Dance v. Commonwealth
| Docket Number | Civil Action 3:18-1593 |
| Decision Date | 03 November 2023 |
| Parties | GARY L. DANCE, JR., Plaintiff v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE, GREGORY BACHER, GEORGE BIVENS, TYREE BLOCKER, MARCUS BROWN, DAVID CAIN, LISA CHRISTIE EDWARD HOKE, WENDELL MORRIS, AND MICHAEL WITMER, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Presently before the court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment, (Doc. 135), and Plaintiff's motion to strike. (Doc. 142). Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all claims in Plaintiff's second amended complaint, (Doc 79). Plaintiff has moved to strike Defendants' motion for summary judgment and its accompanying statement of material facts. Upon review, Plaintiff's motion to strike will be DENIED, and Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Plaintiff Gary L. Dance, who is an African-American man, worked for the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP). (Doc. 156 ¶¶22-23). In 1996, he was assigned to the King of Prussia station, and in 2012, reassigned to Troop T - Pocono as Eastern Patrol Section Commander. (Id. ¶24, 26). As a state trooper, Dance was promoted to Corporal in 1998, Sergeant in 2002, Lieutenant in 2005, Captain in 2018, and Major in 2020. (Id. ¶25; Doc. 139 ¶¶41-42, 46).
Plaintiff alleges that on multiple occasions he was passed over for promotion in favor of other less experienced, and Caucasian, officers. (Doc. 79 ¶¶54-56, 63, 68, 72, 80, 84, 89, 91-93, 96, 106). He also alleges that he was excluded from various decisions and communications and that certain opportunities were withheld from him. (Id. ¶¶37, 62) At various points, he informed Defendant Hoke of his concerns regarding discrimination and retaliation. (Id. ¶¶58, 65; Doc. 156 ¶¶58, 64-65). During his employment Plaintiff made internal complaints of discrimination and retaliation with the PSP Equal Employment Office. (Doc. 156 ¶79).
Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission in July 2016. (Doc. 139 ¶1). Regarding this Charge, the EEOC determined that there was reasonable cause to believe that Defendant PSP had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (Doc. 138-62). Conciliation was unsuccessful, and Plaintiff received notice of his right to sue. (Doc. 138-63). Plaintiff filed another Charge of Discrimination in November 2017. (Doc. 139 ¶7; Doc. 138-72). He filed additional charges in February 2019, (Doc. 138-72), and May 2019 (Doc. 138-74).
This case was originally filed in December 2017. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff amended his complaint first in May 2019, (Doc. 59), and again in December 2019. (Doc. 79).
The Second Amended Complaint names as defendants the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania State Police, and a number of PSP employees. (Doc. 79). Plaintiff brings claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 42 U.S.C. §1981 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, and the First and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant §1983.
The court previously dismissed all of Plaintiff's Title VII claims that occurred before September 15, 2015, and all of Plaintiff's claims under §1983 that occurred before December 29, 2015. (Doc. 37).
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery [including, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file] and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 1990). A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, and is material if it will affect the outcome of the trial under governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Ericksen, 903 F.Supp. 836, 838 (M.D. Pa. 1995). At the summary judgment stage, “the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; see also Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (). Rather, the court must consider all evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 2007).
To prevail on summary judgment, the moving party must affirmatively identify those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. The moving party can discharge that burden by showing that “on all the essential elements of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.” In re Bressman, 327 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. If the moving party meets this initial burden, the non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts,” but must show sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in its favor. Boyle v. County of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). However, if the non-moving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [the non-movant's] case, and on which [the non-movant] will bear the burden of proof at trial,” Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment because such a failure “necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23; Jakimas v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff has filed a “Motion to Strike Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Their Statement of Material Facts,” (Doc. 142), based on alleged violations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule 56.1. (Id. at 2).
Plaintiff first faults Defendants for not appending exhibits to their motion. Yet Rule 56 does not require “that the moving party supplement its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Instead, “the burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court- that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Id. at 325.
As alleged violations of Local Rule 56.1, Plaintiff cites various “sweeping legal conclusions” contained in Defendants' statement of facts “without citations to the record.” (Doc. 143 at 7). Some of the statements to which Plaintiff refers are negations: assertions that Plaintiff has not produced evidence showing a certain fact. (Doc. 136 ¶¶10.a-c, 13a-3, 21). As such, they cannot themselves be supported by a record citation. Others are merely subparts of statements which do include a reference to the record. (Id. ¶¶39a-b, 40a-c). Still others are pure legal conclusions, not statements of fact. (Id. ¶¶47-57). Of course, such statements are of no use to the court or to Defendants-but that does not necessarily render the entire statement of facts unacceptable. Finally, Plaintiff cites one factual assertion which lacks a reference to the record. (Id. ¶46). That statement, that Plaintiff was offered and accepted a promotion to Major in March 2020, is undisputed. (Doc. 139 ¶46). How the absence of citation for one undisputed fact, undoubtedly within Plaintiff's personal knowledge, so frustrates the purpose of Local Rule 56.1 as to warrant striking entire filings is unclear.
Local Rule 56.1 requires that “[statements of material facts ... shall include references to the parts of the record that support the statement.” With one exception, Defendants have provided a supporting reference to each statement of fact. Assuredly, Defendants' statement, as well as Plaintiff's counter-statement, could be more concise. And attempts in either to pass off legal conclusions, speculations, or opinions as facts are rejected.
Nonetheless, there is no indication that Plaintiff has been prejudiced by any technical violation of Local Rule 56.1. Defendants' fail to attach certain cited evidence at their own peril; in any event, Plaintiff's answer to Defendants' statement indicates that Plaintiff could access the record. As to the extraneous legal conclusions contained in Defendants' statement of facts, the court pays no mind to those whatsoever. And Plaintiff cannot claim that he was somehow disadvantaged by the absence of a record citation for the fact that Plaintiff himself was promoted to Major, a fact which he admits.
A district court's decision whether to employ sanctions for violations of local rules is “fully within the discretion of that Court.” Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613-14 (3d Cir. 2018). Here, the court concludes that sanctions are unnecessary. To be sure, the court continues to require strict compliance with the Local Rules. At the same time, it urges counsel to train their efforts on resolution of the case. See Model Rules of Pro. Conduct. r. 3.2 .
Count I of the Complaint brings various claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (Doc. 79 ¶¶110-14). Before bringing a Title VII claim in court, a plaintiff must file a complaint with the...
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