Daniel Corp. v. Reed
| Decision Date | 01 October 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. S12A0867.,S12A0867. |
| Parties | DANIEL CORPORATION v. REED et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
291 Ga. 596
732 S.E.2d 61
DANIEL CORPORATION
v.
REED et al.
No. S12A0867.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Oct. 1, 2012.
[732 S.E.2d 62]
James J. Thomas, II, Ichter Thomas, Atlanta, for appellant.
Amber Ali Robinson, Mark G. Trigg, Greenberg Traurig, Atlanta, for appellees.
BLACKWELL, Justice.
[291 Ga. 596]Within nine months after the City of Atlanta issues an alcohol license, the holder of that license must “open for business the establishment referred to in the license,” and if the holder fails to do so, it automatically forfeits the license. City of Atlanta Code of Ordinances § 10–69(a). SPI Club, Inc. operates two nightclubs in Atlanta, and in July 2010, the City issued an alcohol license for each club. Daniel Corporation contends that SPI Club failed to open either club for business within nine months of the issue of these licenses, and in April 2011, Daniel sued City officials, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel these officials to recognize an automatic forfeiture of the licenses. The court below found that SPI Club had, in fact, opened the clubs for business within the required time, and it denied the petition for a writ of mandamus. Daniel appeals, and we affirm.
After Daniel filed its petition, SPI Club intervened as a defendant, and the parties agreed to a stipulation of the material facts. According to that stipulation, one of the clubs hosted two private events in August 2010. The first event, on August 21, was a birthday celebration attended by approximately 100 people. The second event, on August 23, was a wedding celebration attended by approximately 50 people. Food and alcoholic beverages were served, but not sold, at both events, and musical entertainment was arranged by the third-party organizers of the events. Bartenders, servers, and other event workers were provided by a third-party employee leasing company that works with SPI Club. SPI Club charged a venue rental fee for the use of its club for the wedding celebration, but not for the birthday celebration.
The other club hosted a private event in October 2010 that was organized by a third-party promoter and attended by approximately 110 people. No food or alcoholic beverages were served at this event, but non-alcoholic beverages were served. The event was staffed by bartenders, servers, and other event workers provided by the same third-party employee leasing company, and the promoter hired a professional disc jockey for entertainment. SPI Club charged the promoter a venue rental fee for the use of the club, and the promoter [291 Ga. 597]charged a cover to the people who attended the event, keeping the cover charges for himself.
Daniel contends that SPI Club failed to “open [the clubs] for business,” as that term is used in the ordinance, in two respects. First, Daniel says, an establishment “open[s] for business” under the ordinance only when it commences to do business on a regular and continuing basis. Opening an establishment only on one or two days of a nine-month period does not, Daniel argues, satisfy the requirement. Second, Daniel contends, for a licensed establishment to “open for business,” it must make some use of the license. Because no alcohol was sold at either club within nine months of the issue of the licenses, SPI Club made no use of the license, Daniel asserts, and it did not, therefore, “open [either club] for business.”
The principles that guide our consideration of the meaning of statutes are settled ones, and we apply those same principles when we consider the meaning of an ordinance. Risser v. City of Thomasville, 248 Ga. 866, 866, 286 S.E.2d 727 (1982). As such, we look first to the text of the ordinance, and if the text is clear and unambiguous,
[732 S.E.2d 63]
we look no further, attributing to the ordinance its plain meaning. Opensided MRI of Atlanta v. Chandler, 287 Ga. 406, 407, 696 S.E.2d 640 (2010). As we look to the words of the ordinance, we attribute to those words “their ordinary, logical, and common meanings,” unless a clear indication of some other meaning appears. Judicial Council of Ga. v. Brown & Gallo, 288 Ga. 294, 297, 702 S.E.2d 894 (2010). And we read the ordinance as a whole “according to the natural and most obvious import of the language, without resorting to subtle and forced constructions, for the purpose of either limiting or extending [its] operation.” Jones v. Douglas County, 262 Ga. 317, 321(1)(b), 418 S.E.2d 19 (1992) (citations omitted). Moreover, as we consider the meaning of an ordinance, we remember that it is “not to be construed in a vacuum, but in relation to other [ordinances] of which [it is] a part, and all [ordinances] relating to the same subject matter are to be construed together, and harmonized wherever possible.” East West Express v. Collins, 264 Ga. 774, 775(1), 449 S.E.2d 599 (1994) (citation omitted). Finally, as this case involves a forfeiture ordinance, we recall that forfeitures, generally speaking, “are not favored.” Cisco v. State, 285 Ga. 656, 663(3), 680 S.E.2d 831 (2009).
With these principles in mind, we turn to City of Atlanta Code of Ordinances § 10–69(a), which provides:
All holders of licenses under this division must, within nine months after the issuance of the license, open for business the establishment referred to in the license. Failure to open the licensed establishment within the nine-month period [291 Ga. 598]shall serve as automatic forfeiture and cancellation of the unused license, and no refund of license fees shall be made to the license holder.
City of Atlanta Code of Ordinances § 10–69(a). We first consider the contention that the “open for business” requirement implies regularity and continuity, such that a license holder does not “open [an establishment] for business” simply by doing irregular and occasional business there. In light of the meaning ordinarily attributed to the word “open” when used in the context in which it appears in the ordinance, see Bd. of Zoning Adjustment v. Fulton Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 177 Ga.App. 219, 222(2), 338 S.E.2d 730 (1985), the requirement that an establishment “open for business” seems to refer to a discrete and singular point in time, the point at which an establishment commences or starts to do business.1 Regularity and continuity are...
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...accord Golden Isles Outdoor, LLC v. Lamar Co., LLC, 331 Ga. App. 494, 499-500 (1), 771 S.E.2d 173 (2015).24 Daniel Corp. v. Reed, 291 Ga. 596, 597, 732 S.E.2d 61 (2012) ; accord Golden Isles Outdoor, LLC, 331 Ga. App. at 496 (1), 771 S.E.2d 173.25 Daniel Corp., 291 Ga. at 597, 732 S.E.2d 61......
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...and reasonable construction, courts must construe the statute accordingly.") (punctuation and citations omitted).7 Daniel Corp. v. Reed, 291 Ga. 596, 597, 732 S.E.2d 61 (2012) ; accord Risser v. City of Thomasville, 248 Ga. 866, 866, 286 S.E.2d 727 (1982).8 Daniel Corp., 291 Ga. at 597, 732......
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...and if the text is clear and unambiguous, we look no further, attributing to the [statute] its plain meaning.” Daniel Corp. v. Reed, 291 Ga. 596, 732 S.E.2d 61 (2012). See also Opensided MRI of Atlanta v. Chandler, 287 Ga. 406, 407, 696 S.E.2d 640 (2010). And “[a]s we look to the words of a......
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