Dana Corp. v. American Standard, Inc.
| Citation | 866 F. Supp. 1481 |
| Decision Date | 24 October 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:92-CV-581RM.,3:92-CV-581RM. |
| Parties | DANA CORPORATION, et al., Plaintiffs, v. AMERICAN STANDARD, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
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Daniel F. Stella, James G. Fausone, Troy R. Taylor, Jeffrey S. Jones, Joseph C. Basta, Dykema Gossett, Detroit, MI, for Dana Corp., General Motors Corp., United Technologies and Warsaw Black Oxide, Inc.
Stephen J. Butler, Jill A. Weller, John H. Beasley, Thompson Hine and Flory, Cincinnati, OH, for American Standard, Inc.
Thomas J. Goeglein, Beckman Lawson Sandler Snyder and Federoff, Fort Wayne, IN, Stephen R. Snyder, Beckman Lawson Sandler Snyder and Federoff, Syracuse, IN, for City of Warsaw.
Alan G. Enderle, Douglas L. Callander, Stephen J. Hessen, Jeffrey D. Swenarton, Kreis Enderle Callander & Hudgins, Kalamazoo, MI, for Clausing Indust., Inc.
Therese A. Czajka, Jacqueline A. Simmons, Ice Miller Donadio and Ryan, Indianapolis, IN, Michael L. Miner, Valentine and Miner, Warsaw, IN, for Da-Lite Screen Co., Inc.
Craig E. Pinkus, Stephen P. Ullrich, Dutton Overman Goldstein Pinkus, Indianapolis, IN, for Dalton Foundries, Inc.
Bradley W. Skolnik, Freihofer Minton Keeler and McClamroch, Indianapolis, IN, for Daymude Development, Inc.
J. Frank Kimbrough, Wilks and Kimbrough, Fort Wayne, IN, for GTE North Inc.
Craig E. Pinkus, Stephen P. Ullrich, Dutton Overman Goldstein Pinkus, Indianapolis, IN, Bruce P. Clark, Karen R. Tallian, Bruce P. Clark and Associates, Munster, IN, for Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc.
Thomas A. Barnard, Johnson Smith Densborn Wright and Heath, Indianapolis, IN, Shavan Giffen, Jeffrey Reitmyer, Louis Zednik, K-Mart Corp., Troy, MI, for K-Mart Corp.
R. Lawrence Steele, Edward Joseph Hussey, Hodges and Davis P.C., Merrillville, IN, for Liberty Homes, Inc.
Robert C. Mitchell, Morton Intern., Inc., Chicago, IL, Donald K. Schott, Arthur A. Vogel, Jr., George J. Marek, Quarles and Brady, Madison, WI, for Morton Intern., Inc.
James F. Warchall, Carol A. Doyle, Kristin J. Brandser, Donna M. Kellick, Sidley and Austin, Chicago, IL, for R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., Inc.
Michael J. Stepanek, Jr., South Bend, IN, for The Shirt Shed, Inc.
Craig M. Buche, Michael F. DeBoni, Yoder Ainlay Ulmer and Buckingham, Goshen, IN, for Syracuse Rubber Products, Inc.
Susan H. Shumway, Shumway and Merle, Southport, CT, for Uniroyal, Inc.
Frank J. Deveau, Donald C. Biggs, Sommer and Barnard, Indianapolis, IN, James E. Utterback, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., Zimmer, Inc., James S. Butts, Warsaw, IN, for Zimmer, Inc.
Plaintiffs Dana Corporation, General Motors Corporation, United Technologies Automotive, Inc., and Warsaw Black Oxide, Inc. commenced this action for cost recovery and contribution under Sections 107 and 113 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). The plaintiffs seek recovery from the numerous defendants of the past and future response costs at a former landfill site near the City of Claypool, Indiana known as the Lakeland Disposal Service Superfund Site (the "Site"), which is on the Superfund National Priority List. The total costs associated with the investigation and remediation of the Site may approach $20 million. Ten defendants1 have moved for summary judgment on the issue of whether they are generators under CERCLA.
Oral argument on the motions was heard on September 16, 1994. At that hearing, the plaintiffs orally requested an opportunity to file supplemental materials in support of John Tatum's assumptions and a supplemental brief on the applicable legal standards. Since then, American Standard and Syracuse Rubber have sought leave to file supplemental briefs. The court believes that all parties had more than adequate opportunities to submit written argument before the September 16 hearing, and so denies each of those motions.
In Part I of this opinion, the court discusses the basic facts surrounding the case; discussion of the facts surrounding the parties to the summary judgment motions is reserved for Part III. In Part II-A, the court rejects various parties' suggestions that some different standard governs summary judgment motions in CERCLA cases. The court concludes that the plaintiffs bear the same burden in this case as do all plaintiffs facing summary judgment motions: they must come forth with evidence that would be sufficient to withstand a motion for judgment as a matter of law at trial; nothing more and nothing less. Application of this standard in Part III of the opinion demonstrates that speculative evidence — testimony that an event "could have happened" or was "possible" — does not satisfy this burden.
Part II-B addresses an issue not clearly answered by other courts: what sort of showing, short of direct evidence that a defendant's hazardous waste was disposed of at the site in question, will suffice to allow a CERCLA plaintiff to survive a motion for judgment as a matter of law, and hence survive a summary judgment motion. The court concludes that while the plaintiff must present evidence sufficient to support, by a preponderance of the evidence, a finding that a defendant's hazardous waste was disposed of at the site in question, the plaintiff may satisfy this burden through the use of circumstantial evidence. If the plaintiff demonstrates that the defendant produced a continuous and predictable waste stream that included hazardous constituents of the sort eventually found at the site, and that at least some significant part of that continuous and predictable waste stream was disposed of at the site, the factfinder reasonably may infer that the defendant's hazardous waste was disposed of at the site. If the plaintiff cannot demonstrate such a continuous and predictable waste stream, or is unable to show that a significant part of the defendant's waste stream reached the site, the plaintiff must present some further evidence to justify a reasonable factfinder in inferring that the defendant contributed to the hazardous waste at the site. In Part III of the opinion, the court applies this standard to the claims against the ten moving defendants.
Part II-C of the opinion addresses various objections to expert affidavits and deposition testimony offered by the plaintiffs in opposition to the summary judgment motions.
Because of the parties' extensive disagreement concerning the facts contained in the record, this opinion, in a departure from this court's usual practice, contains extensive footnote references to the record before the court. Sadly, Part III of this opinion demonstrates a troubling unreliability in the plaintiffs' representations as to what is in the record before the court.
Lakeland Disposal Service, Inc. ("LDS") was a waste disposal service that hauled its customers' waste in compactor trucks (standard rear-loaded garbage trucks), roll-offs (large metal box-type containers), and in vacuum-type pumper trucks for liquid wastes. LDS operated the Site as a landfill from about May 1974 until about August 1978. LDS had residential and business, including industrial, customers.2 The Guide Lamp Division of General Motors was the single largest LDS customer whose waste was disposed of at the Site.3
Liquid wastes were hauled in tank trucks and then deposited directly onto the soil at the Site. Drummed wastes were buried at the Site. Roll-off and compactor truck waste were disposed of throughout the surface of the Site. The roll-off and compactor truck waste were bulldozed and covered daily.4
David Lindsay became the owner and operator of LDS in 1973 and of the Site in May 1974. Mr. Lindsay's operation of the site continued until June 1976 (the "Lindsay era"). During the Lindsay era, LDS utilized several area landfills to dispose of the waste it collected from its customers: Scott's Landfill, Ransbottom/Custer/Packerton Landfill, Likens/Hoss Hills Landfill, and the Site. LDS hauled sludge waste exclusively to the Site during the Lindsay era.5 LDS drivers would not use the Site for roll-off and compactor trash if another landfill was more economical, that is, based on the relative proximity of the customer to another landfill.6
Mr. Lindsay sold LDS and the Site to Stephen W. Shambaugh on or about June 1, 1976. Mr. Shambaugh owned and operated the Site from June 1, 1976 until August 1978 (the "Shambaugh era"). LDS utilized several area landfills, including Scott's, Ransbottom/Custer/Packerton, Spring Valley/Dunn & Shambaugh, Beer & Slabaugh, Wabash Valley, Adams Center, and the Site. Mr. Shambaugh disposed of what he considered to be trash (roll-off and compactor truck waste) at the other area landfills. As during the Lindsay era, LDS drivers were to take roll-off waste to the landfill nearest the customer. Mr. Shambaugh used the Site for what he considered to be hazardous substances, since he could earn more money disposing of hazardous substances at the Lakeland Landfill.
During both the Lindsay and Shambaugh eras, all bulk liquid industrial waste hauled by LDS was disposed of at the Site.7 With the exception of drummed paint sludges received from the General Motors Anderson, Indiana plant after April 1977, all drummed waste hauled by LDS was disposed of at the Site. The General Motors drummed paint sludges were disposed of at the Spring Valley Landfill.8
Mr. Shambaugh recalled disposing of trash at the Site during a six month period of time in 1977 or 1978.9 Trash was accepted because Mr. Shambaugh believed he needed to mix trash with General Motors' hazardous paint sludge that was disposed of at the Site. A trench was excavated for the purpose of mixing trash with General Motors' paint sludge. LDS also hauled trash to other landfills while the trench was open.10 Once the ...
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Table of Cases
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