Daniel B. v. O'BANNON
| Decision Date | 11 June 1984 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 79-4088. |
| Citation | 588 F. Supp. 1095 |
| Parties | DANIEL B., and Jerry G. on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. Helen O'BANNON, in her official capacity as Secretary, Department of Public Welfare, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Leon Soffer, in his official capacity as County Administrator, Philadelphia County Mental Retardation Program, and City of Philadelphia. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Andrew F. Erba, Community Legal Services, Inc., and Edmond A. Tiryak, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiffs.
Gabriel L. Bevilacqua, Philadelphia, Pa., for City of Philadelphia.
Alan J. Davis, City Sol., Joseph M. Davidson, Marc H. Myers, Shelly Yanoff, Asst. City Solicitors, Richard J. Gold, Pauline C. Cohen, Chief, Asst. City Solicitors, Philadelphia, Pa., for Leon Soffer, Ph.D and The City of Philadelphia.
Michael Harvey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Civ. Litigation Div., Harrisburg, Pa., for Helen O'Bannon.
Plaintiffs filed this action on behalf of a putative class of mentally retarded individuals institutionalized at Woodhaven Center ("Woodhaven"), an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded operated by Temple University under contract with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief for all Woodhaven residents "who are unnecessarily institutionalized at that facility because defendant state officials have failed to fulfill their federal and state duties to provide plaintiffs with suitable community living arrangements." Third Amended Complaint ¶ 1. Plaintiffs brought this action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 28 U.S.C. § 1331; jurisdiction was conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4).
The plaintiffs, residents of Woodhaven, sought to represent a class consisting:
of all mentally retarded individuals who presently reside or in the future will reside at the Woodhaven Center, whose domicile is Philadelphia, and who have completed or will complete their treatment regimen there but are unable to leave that institution due to the defendants' failure to perform their duties under federal and state law to provide them suitable community living arrangements.
Third Amended Complaint ¶ 11. Plaintiffs alleged the Secretary of the Department of Public Welfare of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania:
has the responsibility, inter alia, to: (i) assure within Pennsylvania the availability and equitable provision of mental retardation services to all persons who need them; (ii) assist each county and Philadelphia in carrying out mental retardation duties; and (iii) supervise and fund mental retardation facilities, services and programs.
Third Amended Complaint ¶¶ 6, 7. Plaintiffs alleged the Deputy Commissioner of the Philadelphia Office of Mental Health and Retardation, and the City of Philadelphia:
have the responsibility, inter alia, to: (i) establish a mental retardation program in Philadelphia for the care, treatment and rehabilitation of the mentally retarded; (ii) establish multidisciplinary staff units known as base service units to provide such service; (iii) direct, control and monitor the activities of the base service units, including aftercare services to prevent unnecessary and prolonged institutionalization and the creation and operation of community living arrangements.
Third Amended Complaint ¶ 10. The complaint concerned not the treatment received at Woodhaven but the failure to release plaintiffs into community treatment programs.
Plaintiffs alleged they voluntarily committed themselves to Woodhaven pursuant to contracts entered into with Woodhaven and plaintiffs' respective base service units ("BSU"). Third Amended Complaint ¶¶ 19, 30. The contracts called for Woodhaven to provide appropriate treatment programs for plaintiffs and for the BSUs to provide community living arrangements when plaintiffs completed these treatment programs. Third Amended Complaint ¶¶ 21, 32. Plaintiffs alleged that although they completed their Woodhaven treatment programs and were referred by the Woodhaven staff to BSUs for community placement, they have not been placed in community living arrangements. Third Amended Complaint ¶¶ 24, 25, 35 and 36. Plaintiffs alleged that they have not been placed "because defendants ... have failed to discharge their ... duties under federal and state law to provide plaintiffs with suitable community living arrangements." Third Amended Complaint ¶¶ 25, 36.
Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that defendants violated plaintiffs' right to treatment and protection from harm provided in the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6000 et seq., Third Amended Complaint ¶¶ 48, 49, and defendants' duty under Pennsylvania law to provide treatment in the least restrictive alternative. Third Amended Complaint, ¶ 50. However, at the last pretrial conference plaintiffs withdrew their claims under the Eighth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 6011 (the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act) because of doctrinal developments since the filing of this complaint. On January 23, 1984, the Supreme Court held in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984), that the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal suit against state officials to enforce state law; therefore, the state grounds must also be dismissed. Plaintiffs' claims for relief are now based on the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Plaintiffs also seek injunctive relief requiring defendants to develop and execute an individual plan for each plaintiff for placement in a community living arrangement.
Before the court are three motions:
For the reasons stated below, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted, plaintiffs' motion to certify a class is denied and the motion to intervene of Alfred W. is denied.
Defendant Secretary of Public Welfare (hereinafter "defendant Secretary") moves for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for a stay, on the ground that plaintiffs are members of the class certified in Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital, 446 F.Supp. 1295 (E.D.Pa.1977); aff'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir.1979); vacated and remanded, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 964 (1981); judgment reinstated on remand, 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir.1982); reversed and remanded, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) ("Pennhurst"), and are barred under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel from maintaining this action.
The Pennhurst action was filed in May, 1974 by retarded residents and former residents of Pennhurst State School and Hospital (now Pennhurst Center), an institution owned and operated by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, to obtain, inter alia, an injunction closing Pennhurst and requiring the state to provide care, training and education for class members in community living arrangements. Pennhurst, 446 F.Supp. at 1298. In November, 1976, the court certified a class consisting of all retarded persons "who as of May 30, 1974, and any time subsequent, have been or may become residents of Pennhurst...." 446 F.Supp. at 1300. The class includes all retarded persons residing at Pennhurst on that date, those on the waiting list and those who may be placed at Pennhurst because of the unavailability of "alternative services in the community." Id. The defendants are "Pennhurst; the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare; various state and county officials responsible for supervising the Commonwealth's and the counties' retardation programs; and the superintendent and various employees of Pennhurst." 446 F.Supp. at 1301-02 (footnote omitted).
When the instant case was filed late in 1979, plaintiffs recognized that the decision of the Court of Appeals in Pennhurst would determine the federal claims presented herein but asserted a distinctive state contract claim justifying separate litigation. Plaintiff sought discovery on contractual arrangements regarding members of the putative class and defendants resisted the discovery and certification of the putative class. Developments in the Pennhurst litigation resulted in amendments to plaintiffs' complaint and a modified defendants' response regarding class certification. Status conferences were held to discuss the scheduling and disposition of this case in view of the status of the Pennhurst litigation.
Defendants Soffer and the City of Philadelphia then filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs did not have a right to care in the least restrictive setting; that motion was denied. However, defendant Secretary's motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs as members of the class in Pennhurst were bound by the results of that litigation was held under advisement pending the submission of reports by the parties concerning the relationship of the class proposed in this litigation to that in Pennhurst. At the last conference concerning the status of this case in view of the Pennhurst litigation, it was thought that the Supreme Court decision on the appeal then pending might resolve this litigation but the latest opinion in Pennhurst filed January 24, 1984 reversed and remanded for further consideration of the federal grounds for the judgment of the district court.
A motion for summary judgment can be granted only when there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Goodman v....
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