Dane County v. McManus

Decision Date30 June 1972
Docket NumberNo. 284,284
Citation198 N.W.2d 667,55 Wis.2d 413
Parties, 70 A.L.R.3d 1313 COUNTY OF DANE, Respondent, v. Jack McMANUS, Appellant.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

This case involves a statutory and constitutional challenge to the validity of a county ordinance which provides for reserved parking of vehicles by county employees in a county-owned parking ramp.

The parking ramp is located in downtown Madison in the immediate vicinity of the City-County Building where the employees in question work. The ramp is partially enclosed, is several stories high, and has parking space for more than 1,000 cars.

On December 28, 1970, the County of Dane, a municipal corporation, and the Dane County Joint Council of Unions, Wisconsin county and municipal employees, Council #40, AFSCME AFL-CIO (hereinafter joint council), signed a labor agreement. The joint council had been recognized by the county of Dane as the exclusive bargaining agent for all Dane county employees except for members of the traffic and sheriff's departments and certain supervisory personnel.

Art. XVI, sec. 4 of the Agreement, entitled 'Parking,' provided that:

'Employees shall be provided parking space in the County Parking Ramp Monday through Friday for the fee of thirteen dollars ($13) per month. The space provided shall be a block of space, prefereably on the lowest level (floor one), which shall be reserved for County employees during the regular work day hours Monday through Friday. Employees classified as clerical in Appendix A shall have preference over all others in the event of a space shortage and such employees will receive preference by order of seniority.'

The labor agreement, including the above provision, was to be effective as of January 1, 1971. Both parties are agreed that the rate of $13 per month is substantially lower than the meter rate for any member of the public during an equivalent time period (approximately $22 per month).

The Dane County Board amended its parking ramp ordinance, sec. 18.03, in order to make the parking provision of the labor agreement effective.

Sec. 18.03, entitled 'PARKING SYSTEM, GENERAL,' now provides:

'No person shall without permission of the Dane County Public Protection Committee, leave or park any motor vehicle or vehicles in the Dane County Parking Ramp contrary to a posted sign thereof if there is in pliain view on such property a 'NO PARKING' sign or a sign indicating limited or restricted parking.

'The Dane County Public Protection Committee is authorized to designate areas for parking of vehicles of Dane County employees who have obtained the necessary permit from Dane County and said area shall be designated for Dane County employees only.'

Pursuant to the delegation of authority, the Dane County Public Protection Committee reserved an area in the Dane County Parking Ramp and posted proper signs in the restricted area. On January 1, 1971, two days of the underground area of the Dane County Parking Ramp became reserved for the exclusive use of Dane county employees between the hours of 7 a.m. and 5 p.m. The hours were effective Monday through Friday.

On January 8, 1971, appellant-defendant Jack McManus parked a Jeep Wagon in the reserved section of the Dane County Parking Ramp. He was given a parking ticket and issued a traffic violation summons due to a violation of sec. 18.03 of the Dane County Ordinance.

In the Dane county court the defendant moved to dismiss the action on the basis that sec. 18.03 of the Parking Ramp Ordinance was invalid for a variety of reasons. On April 19, 1971, the trial court denied the motion in a memorandum decision and found the defendant guilty as charged. The defendant was fined $10 plus $7 costs. On June 18, 1971 the circuit court for Dane county affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appeals.

Jack McManus, Madison, for appellant.

Glenn L. Henry, Madison, for respondent.

Robert W. Warren, Atty. Gen., John C. Murphy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, amicus curia.

BEILFUSS, Justice.

Two issues have been presented by the parties:

1. Is sec. 18.03 of the Parking Ramp Ordinance (and also Art. XVI, sec. 4 of the labor agreement) against the public policy of Wisconsin as expressed in ch. 111, Stats., 'Employment Relations?'

2. Is sec. 18.03 (and also sec. 59.071(1)(lm), Stats.) either unconstitutional on its face or unconstitutional as applied?

The defendant's first contention is that sec. 18.03 of the Dane County Ordinances, and Art. XVI, sec. 4 of the collective bargaining agreement, violate the legislative expression of public policy as set forth in ch. 111, Stats. More specifically, the defendant contends that sec. 111.01(1) and (2) was not complied with when sec. 18.03 (Dane County Ordinance) was passed.

Sec. 111.01(1), Stats., provides:

'Declaration of policy. The public policy of the state as to employment relations and collective bargaining, in the furtherance of which this subchapter is enacted, is declared to be as follows:

'(1) It recognizes that there are three major interests involved, namely: That of the public, the employe, and the employer. These three interests are to a considerable extent interrelated. It is the policy of the state to protect and promote each of these interests with due regard to the situation and to the rights of the others.'

Sub. (2) of sec. 111.01, Stats., in relevant part, provides that the employer and employees:

'. . . should not be permitted, in the conduct of their controversy, to intrude directly into the primary rights of third parties to earn a livelihood, transact business and engage in the ordinary affairs of life by any lawful means and free from molestation, interference, restraint or coercion.'

Defendant asserts that the general public interest was not adequately considered when sec. 18.03 (Dane County Ordinance) was passed, and that the ordinance and the collective bargaining agreement provision are invalid for that reason.

A more recent legislative expression of public policy dealing with state employees is cited by the defendant to support his position.

Sec. 111.80, Stats., provides:

'Subchapter V.

'State Employment Labor Relations Act.

'111.80 Declaration of policy. The public policy of the state as to labor relations and collective bargaining in state employment, in the furtherance of which this subchapter is enacted, is as follows:

'(1) It recognizes that there are 3 major interests involved, namely: that of the public, the state employe, and the state as an employer. These 3 interests are to a considerable extent interrelated. It is the policy of this state to protect and promote each of these interests with due regard to the situation and to the rights of the others.'

However, County of Dane contends that sec. 111.70(2), Stats., allowed the Dane county employees to negotiate for the parking spaces in the Dane County Parking Ramp as a term or condition of employment.

Sec. 111.70(2), Stats., provides:

'Rights of Municipal Employes. Municipal employes shall have the right of self-organization, to affiliate with labor organizations of their own choosing and the right to be represented by labor organizations of their own choice in conferences and negotiations with their municipal employers or their representatives on questions of wages, hours and conditions of employment, and such employes shall have the right to refrain from any and all such activities.'

The legislative grant of bargaining rights to public employees includes the right to bargain for conditions of employment. Convenient and accessible parking space can be a proper item of concern in considering conditions of employment, especially for employees working downtown in urban areas.

In addition, the legislature has specifically granted county boards the right to provide for restrictive parking. Sec. 59.07(1), Stats., provides:

'General powers of board. The board of each county may exercise the following powers, which shall be broadly and liberally construed and limited only by express language:

'(1) Property. (a) How acquired; purposes. Take and hold land sold for taxes and acquire, lease or rent property, real and personal, for public uses or purposes of any nature, including without limitation acquisitions for county buildings, . . .'

Also, sec. 59.07(1)(1m), Stats., provides:

'Parking Areas. Enact ordinances providing for establishing areas for parking of vehicles on lands owned or leased by the county; for regulating, permitting, prohibiting, restricting or limiting parking of vehicles on such areas or parts of such areas, including, without limitation by reason of enumeration, provision for parking in such areas or parts thereof for only certain purposes or by only certain personnel; for penalties for violations thereof, but not to exceed the sum of $50 for each offense; and for the enforcement of such ordinances.'

Sub. (1) and para. (lm) of sub. (1), sec. 59.07, Stats., provide legislative authority for the county to set aside certain areas of land and property owned by the county for the purpose of parking, including restricted parking. Such explicit state legislative authority clearly overrides the defendant's contention that sec. 18.03 of the Dane County Ordinances did not consider the public interest. Sec. 18.03 merely followed sec. 59.07(1) and sec. 59.07(1) (1m) in setting aside a reserved parking area for county employees. The state itself has given counties the authority to provide for restrictive parking on county owned land.

Aside from the statutory authority given to the county boards to provide for restricted parking, we believe that provision for reasonable restricted parking to municipal employees can be in the public interest to attract and keep employees and aid in timeliness and governmental efficiency.

We conclude that sec. 18.03 of the Parking Ramp Ordinance is not violative of statutory public policy.

The defendant makes two constitutional attacks on sec. 59.07(1)(1m), Stats. The first one is a...

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