Damon v. Robles
| Citation | 245 Md.App. 233,226 A.3d 410 |
| Decision Date | 02 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2196, Sept. Term, 2017,2196, Sept. Term, 2017 |
| Parties | Renee Denice DAMON v. Edwin Rafael ROBLES |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Submitted by: Renee Denice Damon, Randallstown, MD, Pro Se, for Appellant.
Submitted by: Edwin Rafael Robles, Baltimore, MD, Pro Se, for Appellee.
Panel: Graeff, Beachley, James A. Kenney, III, Senior Judge, Specially Assigned, JJ.*
Graeff, J. Renee Denice Damon, appellant, appeals from an order issued by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County granting, in part, the motion filed by Edwin Robles, appellee, to modify his child support arrearage based on a 2012 change in the law that prevents child support arrearages from accruing when a parent is incarcerated. The court ordered the Office of Child Support Enforcement ("OCSE") to reduce the child support arrears that had accrued from October 1, 2012, the effective date of Md. Code , § 12-104.1 of the Family Law Article ("FL"), through August 2014, when Mr. Robles was released from prison.
On appeal, Ms. Damon presents one question for this Court's review, which we have rephrased slightly, as follows:
Did the circuit court incorrectly interpret FL § 12-104.1(b) when it retroactively applied the law to past due child support arrearages?
For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court, with an amendment to the amount of credit in arrears.
Ms. Damon and Mr. Robles are the parents of a daughter ("N"), who recently turned 18 years old. The parties were never married. On March 16, 2006, Mr. Robles was ordered to pay $430 per month in child support, plus $40 per month toward arrears. Payments were to be made to the Maryland Child Support Account and forwarded to Ms. Damon.
Four years later, in March 2010, Mr. Robles was incarcerated. He remained in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons until August 2014. FL § 12-104.1, which provides that arrearages of child support may not accrue during an obligor's incarceration under certain circumstances, went into effect on October 1, 2012, 23 months before Mr. Robles' release.
On April 30, 2014, a few months prior to his release, Mr. Robles filed a motion to modify child support, alleging that his incarceration amounted to a change in circumstances. By consent order dated February 20, 2015, Mr. Robles' child support obligation was reduced to $338 per month, by wage lien through the OCSE, retroactive to April 30, 2014.
On May 19, 2017, Mr. Robles again moved to modify child support. He alleged that he had been incarcerated for 56 months, could not afford to pay his child support during that time, and his "arrears were accumulated because of [his] incarceration."
Ms. Damon filed an answer, asking the court to deny the motion. She did not dispute that Mr. Robles had been incarcerated, but she alleged that he made a decision to return to his criminal lifestyle.
On August 8, 2017, Mr. Robles, now represented by counsel, filed a first amended motion to modify child support and "Petition for Accounting." He alleged that he owed $21,693 in child support arrears as of July 2017, that most of that amount accrued during his incarceration, that he was unable to file a motion to modify during his incarceration, and, because of the arrears balance, he was unable to "obtain credit, licenses, and otherwise manage his life." He asked the court to order the OCSE to perform an accounting to determine the total amount of arrears that had accrued during the period of his incarceration and to reduce the arrearages to "reflect the [i]ncarceration."
Ms. Damon answered the amended motion and again asked the court to deny the requested relief. On October 5, 2017, a hearing was held before a family law magistrate. The magistrate granted Mr. Robles a postponement to allow OCSE to perform an audit.1
On November 1, 2017, the OCSE completed its audit. The audit reflected that Mr. Robles accrued $22,852 in child support arrears from March 2010 until August 2014.
On November 28, 2017, the parties appeared for a modification hearing before a judge. Mr. Robles' attorney argued that, since the enactment of FL § 12-104.1 in 2012, it had been the practice of the local child support enforcement agencies to "automatically stop" accrual of arrearages for obligors who became incarcerated. Because Mr. Robles already was incarcerated when the law took effect, however, his case "wasn't caught," and his child support arrears continued to accrue.
The court asked if the law applied "retroactively to arrearage figures that accrued before the change in the law?" Counsel replied that, although his "first position" was that the court should set aside all of Mr. Robles' arrears accrued during his incarceration, he recognized that the law may only apply prospectively, and therefore, his alternative request was that the court set aside the arrears that accrued from October 1, 2012, forward. He calculated the latter amount to be $9,890 by multiplying 23 months by $430 per month.2
Ms. Damon argued that the language and history of FL § 12-104.1 made clear that the statute applied only to persons who became incarcerated after October 1, 2012. She asserted that, because Mr. Robles already was incarcerated when the law took effect, it did not apply to him.3
The court stated at the end of the hearing that, although Mr. Robles' motion was captioned as a motion to modify child support, it actually was a motion for an order changing the arrearages. On December 5, 2017, the court issued an order granting, in part, and denying, in part, Mr. Robles' motion. It noted that Mr. Robles was incarcerated from March 2010 until August 2014, and it ruled that the child support arrears that accrued while Mr. Robles was incarcerated after October 1, 2012, should be set aside. Thus, the court ordered the OCSE to adjust the $23,154 arrearage figure and reduce it by the amount calculated by counsel, $9,890.
This appeal followed.
Ms. Damon, a self-represented litigant, contends that the circuit court erroneously reduced a portion of appellee's child support arrearage for a period of time in which he was incarcerated. She asserts that there is no indication that the General Assembly intended that the law be applied retroactively. Before addressing appellant's specific claim, we will briefly discuss the law regarding the calculation of child support as it relates to an incarcerated parent.
To maintain eligibility for federal funding relative to paternity and child support, Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651, et seq . obligates States to have certain laws in effect. As pertinent here, since 1986, federal law has required states to enact:
42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9) (emphasis added). See Harvey v. Marshall , 389 Md. 243, 265, 884 A.2d 1171 (2005).
In 1988, to comply with that federal law, the General Assembly enacted FL § 12-104, which provides that a court "may modify a child support award subsequent to the filing of a motion for modification and upon a showing of a material change of circumstance[,]" but it "may not retroactively modify a child support award prior to the date of the filing of the motion for modification." See Harvey , 389 Md. at 266–67, 884 A.2d 1171 (). The term "modify" includes a reduction, alteration, or elimination of child support arrearages. Id. at 268, 884 A.2d 1171.
States have taken different approaches to modification of child support due to a parent's incarceration. For example, some states have taken the position that a parent's reduction in income caused by incarceration may constitute a change in circumstances for purposes of modification of child support. See , e.g. , Clark v. Clark , 902 N.E.2d 813, 817 (Ind. 2009). Other states, by contrast, take the position that, because this change of circumstances was due to the parent's illegal conduct, loss of income due to incarceration does not constitute a material change in circumstances that provides grounds to modify the parent's child support obligation. See , e.g., Staffon v. Staffon , 277 Ga. 179, 587 S.E.2d 630, 632 (2003). Maryland historically has taken the first position, holding that "a prisoner's incarceration may constitute a material change of circumstance if the effect on the prisoner's ability to pay child support is sufficiently reduced due to incarceration." Wheeler v. State , 160 Md. App. 363, 374, 864 A.2d 210 (2004) (quoting Wills v. Jones , 340 Md. 480, 483, 667 A.2d 331 (1995) ).
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