Damman v. Damman

• Decision Date: 06 December 1910
• Citation: 145 Wis. 122,128 N.W. 1062
• Parties: DAMMAN v. DAMMAN.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

145 Wis. 122

128 N.W. 1062

DAMMAN

v.DAMMAN.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Dec. 6, 1910.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Milwaukee County; J. C. Ludwig, Judge.

Action for divorce by George Damman against Elizabeth Damman. From a judgment dismissing the complaint, the plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

This is an action for divorce. The complaint charges the defendant with cruel and inhuman treatment of the plaintiff, and alleges coarseness and vulgarity on the part of the defendant, that she associates with low characters and attends questionable places, but does not charge actual adultery. The answer is a general denial, with countercharges of the same general character against the plaintiff. At the close of the testimony the court said: “The first principal governing the law of equity cases, and particularly divorce cases, is this: That the party seeking relief must come into court with clean hands. This is not such a case. Further comment by the court is not necessary. The divorce is denied.” The court found that the parties were husband and wife, the age of the respective parties, the fact that they had resided within the state for more than one year before the action was begun, and that no issue resulted from the marriage. The court further found that the plaintiff “has not shown himself entitled to a divorce and has not come into equity with clean hands, and the complaint is therefore dismissed.” From the judgment entered upon the findings the plaintiff appeals, and assigns substantially two grounds of error: (1) The judgment should be reversed because the court failed to make specific findings of fact. (2) If the plaintiff was guilty of misconduct, his lapses had been condoned by the defendant.Andrew Gilbertson, for appellant.

W. H. Timlin, Jr., and Patrick W. Dean, for respondent.

BARNES, J. (after stating the facts as above).

The first question we are called upon to consider is whether the judgment should be reversed because of the failure of the trial court to make specific findings of fact covering the controverted questions which were litigated. Section 2863, St. 1898, requires the trial judge to state in his decision the facts found by him. That the convenience of this court would be subserved by complying with the statute in regard to making specific findings is obvious. That the interests of litigants may suffer in consequence of failure to make such findings should be just as obvious to those familiar with our decisions upon the subject. The cases will be found cited in Young v. Miner, 141 Wis. 501, 504, 124 N. W. 660;Farmer v. St. Croix Power Co., 117 Wis. 76, 93 N. W. 830, 98 Am. St. Rep. 914;Brown v. Griswold, 109 Wis. 275, 85 N. W. 363. The latest case bearing upon the subjectis Jansen v. Huerth, 127 N. W. 945, and this case, as well as Closuit v. John Arpin Lumber Co., 130 Wis. 258, 110 N. W. 222, and Brown v. Griswold, supra, furnish instances where judgments were reversed largely because of the failure of the court to make specific findings.

It has frequently been held that, while it is error not to make such findings as are required by section 2863, St. 1898, it is not necessarily reversible error, but that general findings are not within the rule that the decision of the trial court with respect to disputed matters of fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless against the clear preponderance of the evidence. Chippewa Bridge Co. v. Durand, 122 Wis. 85, 99 N. W. 603, 106 Am. St. Rep. 931;Farmer v. St. Croix Power Co., 117 Wis. 76, 81, 93 N. W. 830, 98 Am. St. Rep. 914, and cases cited; Closuit v. John Arpin Lumber Co., supra. The latter case presents as clearly and definitely as any the attitude of this court toward general findings. It is said that such findings leave the court in a...