Daly v. Komline-Sanderson Engineering Corp.

• Decision Date: 20 May 1963
• Docket Number: No. A--97,KOMLINE-SANDERSON,A--97
• Citation: 191 A.2d 37,40 N.J. 175
• Parties: Robert R. DALY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.ENGINEERING CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 175

40 N.J. 175

191 A.2d 37

Robert R. DALY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. KOMLINE-SANDERSON ENGINEERING CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.

No. A--97.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued March 5, 1963.

Decided May 20, 1963.

Joseph M. Nolan, Newark, for appellant (Martin Clinton Conant, Newark, on the brief).

Robert R. Daly, Newark, pro se (Sam Weiss, Newark, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered

PER CURIAM.

The parties agreed to arbitration of their dispute over legal fees. An award was made and the judgment under review entered upon it. We certified defendant's appeal before argument in the Appellate Division.

Defendant contends the arbitration agreement is void because it invades our exclusive jurisdiction over practice of the law. We see no substance in this objection. We think we should encourage arbitration of disputes between attorney and client, and to that end should uphold an award in the absence of good reason to reject it. Whether an award in a dispute of this kind should be vulnerable on grounds which are not available in attacks on arbitration awards generally, we need not decide.

The only other ground of attack which we need discuss is that the lump sum award may have included (1) a larger allowance for services on a loan from the Small Business Administration than is permitted under the regulations of that agency, and (2) an allowance for services in a matter in which plaintiff was guilty of disloyalty as evidenced by his subsequent conviction, State v. Daly, 38 N.J. 1, 182 A.2d 861 (1962), and disbarment, In re Daly, 39 N.J. 112, 187 A.2d 717 (1963).

The controversy between the parties involved a number of distinct matters. The agreement for arbitration did not require separate awards as to each item. The arbitrators were three in number, one selected by each of the disputants and the third by their nominees. The arbitrators are members of the bar and, in response to our order, all certified they understood a single award was expected. We believe that under the agreement to arbitrate a lump sum award was permissible.

The question is whether the two objections advanced by defendant suffice to justify interference with an award which conforms with an agreement deliberately made. The essence of arbitration is, of course, that the arbitrators decide both the facts and the law. Judicial review of an award is extremely narrow, generally confined to matters of corruption or errors appearing on the fact of the award. N.J.S. 2A:24--8 and 9, N.J.S.A.; Carhal Factors, Inc. v. Salkind, 5 N.J. 485, 76 A.2d 252 (1950); Carpenter v. Bloomer, 54 N.J.Super. 157, 148 A.2d 497 (App.Div.1959); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2358 (McNaughton rev. 1961). We think defendant's objections do not fall within the limits of judicial interference. In an effort to determine whether they could be solved practically, we asked the arbitrators to certify how much was allowed with respect to each of the two items. Their reply was that they are unable to specify a sum allocated to any item since the lump sum award represents an adjustment or reconciliation of divergent views among them. This...