Daly v. McFarland, No. A10–1184.

• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)
• Citation: 812 N.W.2d 113
• Docket Number: No. A10–1184.
• Parties: Christopher John DALY, Respondent, v. Zachary John McFARLAND, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 25 April 2012

812 N.W.2d 113

Christopher John DALY, Respondent,
v.
Zachary John McFARLAND, Appellant.

No. A10–1184.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 25, 2012.

[812 N.W.2d 117]

Syllabus by the Court

1. The doctrine of primary assumption of risk does not apply to preclude liability for negligent operation of a snowmobile.

2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to instruct the jury on the emergency rule.

3. The district court abused its discretion in reconciling an inconsistent jury verdict form; the remedy is remittitur or, in the event remittitur is rejected by the plaintiff, a new trial on liability.

William O. Bongard, Marcia K. Miller, Sieben, Grose, Von Holtum & Carey, Ltd., Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.

Kay Nord Hunt, Lommen, Abdo, Cole, King & Stageberg, P.A., Minneapolis, MN; and Michael T. O'Rourke, Erickson, Zierke, Kuderer & Madsen, P.A., Fairmont, MN, for appellant.

OPINION
MEYER, Justice.

Respondent Christopher John Daly sued appellant Zachary John McFarland for injuries sustained as the result of an accident involving two snowmobiles. A unanimous jury returned a special verdict form finding that both Daly and McFarland were negligent, but that Daly's negligence was not a direct cause of the accident. The jury then allocated 30% of the fault for the accident to Daly. The court entered judgment for Daly in the amount of $442,633.50, the full amount of damages that the jury found Daly to have suffered. McFarland then moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), arguing that the district court improperly reconciled the jury's special verdict form answers, and that McFarland was not negligent as a matter of law. In the alternative, McFarland moved for a new trial because of error in the reconciliation of the special verdict form, and also because of the failure of the court to instruct the jury on the emergency rule or the primary assumption of risk doctrine. The district court denied the motion in its entirety. The court of appeals affirmed. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

This case arises out of a snowmobiling accident that occurred on January 20, 2007. Daly, McFarland, Neil Forsberg, and Jeff Engelkes are all in their mid-thirties, had operated snowmobiles together for years, and were experienced snowmobile drivers. The four riders departed from Engelkes' small engine repair shop. Outside of Fulda, the group crossed a bean field, riding four abreast. Daly slowed down at the end of the field and McFarland passed him as they approached a ditch. While McFarland was passing Daly, McFarland's snowmobile hit a drift and vaulted into the air. McFarland pushed the snowmobile away from his body to avoid injury, and it flipped toward Daly. Daly tried to avoid McFarland's snowmobile, but the two snowmobiles collided, causing Daly to fall off his snowmobile and suffer injuries.

At trial Daly argued that the accident occurred as a result of McFarland's excessive and negligent speed. Daly claimed that while he slowed down to allow someone else to lead through the ditch, McFarland maintained his speed of at least 60 miles per hour. Daly argued that McFarland was negligent in not adjusting his speed to deal with drifts as he came across them, as required by Minn.Stat. § 84.87, subd. 2 (2010), and that McFarland's unsafe speed caused the wreck.

Deputy Chad Kempema, who was the officer at the scene, testified that McFarland admitted at the time of the accident that he had lost control of his snowmobile.

[812 N.W.2d 118]

Daly testified that he slowed down in the bean field while McFarland did not. Daly saw McFarland pass him and hit something, and then McFarland's “snowmobile just shot straight up in the air.” McFarland agreed that Daly had slowed down and that McFarland had passed him.

Kenneth Drevnick, an accident reconstruction expert, testified on behalf of Daly. Drevnick testified that McFarland lost control of his snowmobile because of McFarland's speed and some modifications McFarland made to his snowmobile, which contributed to the snowmobile's “vault” into the air when it hit the drift.

McFarland claimed that the collision was an accident and that up until the point where he hit the snowdrift, he drove reasonably. McFarland argued that the four riders involved were experienced snowmobilers, riding at a safe speed, and obeying the law. McFarland estimated that the whole group drove between 45 and 50 miles per hour in the field, and that he was at that speed when he hit a drift and his snowmobile launched into the air. McFarland testified that he pushed the snowmobile away from his body after the snowmobile went in the air. McFarland argued that if he was negligent in driving, that Daly was also negligent, since Daly failed to pay attention, was wearing headphones, and should have seen the hazardous drifts as well. Daly admitted that he was wearing headphones and listening to music.

McFarland testified that he would have slowed down had he seen a drift, depending on its size. McFarland also testified that the snowdrifts they encountered were for the most part soft, and that he had not encountered any icy patches. He said that when operating a snowmobile it is not possible to tell before hitting a drift whether it will be hard or soft. He also stated that in his 20 years of riding he had never had a snowmobile react to a drift as it did during this accident.

The other two snowmobilers, Forsberg and Engelkes, testified that there was no horseplay, racing, or goofing around during the ride. Forsberg said the spacing and the speed of the group was safe. Both Forsberg and Engelkes said that the group's speed was consistent and that they considered it safe. However, Forsberg did not see McFarland pass Daly, and Engelkes did not actually see the accident at all.

William Elkin, an accident reconstructionist, testified for McFarland. Elkin based his opinions on case files, photographs, snowmobile safety materials, and Drevnick's report. Elkin testified that snowmobiles were more hazardous than automobiles or motorcycles, and that riding in a group had a greater risk of collision than riding solo because of rider proximity. He also noted that wearing headphones and listening to music would decrease a rider's ability to perceive danger. Elkin testified that a snowdrift of the size encountered by McFarland would not normally be expected to roll or rotate a snowmobile, and would not be identified by a snowmobiler as a hazard. Elkin also asserted that the angle at which a snowmobile hits a drift is more important than the impact speed in determining whether the snowmobile will become airborne.

Before closing arguments, McFarland requested that CIVJIG 25.16, the emergency rule instruction, be given to the jury, which was denied. The parties, however, agreed on the wording of the special verdict form.

A unanimous jury returned a special verdict finding that both Daly and McFarland were negligent, and that Daly's negligence was not a direct cause of the accident. However, the jury also allocated 30% of the fault for the accident to Daly.

[812 N.W.2d 119]

After determining the jury intended to say that Daly's negligence had not caused the accident, the district court entered judgment for Daly in the amount of $442,633.50, the full amount awarded by the jury for Daly's damages from the accident.

McFarland moved for JMOL on two grounds: (1) that McFarland was not liable as a matter of law based on the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk; and (2) that the district court improperly reconciled the jury's answers on Daly's negligence. In the alternative, McFarland moved for a new trial because of the improper reconciliation of the special verdict form, and also because of the failure of the court to instruct the jury on the emergency rule or the primary assumption of risk doctrine. The district court denied the motion in its entirety.

The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the district court properly denied McFarland's motion for JMOL because primary assumption of risk did not apply to the range of normal snowmobiling occurrences. The court of appeals upheld the denial of the emergency rule instruction because McFarland was not confronted with a sudden emergency, and deferred to the district court's broad discretion in reconciling the special verdict form.

McFarland appeals on three grounds: (1) that the primary assumption of risk doctrine should include recreational snowmobiling and relieve McFarland of his duty of care owed to Daly; (2) that the jury should have been given an instruction regarding the emergency rule; and (3) that the district court improperly reconciled the special verdict form.

I.

McFarland argues the primary assumption of risk doctrine should apply to preclude as a matter of law any liability for negligent operation of a snowmobile by an experienced snowmobile operator. A motion for judgment as a matter of law is reviewed de novo. Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp., 766 N.W.2d 910, 919 (Minn.2009). Under Minn. R. Civ. P. 50.01, a court grants judgment as a matter of law if “a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.” JMOL is inappropriate if “jurors could differ on the conclusions to be drawn from the record.” Bahr, 766 N.W.2d at 919. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, which in this case is Daly. Id.

When applicable, the primary assumption of risk doctrine completely bars a plaintiff's claim because it negates the defendant's duty of care to the plaintiff. Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 24, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827 (1971) (“Primary assumption of risk, express or implied, relates to the initial issue of whether a defendant was negligent at all—that is, whether the defendant had any duty to protect the plaintiff from a risk of harm.”). “Primary assumption of the risk completely negates a defendant's negligence.” Bjerke v....