Danforth Lessee v. Thomas

• Decision Date: 08 March 1816
• Parties: DANFORTH'S LESSEE v. THOMAS
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

14 U.S. 155

4 L.Ed. 59

1 Wheat. 155

DANFORTH'S LESSEE v. THOMAS.

March 8, 1816

ERROR to the circuit court for the district of East Tennessee. This cause, depending mainly on the same principles with the preceding case of Preston v. Browder,^a was argued by Key for the plaintiff, and by Jones for the defendant in error. The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

^a Ante, p. 115. March 8th.

TODD, J., delivered the opinion of the court as follows:

This was an action of ejectment brought by the plaintiff in error against the defendant in error. On the trial of the cause in the circuit court, it appeared from evidence that the land in controversy was situate in the tract of country lying south of Holston and French broad river, and between the rivers Tennessee and Big Pigeon, the Indian title to which was extinguished by the treaty of Holston. The plaintiff claimed by virtue of a grant, issued by the state of North Carolina, bearing date the 26th of December, 1791. The defendant claimed under a grant from the state of Tennessee, bearing date the 2d of January, 1809. The defendant, by his counsel, objected to the grant under which the plaintiff claimed title being admitted in evidence, on the ground that it was for land which the laws of North Carolina had prohibited from being entered, surveyed, or granted. The court sustained the objection, and prohibited the grant from going in evidence to the jury; whereupon a verdict and judgment was rendered in favour of the defendant. A bill of exceptions was taken to the opinion of the court, and the cause was brought up to this court by writ of error.

The correctness of the opinion of the circuit court depends on the sound construction of the act of the general assembly of the state of North Carolina, passed in 1783, c. 2. s. 5 and 6, whereby the lands, within certain limits therein designated, (including the lands in controversy) are reserved for the Cherokee Indians, and the citizens prohibited from entering and surveying lands within those limits. It is contended, on the part of the plaintiff, that this act cannot be construed, nor did the legislature mean to give the Indians a right of property in the soil, but merely the use and enjoyment of it. That the succeeding legislatures, by the acts of 1784, 1786, and 1789, have changed this reservation for the use of the Indians, and given unlimited access, for the purposes of making entries and surveys 'to all lands not before specially located,' and to ...