Damiani v. Albert

• Court: California Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: McCOMB; GIBSON
• Citation: Damiani v. Albert, 48 Cal.2d 15, 306 P.2d 780 (Cal. 1957)
• Decision Date: 15 February 1957
• Parties: Louis DAMIANI, Appellant, v. Harry ALBERT et al., Respondents. L. A. 24364.

Page 780

306 P.2d 780

48 Cal.2d 15

Louis DAMIANI, Appellant, v. Harry ALBERT et al., Respondents.

L. A. 24364.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Feb. 15, 1957.

Rehearing Denied March 13, 1957.

Herbert W. Simmons, Jr., Rosalind G. Bates and Roland S. Bates, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel and Andrew O. Porter, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for respondents.

McCOMB, Justice.

From a judgment denying his application for a writ of mandate to compel respondents to reinstate him to a position he had formerly held as deputy sheriff of Los Angeles County, petitioner ^* appeals.

Facts: Petitioner, a deputy sheriff of Los Angeles County, was charged with filing a report he knew to be false stating that his superior officer, Sgt. Mallette, was intoxicated when serving as a uniformed officer at a junior highschool dance on October 15, 1954. It was also charged that he violated rules of the sheriff's office requiring official communications to be sent through the 'chain of command,' that he had previously been suspended twice for disciplinary reasons.

Petitioner was accordingly discharged for cause on November 18, 1954. He requested a hearing before respondent County Civil Service Commission, which, after a formal hearing, sustained the discharge. He then petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate, which was denied.

Questions: First. Was there substantial evidence to sustain the findings of the commission and the trial court that petitioner (a) filed a false report, which he knew to be false, charging that his superior officer was intoxicated when serving as a uniformed officer at a junior highschool dance on October 15, 1954, and (b) violated the rules of the sheriff's office requiring that afficial communications be sent through the chain of command?

Yes. On an application for a writ of mandate to review an order of a local quasi-judicial body such as the commission in the present case, the trial court does not have the right to judge the intrinsic value of the evidence or to weigh it. The power of the court is confined to whether there was substantial evidence before the commission to support its findings. (Fascination, Inc., v. Hoover, 39 Cal.2d 260, 264(2), 246 P.2d 656; Bank of America etc., v. Mundo, 37 Cal.2d 1, 5(3), (4, 5) 229 P.2d 345; Nishkian v. City of Long Beach, 103 Cal.App.2d 749, 751(2), 230 P.2d 156; Cantrell v. Board of Supervisors, 87 Cal.App.2d 471, 475(2), 197 P.2d 218.)

Applying the foregoing rule to the facts of the present case, the record discloses that:

(a) Petitioner filed a written report stating that his superior officer, Sgt. Mallette, was intoxicated when serving as a uniformed officer at a junior highschool dance on October 15, 1954, between 8 and 9 p. m., that his speech was thick and his gait unsteady. Sgt. Mallette denied drinking any alcoholic beverage on the night in question, and testified he had not seen petitioner at the dance or after leaving the police station at 8 p. m. This testimony was corroborated by Officer William A. Weberg, who was petitioner's partner in the same radio car with him on the night in question from 7 p. m. to midnight. He testified that when he saw Sgt. Mallette at the station at 8 o'clock he appeared to be perfectly normal and that neither he nor petitioner saw the sergeant between 8 p. m. and 12 p. m. that night.

The principal of the highschool testified that he talked with the sergeant between 8 and 9 p. m. on the night in question and he observed no evidence of his having used liquor, that his speech was normal, and that he walked in his usual alert manner.

On the witness stand, petitioner directly contradicted his own report by admitting that Sgt. Mallette' speech was not thick and that his gait was not unsteady.

(b) Section 1205 of the Manual of Policy and Ethics of the Sheriff's Department reads: 'All official communications of the Department, whether moving downward, or requests, information, suggestions, or complaints moving upward, shall be confined to official channels. Each link in the chain of command shall be respected in this regard. It shall be the responsibility of each echelon to forward communications to the next higher echelon with his approval, disapproval or recommendations.'

Capt. Mullison, the officer in charge of the reserves, testified that petitioner accosted him in the hall at the sheriff's station and gave him information relative to the actions of one of the members of his group. In fact, Capt. Pascoe was in charge of the station and was petitioner's immediate commanding officer. He testified that he had never given petitioner permission to communicate with...