Daly v. Morgan
| Decision Date | 23 November 1888 |
| Parties | DALY v. MORGAN, TREASURER, ET AL. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from circuit court, Baltimore county, in equity; WATERS and FOWLER, Judges.
Bill by Henry T. Daly, a resident and tax-payer of a portion of Baltimore county added to the city of Baltimore under act Md. 1888, c. 98, against George W. Morgan, treasurer of Baltimore county, and the mayor and council of the city of Baltimore to restrain the collection of a tax. Injunction refused, and plaintiff appeals.
W F. Mitchell and D. G. McIntosh, for appellant.
W J. Taylor and B. Carter, for appellees.
The nineteenth section of the Acts of 1888, c. 98, entitled an "Act to extend the limits of Baltimore city by including therein parts of Baltimore county," provides: First, that until the year 1900 the rate of taxation for city purposes on all taxable property within the districts to be annexed shall not exceed the then existing tax rate of such property in Baltimore county, and that until said year no increase shall be made in the assessment of such property; second, that until the year 1900 the city of Baltimore shall expend within the districts annexed an amount equal to the revenue derived therefrom by taxation, in affording to the residents within such districts the rights and privileges enjoyed by residents within the present limits of the city. The act further provides that the question whether the several parts of Baltimore county shall be annexed to the city shall be submitted to the legal voters residing "therein, respectively." The main questions arising upon the construction of this act are-- First, the constitutional power of the legislature to extend the limits of Baltimore city, by including therein parts of Baltimore county; and, secondly, its power to discriminate in the rates of assessment and taxation for city purposes, as between property within the districts annexed under the provisions of the act and property within the former limits of the city.
The power of the legislature to extend the limits of a city, by including therein parts of the county adjoining, when the city itself is a part of the county, is not and cannot be questioned. It is contended, however, that Baltimore city, being a separate and independent territorial division of the state, and not a part of Baltimore county, the legislature has no power to change the lines of the county by annexing part of its territory to the city; and, in support of this contention, the appellant relies entirely upon section 1 of article 13 of the constitution. After providing for the organization of new counties, and for locating county-seats, this section further provides: "Nor shall the lines of any county be changed without the consent of a majority of the legal voters residing within the district, which, under said proposed change, would form a part of a county different from that to which it belonged prior to said change." It does not say, as has been argued, that the lines of a county shall not be changed, "except it be for the purpose of annexing parts of one county to another county." It merely provides that, where the lines of a county are to be changed for this purpose, it must be done with the consent of a majority of the voters residing within the district to be annexed. The object, and sole object, of this provision of section 1, was to provide for the annexation of parts of one county to another. The entire section, in fact, and the article in which it is to be found, deals exclusively with the organization of "new counties," "the location of county-seats," and the mode by which parts of one county may be annexed to another county, and the limitation imposed upon the legislative power is in respect of these matters, and these only. Counties are political divisions of the state, organized with a view to the general policy of the state, and the functions and powers exercised by them have reference mainly to such policy. Besides, their representation in the general assembly is fixed by the constitution, and we can understand why it was deemed proper to make some provision in regard to the organization of counties, and the annexation of parts of one county to another. Towns and cities, however, are ordinarily chartered at the instance, and mainly with reference to the interest, convenience, and advantage, of persons residing within the particular locality incorporated. They are chartered by the legislature, and their boundaries are fixed by it, and the power to extend them, whenever in its judgment the public interests require it, has been exercised by the legislature from the earliest days of the colony. No reason has been suggested why the constitution should prohibit the exercise of this power, and it would seem strange that it should provide for the annexation of parts of one county to another, and deny to the legislature the power to extend the limits of a city, by including therein parts of an adjoining county, even though such county should be a separate and independent territorial division of the state. No one knew better than the framers of the constitution of 1867 that the time must come, and that not far distant, when the extension of the limits of a great city like Baltimore would be absolutely necessary to its proper growth and development; and if they meant to deny the exercise of this power by the legislature, and to say that its limits, as then defined by its charter, should for all time remain the same, it is but reasonable to presume that this intention would have been declared in plain and explicit terms. So far from being expressly declared, there is nothing, either in the language or terms of this section, from which such an intention can be inferred. The legislature has therefore, in our opinion, the same power now which it has always exercised, to extend the limits of Baltimore city by including therein parts of Baltimore county, and this, too, with or without the consent of a majority of the voters residing within the districts annexed.
And this brings us to the question as to the power of the legislature to prescribe different rates of assessment and taxation for city purposes, as between property within the districts annexed under the provisions of the act and property within the former limits of the city. We cannot agree that the discrimination made in this respect by the nineteenth section is in itself inequitable or unjust. The larger part of the territory annexed under the act of 1888 embraces vacant outlying lots and farming lands, and the plainest principles of justice would seem to require a qualified exemption of such property, for a limited period at least, from the heavy burden of city taxation. It must be some time before such property can be available for building or business purposes, or can enjoy the full benefits and privileges of the city government; and if local taxation is founded, or in any manner qualified, by the principle of local benefits, there ought to be, in all fairness, some apportionment in the rate of taxation between such property and property more advantageously located. But the question, it is said, is not one of abstract justice, but of constitutional power to make such apportionment; and it is insisted that all property within the limits of a city, without regard to its location or condition, whether improved or unimproved, must, under the constitution of this state, be subject to the same rate of taxation for city purposes; and, in support of this contention, the appellant relies upon the fifteenth article of the declaration of rights, which says "that every person in the state, or person holding property therein, ought to contribute his proportion of public taxes for the support of the government, according to his actual worth in real and personal property." Now, it can hardly be necessary to say that this article in the declaration of rights is to be found, word for word, in every constitution adopted in this state. We shall not stop to consider the many cases in which it has been the subject of construction by this court, nor the conflict of opinion as to the precise limitation thereby imposed on the taxing power of the state. Whatever may be the diversity of opinion in this respect, all agree that the contribution by every one of his proportion of public taxes levied for the support of the government, according to the value of his property, necessarily implies equality of taxation on all taxable property. We say "taxable property," for although the abstract declaration in the bill of rights may be said to subject all property to taxation, yet it has always been held that the legislature may exempt from taxation such property as in its judgment sound policy may require. Nor can we agree with the appellee that this principle of equality applies only to taxes levied by the state for state purposes. Cities and counties are but local divisions of the state, organized and chartered for the more efficient and economical administration of the government. As such, they have no inherent power of taxation. The legislature itself may levy needful taxes to defray the general expenses of such cities or counties, or it may delegate this power to the local authorities. These expenses of a city or county--for examples, expenses for the administration of justice, the support of the poor, educational purposes, the maintenance of the public highways, and other like expenses--are public or govermental expenses, and the power of taxation exercised by the local authorities to defray such expenses is a delegated power derived from the legislature. The legislature, however, cannot delegate a power prohibited by the constitution, and the taxing power, therefore, when exercised by the city or...
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