 Conn.App. 495, 608 A.2d 93 (1992). We granted the plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal from the Appellate Court 2 and now reverse.
The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. The plaintiff possesses a Connecticut motor vehicle operator's license, which he has held continuously since its first issuance in 1978. Until the action by the commissioner to suspend the plaintiff's license, the plaintiff had no record of any adverse administrative action regarding his license. Furthermore, the plaintiff has never been involved in any reported motor vehicle accident or other incident resulting either from his seizure episodes or otherwise.
In July, 1986, the plaintiff suffered a seizure, which resulted in altered consciousness. 3 Shortly thereafter, beginning in October, 1986, the plaintiff began treatment and supervised care under the direction of a neurologist. The plaintiff informed the neurologist of the July, 1986 seizure and also that he had had several seizure episodes during the previous two years. The neurologist prescribed the medication Tegretol to control the seizures. 4 Since 1986 the plaintiff has reported regularly to the neurologist and has complied with the prescribed medication regimen to attempt to control the seizure disorder.
Despite these preventive measures, in July, 1987, the plaintiff suffered another seizure. The commissioner, who is the plaintiff's employer, thereafter required the plaintiff to submit periodic medical reports from his neurologist regarding his condition. 5 In the first report, submitted in August, 1987, the neurologist indicated that the plaintiff was taking Tegretol and that his blood level testing was within the proper therapeutic range. A second report in January, 1989, again indicated that the plaintiff's blood level was within the proper therapeutic range and that he continued to comply with the prescribed medication regimen. Neither the August, 1987 nor the January, 1989 report indicated any seizure activity subsequent to the July, 1987 episode. The commissioner took no action regarding the plaintiff's status as a holder of a motor vehicle operator's license until March, 1989, when he formally placed the plaintiff on medical probation.
The plaintiff had been free of any medical difficulties for nearly two years, until May, 1989, when he suffered his most recent seizure. A subsequent report prepared by the neurologist again found that the plaintiff's blood level tests and medication compliance were proper. The neurologist issued an additional statement expressly concluding that the plaintiff was capable of regular full-time work, including required driving.
The commissioner had thus received reports of three seizure episodes of the plaintiff covering a period of thirty-three months. Concerned about the ability of the plaintiff safely to operate a motor vehicle, the commissioner forwarded the three neurological reports to the department of motor vehicles medical advisory board 6 (board) and requested the board to review the plaintiff's record. To enable the board to collect additional information regarding the plaintiff's medical status, the board recommended that the plaintiff's license be temporarily suspended. In particular, the board sought to confer with the plaintiff's neurologist in order to obtain a more detailed assessment of the plaintiff's condition. Acting on this recommendation, the commissioner suspended the plaintiff's license, effective August, 1989. The notice of suspension indicated that, pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-111(a), the commissioner was suspending the plaintiff's license because the plaintiff's "continued operation of a motor vehicle would be dangerous to [the plaintiff] and others." 7
The plaintiff requested an administrative hearing to contest the suspension. The hearing was held on three separate dates during the fall of 1989 and dealt with the plaintiff's challenge to the suspension then in effect. Both parties focused the presentation of their evidence at the hearing solely on the basis and details of the suspension. The board heard nothing, therefore, regarding appropriate or possible recommendations for the length of the license suspension, a basis to reinstate the license, or conditions to be placed on the license upon reinstatement.
The hearing officer filed his administrative decision on January 2, 1990. The factual findings, which recited the facts as presented above, did not address the issues of reinstatement or conditions thereon. The hearing officer found that the plaintiff was not "a proper person to hold a Connecticut operator's license" and, therefore, concluded that the commissioner's suspension of the plaintiff's license had been valid. The hearing officer further determined that the suspension would remain in effect until May 4, 1990, at which time the plaintiff would be eligible for reinstatement of his license. The hearing officer also ordered, however, that upon reinstatement of the license, and as a condition of reinstatement, the plaintiff would be required to submit periodic medical reports to the commissioner. Such reports would be required every three months for three years; additional reports were to be required in the event of another seizure episode.
The plaintiff appealed from the administrative decision to the Superior Court and claimed, in addition to other challenges not relevant to the certified questions in this appeal, that the commissioner's decision regarding the postreinstatement reporting requirements lacked statutory or regulatory authority and that the commissioner's decision prejudiced the substantial rights afforded to him by the Connecticut constitution. 8 The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's administrative appeal, and the plaintiff appealed the judgment to the Appellate Court.
In the Appellate Court, the plaintiff reasserted his arguments that the commissioner had acted without statutory authority and that his decisions regarding the initial suspension and postreinstatement requirements had violated the state constitution. Daly v. DelPonte, supra, 27 Conn.App. at 496, 608 A.2d 93. That court rejected both of the plaintiff's challenges. 9 Regarding the authority of the commissioner to impose postreinstatement reporting requirements, the court determined that the plaintiff was an "applicant" for the purpose of General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-36(e) 10 because, although he was already a license holder, the reinstatement following a suspension placed his license in the category of those issued to "applicants." Id., at 500, 608 A.2d 93. Because the plaintiff was, therefore, an "applicant," the commissioner could properly impose medical reporting requirements as a condition of licensing. Id., at 500-501, 608 A.2d 93. Next, the Appellate Court determined that the commissioner's decision survived the plaintiff's state equal protection challenge. Reviewing the administrative action pursuant to a strict scrutiny standard, the court concluded that the state has a compelling interest in highway safety and that the "reporting requirements placed on the plaintiff are both necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve this goal." Id., at 506, 608 A.2d 93. The Appellate Court, accordingly, affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id., at 508, 608 A.2d 93.
We granted the plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal to determine whether the commissioner has statutory authority to impose postreinstatement medical reporting requirements and, if so, whether his exercise of such authority in the circumstances of this case violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Daly v. DelPonte, 223 Conn. 903, 610 A.2d 177 (1992). Although we agree with the Appellate Court that the commissioner has statutory authority to condition a motor vehicle operator's license on the licensee's reporting his or her medical status, we determine that in this case the commissioner's exercise of that authority violated the equal protection provision of our state constitution.
The first question before this court is whether the commissioner has the statutory authority to direct a licensed motor vehicle operator to submit periodic medical reports as a condition of the continued possession of the license. The Appellate Court concluded that the commissioner has such authority pursuant to § 14-36(e), which provides, in part, for the issuing of licenses. 11 The plaintiff challenges this conclusion claiming that § 14-36(e) authorizes the commissioner to place conditions only on a license issued to an applicant who does not already hold a Connecticut license.
The plaintiff makes a plausible argument...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- Anthony A. v. Comm'r of Corr.
-
Ramos v. Vernon
... ... O'Neill, 238 Conn. 1, 678 A.2d 1267 (1996), Daly v. Delponte, 225 Conn. 499, 624 A.2d 876 (1993), and Gaines v. Manson, 194 Conn. 50, 481 ... ...
-
Lopiano v. Lopiano, (SC 15899)
... ... upon due to his disability, we do not apply the strict scrutiny analysis required by Daly v. DelPonte, 225 Conn. 499, 513-14, 624 A.2d 876 (1993) ... 10. The ... ...
- State v. Joyner, 14349
-
State constitutional law in the land of steady habits: Chief Justice Ellen A. Peters and the Connecticut Supreme Court.
...were violated where a civil litigant was deprived of a statutory right without a hearing on the statute's validity); Daly v. DelPonte, 624 A.2d 876 (Conn. 1993) (reporting that requirements imposed on a driver with medical seizure disorder violated driver's equal protection rights under sta......
-
Disability Constitutional Law
...that [the statute in question] is not in violation of the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions.").301. 624 A.2d 876, 877 (Conn. 1993).302. Id. at 882.303. Conn. Const. art. XXI. For the history of this provision, see Robert I. Berdon, Connecticut Equal Protection ......
-
Right to Shelter Under the Connecticut Constitution
...modidifying 169 N.J.super. 543, 405 A.2d 427 (1979); Doe v. Maher, 40 Con Sup. 394,815 A.2d 134(Super.Ct. 1986). 9 In Daly v. Delponte, 225 Conn. 499, 513-14 (1993), the Connecticut Supreme Court held that Article 1, 9 20 of its state constitution required strict scrutiny of discrimination ......
-
1994 Connecticut Appellate Review
...229 Conn. 1, 639 A.2d 502 (1994). 9. 229 Conn. at 8, n. 11. This quotation comes from decisions in 1982 and 1989. But Daly v. DelPonte, 225 Conn. 499, 624 A.2d 876 (1992), is to the contrary. And what about Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977)? 10. See, e.g., Ross, 230 Conn......