Dane Cnty. v. Barron Cnty.
| Citation | 26 N.W.2d 249,249 Wis. 618 |
| Parties | DANE COUNTY v. BARRON COUNTY et al. |
| Decision Date | 13 May 1947 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Eau Claire County; Clarence E. Rinehard, Judge.
Affirmed.
This proceeding was begun by the city of Madison filing a claim against the county of Dane on or about the 3d day of September, 1940, for relief furnished to one Mrs. Lucille Connery for herself and children in the amount of $82.24, which was allowed and paid by Dane County. Dane County thereupon, on May 12, 1941, filed a complaint with the department of public welfare, division of public assistance, seeking recovery of said amount from Barron county and the town of Rice Lake. There were two hearings before the department of public welfare, division of public assistance, which will hereafter be referred to as the department. The first hearing was held on December 9, 1942. The second hearing was held on March 18, 1943. The parties were represented by counsel, considerable evidence was received, both oral and documentary, and the department concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the sum of $82.24 plus disbursements of $102.60 or a total of $184.84 from the town of Rice Lake, Barron county, Wisconsin. An order for payment was made accordingly. From the order so entered the defendants appealed on the 12th day of April, 1944, to the circuit court for Eau Claire county. The trial court upon a hearing affirmed the order of the department and from the court's decision the defendant town appealed to this Court, on April 6, 1946.
The facts will be stated in the opinion.
FOWLER and RECTOR, JJ., dissenting. A. J. Connors, of Rice Lake, and Wilkie, Toebaas, Hart & Jackman, of Madison, for appellant.
Norris E. Maloney, Dist. Atty., of Madison, for respondent.
We shall state only such facts as are necessary to a disposition of the principal questions raised in this case. First, we shall consider the contention of the defendant that the department had no jurisdiction to try and determine the question of the liability of the town of Rice Lake for the reason that sec. 49.03(8a) was void because of an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power to the board. Counsel requests the Court to re-examine Town of Holland v. Village of Cedar Grove, 1939, 230 Wis. 177, 282 N.W. 111, 448 and overrule it.
Town of Holland v. Village of Cedar Grove was decided February 7, 1939. The statute there under consideration was sec. 49.03(8a), stats. of 1937. By ch. 242 of the Laws of 1939, subsec. (8a) of sec. 49.03 of the statutes of 1937 was repealed and recreated and as so recreated became a part of the statutes of 1939. The amendment of 1939 disposed of most, if not all, of the objections urged against the section in the case of Town of Holland v. Village of Cedar Grove, supra.
One of the principal objections urged against sec. 49.03(8a) of the statutes of 1937, was that sec. 49.03(8a) of the statutes of 1937 did not do away with a preexisting statutory action in favor of a county which had paid for the relief of a pauper having a legal residence elsewhere. By the amendment it was provided:
‘(8a) (a) All relief claims by one municipality or county against another municipality or county, which have been disallowed or which have not been acted upon as required by statute, may be prosecuted before the industrial commission which is hereby given the exclusive power and duty to hear, try and determine such controversies and to render its findings therein. * * *’
We have given the arguments of counsel careful consideration and see no reason for reversing the conclusions reached in Town of Holland v. Village of Cedar Grove, supra.
The amendment certainly removed the objection that the previously existing statutory action had not been destroyed.
Second, it is undisputed in this case that if Maurice Connery did not gain a residence in the county of Dane between August 1, 1932 and August 1, 1933, the order of the circuit court should be affirmed. Connery arrived in Madison from Illinois in October, 1931. He was a transient. After his arrival in Madison, he obtained some employment as an extra cook at various restaurants in the city and after a lapse of a few weeks, married Lucille O'Donnell on February 24, 1932, who at the time of her marriage was the mother of two illegitimate children, which Connery adopted in 1935. At the time of their marriage, between them, they had two or three dollars. After the marriage and up until 1932, both Mr. and Mrs. Connery were employed to some extent. On May 1, 1933, Mrs. Conneryleft her employment due to illness, Connery continued to work as an extra cook whenever he could procure employment. His average earnings were $9 to $10 a week. Some weeks he testified that he worked but a single day but thought on the average he was employed two or three days a week at $3 a day.
Connery applied for assistance on July 25, 1933. Assistance was granted the Connery family in July, August and September as follows:
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
¦Date Paid¦Date of Grant 1933¦Type of Aid ¦Amount¦
+---------+------------------+---------------------------+------¦
¦July 28 ¦ ¦Utility (June 8 to July 10)¦$1.10 ¦
+---------+------------------+---------------------------+------¦
¦Aug. 3 ¦6-25 to 7-25 ¦Rent (back) ¦15.00 ¦
+---------+------------------+---------------------------+------¦
¦Aug. 28 ¦7-25 ¦Groceries ¦4.30 ¦
+---------+------------------+---------------------------+------¦
¦Aug. 17 ¦7-26 ¦Kerosene ¦.45 ¦
+---------+------------------+---------------------------+------¦
¦Sep. 30 ¦7-10 to 8-8 ¦Utility ¦1.02 ¦
+---------+------------------+---------------------------+------¦
¦ ¦ ¦Clothing ¦.80 ¦
+---------+------------------+---------------------------+------¦
¦Sep. 2 ¦7-25 to 8-25 ¦Rent (back) ¦15.00 ¦
+---------+------------------+---------------------------+------¦
¦ ¦ ¦Total ¦$37.68¦
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
After September 2, 1933, the following items were paid for which were authorized during August:
+-------------------------------------------+
¦Groceries from August 1 to August 22¦$15.76¦
+------------------------------------+------¦
¦Fuel authorized August 2 ¦.45 ¦
+------------------------------------+------¦
¦Medical expense granted August 1 ¦3.00 ¦
+-------------------------------------------+
We cannot set out all of the detailed facts as to which there is conflicting evidence relating to the amounts received by the Connery family. It is undisputed that the amounts stated above were received. The principal claims made on behalf of the defendant are (1) that Connery by reason of his employment and the use of his credit based thereon could have provided for his family; (2) that a person must make a fair effort to meet his expenses and in the absence of such effort he does not acquire the status of a pauper by receiving public assistance. These contentions raise questions of law. We shall consider them in their order.
Section 49.03(1) provides:
Section 49.02(4) provides: ‘Every person of full age who shall have resided in any town, village or city in this state one whole year shall thereby gain a settlement therein; but no residence of a person in any town, village or city while supported therein as a pauper * * * shall operate to give such person a settlement therein.’
The statutes in force at the time involved in this case did not define the term ‘pauper’ nor was the term ‘poor person’ defined. It is to be noted that sec. 49.03, under which the local municipality is required to give such assistance as it may deem just and necessary, uses the words ‘poor persons' while in sec. 49.02(4) relating to settlement, the term ‘pauper’ is used. Taking all the provisions of ch. 49 into consideration in connection with the purpose and object sought to be attained thereby, the words ‘pauper’ and ‘poor person’ must be held to be practically synonymous.When a poor person in need of assistance as stated in sec. 49.03(1) receives assistance under that section, that is what the municipality furnishing the relief is entitled to be paid by the place of his legal settlement. If this is not true, a municipality which is required to furnish assistance to a ‘poor person’ would assume the risk of furnishing assistance for which the place of settlement was not liable. It is apparent from the statute that the support received by a person which prevents him from acquiring a residence in the place where the assistance is furnished is the assistance furnished him under the provisions of sec. 49.03. It is to be noted that by the Laws of 1945, ch. 585, the entire ch. 49 was revised and in the revision the term ‘pauper’ is dropped as well as ‘poor person’ and the phrase ‘dependent person’ substituted for them. ‘Dependent person’ is defined by the statute to...
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...some of the expense of his own support. The words 'poor person' and 'pauper' are practically synonymous. Dane County v. Barron County, 249 Wis. 618, 26 N.W.2d 249, 251, 254 (1947). For the utilization of the license suspension penalty for failure to pay the poll tax to be immune from attack......
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