Danforth v. City of Yankton
| Decision Date | 18 November 1946 |
| Docket Number | 8898. |
| Citation | 25 N.W.2d 50,71 S.D. 406 |
| Parties | DANFORTH v. CITY OF YANKTON et al. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Nov. 23, 1946.
John E. Walsh, of Yankton, for plaintiff and respondent.
W W. French, H. A. Doyle and Frank Biegelmeier, all of Yankton for defendants and appellants.
This action was instituted by Charles Irving Danforth under the Declaratory Judgment Act (SDC 37.01) against the City of Yankton, the mayor, auditor, treasurer and the commissioners of the city for the purpose of determining the validity and effect of the provisions of Chapter 118, Laws 1945. There was a trial on the merits in the circuit court of Yankton county which resulted in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and from such judgment defendants have appealed.
The statute referred to is entitled 'An Act to Authorize the Governing Bodies of Certain Public Corporations, To Purchase Acquire, Maintain and Operate Interstate Toll Bridges Across Streams and Rivers; to Issue Bonds Therefore, Payable Only From the Revenues of Such Toll Bridges Without Liability Against Such Public Corporations: To Create a Bridge Commission: To Prescribe the Duties and Powers of the Governing Bodies of Such Public Corporations and of such Bridge Commission and to Make the Provisions of Sections SDC 45.2404 to SDC 45.2418 Both Inclusive, Applicable Thereto.'
Under the provisions of this enactment, Ch. 118, Laws 1945, § 2, every municipality or county in the state is 'authorized and empowered to purchase or otherwise acquire, equip, maintain, operate and improve any interstate toll bridge within * * * the corporate or territorial limits of such municipality or county or within five miles thereof, whether the same be all within or partly within and partly without this state.' For the purpose of defraying the cost of purchasing such a bridge the act provides, Ch. 118, Laws 1945, § 3, that 'every municipality or county may borrow money and issue negotiable bonds without pledging or using the credit of such municipality or county; provided no such money shall be borrowed and no such bonds shall be issued until authorized by an ordinance of such municipality, duly adopted, or resolution of the board of commissioners of such county * * * nor until such ordinance or resolution has been submitted to the voters of such municipality or county at a regular or special election and sixty per cent of the electors voting thereon have voted in favor of such ordinance or resolution.' It is further provided in Section 3 of the act that 'Such ordinance or such resolution shall provide that the proposed toll bridge is to be acquired pursuant to the provisions of this chapter; it shall further describe or specify the value or agreed price for the purchase or acquisition of such toll bridge as agreed to between the owner or owners thereof and the governing board of such municipality or board of commissioners of such county, and the governing board may agree with the owner or owners of such toll bridge as to the value thereof and purchase the same at such agreed price or value, and said governing board is hereby authorized to negotiate for the purchase or acquisition of such toll bridge and procure an option thereon and shall have power to negotiate with, and for a nominal consideration procure, an option for the purchase of such bridge.'
The provisions of SDC 45.24, authorizing municipal corporations to acquire and maintain light, heat and power systems and water works systems and to issue bonds therefor payable from the revenues of such utilities, are made applicable to the purchase and operation of bridges acquired under the act, Ch. 118, Laws 1945, § 4, and as to the exercise of powers therein vested it is provided, Ch. 118, Laws 1945, §§ 5, 6: 'The governing board of any such municipality or county may at any time prior to acquisition of title to any such bridge, or thereafter by resolution, provide for and create a bridge commission * * * and after its creation said bridge commission shall be vested with all the powers, rights and duties and shall be governed by the procedure set forth' in SDC 45.24, so far as applicable.
An understanding of the questions sought to be presented requires a recital of the allegations of the complaint. The interest of the plaintiff in the relief he seeks is alleged in the first paragraph of the complaint: 'Plaintiff is now, and at all times hereinafter mentioned was, an elector, freeholder, and taxpayer of the City of Yankton, County of Yankton, and State of South Dakota; and the Plaintiff is now and will continue to be a user and toll payer of the bridge hereinafter identified.'
It is further alleged that the construction of a bridge was completed in 1924 by the Meridian Highway Bridge Company, a South Dakota corporation, extending from a point in the city of Yankton across the Missouri river to a point in Cedar county, Nebraska, where the bridge joins the state highway system of Nebraska; that such bridge company has given an option to purchase its structure to the Kirkpatrick-Pettis Company, which in turn has agreed to sell the bridge to the city of Yankton and accept in payment toll bridge revenue bonds in the sum of $700,000; that the board of commissioners of the city of Yankton enacted an ordinance authorizing and providing for the issuance of toll bridge revenue bonds in the above amount for the purchase of the bridge; that the ordinance was submitted to the voters of the city of Yankton at a special election and was approved by a vote of more than sixty per cent of the electors voting thereon; that the city commission of the city of Yankton adopted a resolution reciting that the commission would not proceed either with the purchase of the bridge or the issuance of revenue bonds until it shall have been adjudicated that the act of 1945, and the proceedings of the city commissioners thereunder are valid and that the proposed revenue bonds will not constitute a general obligation of the city. The complaint asks declaratory relief as follows: (1) that Chapter 118, Laws 1945, is constitutional; (2) that the title of the Act does not embrace more than one subject; (3) that the proposed revenue bonds would be exempt from taxation; (4) that the provisions of the act vesting the governing body of a municipality with authority to appoint a bridge commission are valid; (5) that the enactment of the provisions of SDC 45.24, so far as they may be applicable, by reference is valid; (6) that a bridge acquired under the act would come within the term 'utility' as defined by SDC 45.2401; (7) that the issuance of revenue bonds under this act would not create a debt within the meaning of any constitutional or statutory limitation and particularly Section 4, Article 13 of the Constitution of this state; (8) and that the court grant such other relief as may be lawful and proper in the premises.
An answer was filed admitting that defendants did not intend to proceed further with the purchase of the bridge and issuance of the bonds until the validity of the statute and the other matters involved are determined and praying that the court by its decree determine the validity of the statute and declare 'the rights, status and other legal relations of the city of Yankton and its defendant officers growing out of and in connection with the agreement with Kirkpatrick-Pettis Company and Ordinance No. 92.'
The cause was heard on the pleadings and a stipulation of the facts and the court rendered a decree granting the relief sought.
Notwithstanding the favorable adjudication of the trial court, the city and the other defendants named have appealed and assert that there exists an uncertainty as to the questions adjudicated and seek to obtain a review of the judgment. As a general rule, an appellant must not only have an interest in the subject matter in controversy, but must also be prejudiced or aggrieved by the decision from which he appeals. It would appear that the judgment could not have been more favorable to the appellants and that this court is asked to confirm what was adjudicated below.
The case was submitted upon the assumption that there existed a controversy properly determinable under the Declaratory Judgment Law. If there was an absence of jurisdiction in the trial court to consider the questions presented, the declarations are advisory only and would not be res adjudicata. We must determine at the outset whether the facts and conditions warranted the rendering of a declaratory judgment.
A proceeding for a declaratory judgment must be based on a justiciable controversy between parties having adverse interests in the matter with respect to which the declaration is sought. Security State Bank v. Breen, 65 S.D. 640, 277 N.W. 497; State of North Dakota v. Perkins County, S.D. 9 N.W.2d 500. The court in State v. Dammann, 220 Wis. 17, 264 N.W. 627, 629, 103 A.L.R. 1089, summarizes the jurisdictional requisites as follows: '(1) There must exist a justiciable controversy; that is to say, a controversy in which a claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy, that is to say, a legally protectible interest; and (4) the issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for judicial determination.'
In Borchard on Declaratory Judgments, page 29, the author in discussing the requisites of a suit for declaratory judgment says ...
To continue reading
Request your trial