Damphousse v. Great Lakes Steel
| Citation | 219 F.Supp.2d 833 |
| Decision Date | 14 August 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-CV-73631.,00-CV-73631. |
| Parties | Edgar P. DAMPHOUSSE, Plaintiff, v. GREAT LAKES STEEL, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Hugh M. Davis, Jr., Constitutional Lit. Associates, Detroit, MI, for plaintiff.
Mark W. McInerney, Jack VanHoorelbeke, Detroit, MI, for Great Lakes Steel, Dennis McDermott, Larry Flynn, Jack LeFeve, John Bernard, Alan DeGraw, Nat. Steel Corp., defendants.
Bruce A. Miller, Eric I. Frankie, Miller Cohen, Detroit, MI, for United Steel Workers of America, Local 1299, United Steel Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Dist. 2, United Steel Workers of America, AFL-CIO, United Steel Workers CLC Dist. 2, defendants.
Defendants United Steel Workers of America AFL-CIO District 2, United Steel Workers of America Local 1299 and United Steel Workers of America AFL-CIO, CLC District 2 (collectively referred to as "Union") move for summary judgment of plaintiff Edgar Damphousse's claim of breach of a duty of fair representation. A hearing on the motion was held on July 15, 2002. For the reasons set forth below, defendant Union's motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED.
Plaintiff originally filed suit in Michigan's Wayne County Circuit Court on July 6, 2000 alleging tortious interference with contract/beneficial economic relationship, and unlawful discrimination in violation of Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. §§ 37.2101 et seq., against his former employers defendants Great Lakes Steel ("GLS") and National Steel Corporation ("NSC"), and against former supervisors Dennis McDermott and Jack Lefeve, former crew coordinator John Bernard, GLS Labor Relations Representative Larry Flynn, and GLS Labor Relations Attorney Alan DeGraw. The matter was removed to federal court on August 11, 2000 based on federal question jurisdiction under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 ("LMRA"). Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on November 6, 2000 adding Union as defendants and alleging Union breached its duty of fair representation by deciding not to pursue arbitration of GLS's April 27, 1999 decision to discharge plaintiff. On March 22, 2002, the court issued an automatic bankruptcy stay as to GLS and NSC only. Union filed the instant motion for summary judgment on May 13, 2002. Plaintiff filed a motion to stay as to all parties on May 17, 2002. The motion was denied on June 25, 2002.
Union moves for summary judgment arguing that, in this hybrid LMRA action, plaintiff cannot prove that Union's decision not to pursue arbitration was arbitrary, discriminatory, or made in bad faith. Union asserts it is undisputed that on January 27, 1999, after plaintiff received a January 26, 1999 five day suspension letter, plaintiff left work and drove to Riverside Hospital where he was treated by a Dr. Nasry for emotional distress resulting from the suspension. Union asserts plaintiff threatened to "kill his boss", prompting Dr. Nasry to call Ecorse Police, who in turned notified GLS Security. Union continues that, on April 8, 1999, plaintiff made veiled threats of harming McDermott to plaintiff's workers' compensation attorney Kevin Kales, causing Kales to call GLS Attorney DeGraw to discuss a possible "cooling off" period. Union argues that these threats of physical violence, coupled with past disciplinary action taken against plaintiff, justified Union's refusal to arbitrate plaintiff's discharge.
Plaintiff counters that the alleged threats were made off company property, and that proffered arbitration decisions demonstrate that arbitration challenges to discharge were successful in 16 of 46 cases where threats were made on company property. Plaintiff continues that his alleged threats were made under circumstances where the threats were privileged (physician-patient privilege as to Dr. Nasry, attorney-client privilege as to Attorney Kales), making it unlikely that plaintiff's hearsay statements would be admissible at arbitration. Plaintiff continues that GLS Labor Relations representative Michael Flynn testified that Union pursued arbitration in three other cases involving more immediate threats, with one involving a knife and another involving an actual physical assault. Plaintiff continues that Union knew plaintiff's work history involved a patten of personal attacks by McDermott and co-workers, including the posting of cartoons describing plaintiff as "whining" and an "80 inch mill reject", and the displaying of a local newspaper story reporting unrelated theft charges brought against plaintiff. Plaintiff summarizes that, given these circumstances, Union's decision not to arbitrate plaintiff's discharge was irrational. In the alternative, plaintiff asserts that summary judgment would be premature because discovery has been stayed as to GLS and NSC.
The standard for determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is "`whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Winningham v. North Am. Resources Corp., 42 F.3d 981, 984 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1310 (6th Cir.1989)). The evidence and all inferences therefrom must be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Enertech Elec., Inc. v. Mahoning County Comm'r, 85 F.3d 257, 259 (6th Cir.1996); Wilson v. Stroh Companies, Inc., 952 F.2d 942, 945 (6th Cir.1992).
If the movant establishes by use of the material specified in Rule 56(c) that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the opposing party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S 253, 270, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968); see also Adams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 67 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir.1995). Mere allegations or denials in the nonmovant's pleadings will not meet this burden. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings to avoid summary judgment, but must support its claim with some probative evidence. Kraft v. United States, 991 F.2d 292, 296 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 976, 114 S.Ct. 467, 126 L.Ed.2d 419 (1993).
With respect to plaintiff's claim against Union of breach of a duty of fair representation:
A union breaches its "statutory duty of fair representation * * * when [its] conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190, 87 S.Ct. 903, 916, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967)(internal citations omitted). This standard is stated in the disjunctive, so "the three named factors are three separate and distinct possible routes" for establishing a union's breach of its duty. Black v. Ryder/P.I.E. Nationwide, Inc., 15 F.3d 573, 584 (6th Cir.1994). In Air Line Pilots Association, Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 111 S.Ct. 1127, 113 L.Ed.2d 51 (1991), the United States Supreme Court clarified the meaning of "arbitrary" as it relates to a union's conduct. The Supreme Court held that "a union's actions are arbitrary only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of the union's actions, the union's behavior is so far outside a wide range of reasonableness[] as to be irrational." 499 U.S. 65, 67, 111 S.Ct. 1127, 1130, 113 L.Ed.2d 51 (1991)(internal quotation omitted).
Thus, poor judgement or negligence will not establish a breach of a union's duty of fair representation. Black, 15 F.3d at 584. And while the union's duty includes undertaking a "reasonable investigation," Black, 15 F.3d at 585, that duty "does not require [the] union to exhaust every theoretically available procedure simply on the demand of a union member." St. Clair v. Local Union No. 515, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 422 F.2d 128, 130 (6th Cir.1969)(internal citations omitted). A union may breach its duty, however, if it processes a grievance in a perfunctory manner. Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 580 F.2d 232, 235 (6th Cir.1978).
LaCortiglia v. Aluminum Co. of America, 976 F.Supp. 707, 711 (N.D.Ohio 1997).
Unexplained union inaction which substantially prejudices a union member's grievance may constitute arbitrary conduct which amounts to unfair representation. Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 1207, 1211 (6th Cir.1981). Arbitrariness "reflects reckless disregard for the rights of the individual employee." Id, at 1212.
[M]erely characterizing a union's conduct as "arbitrary", "perfunctory" or demonstrative of "bad faith" is insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Rather, to meet his burden of proof as to the union's breach of its duty of fair representation, a plaintiff must establish by substantial evidence that the union acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily or with bad faith. Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 299, 91 S.Ct. 1909, 1924, 29 L.Ed.2d 473 (1971); Ratkosky v. United Transportation Union, 843 F.2d 869 (6th Cir.1988)(summary judgment granted where plaintiff fails to make a showing of bad faith, discrimination or arbitrary conduct).
Kaiser v. United States Postal Service, 785 F.Supp. 648, 660 (E.D.Mich.1992).
Plaintiff was hired by GLS in 1976. Sometime in 1995-1996, plaintiff transferred or "bid" into the Locomotive Cranes department, where Dennis McDermott was his supervisor. Plaintiff primarily operated overhead electrical cranes in the GLS Main Plant. According to plaintiff, in 1997, someone posted various unflattering cartoons of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hamilton v. Local Union No. 1347 of the Intenational Bhd. of Elec. Workers
...discriminatorily or with bad faith. Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 299 (1971).Damphousse v. Great Lakes Steel, 219 F. Supp.2d 833, 837 (E.D. Mich. 2002)(quoting Kaiser v. United States Postal Service, 785 F. Supp. 6468, 660 (E.D. Mich. 1992)(additional internal citation o......