Daniel Scully v. Arthur Bird

• Decision Date: 04 May 1908
• Docket Number: No. 353,353
• Citation: Daniel Scully v. Arthur Bird, 209 U.S. 481, 28 S.Ct. 597, 52 L.Ed. 899 (1908)
• Parties: DANIEL B. SCULLY and Maurice H. Scully, Appts., v. ARTHUR C. BIRD
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

209 U.S. 481

28 S.Ct. 597

52 L.Ed. 899

DANIEL B. SCULLY and Maurice H. Scully, Appts.,

v ARTHUR C. BIRD.

No. 353.

Submitted April 20, 1908.

Decided May 4, 1908.

Mr. Edward T. Fenwick for appellants.

[Argument of Counsel from page 481 intentionally omitted] Mr. John E. Bird for appellee.

[Argument of Counsel from page 482 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal directly from the circuit court from a decree dismissing the bill of appellants for want of jurisdiction.

The bill sought an injunction against certain acts of the appellee, who is the dairy and food commissioner of the state of Michigan, and who, it is alleged, under cover of his office, is injuriously affecting the reputation and sale of certain products manufactured by appellants. The acts complained of will be detailed more fully hereafter. It is enough to say preliminarily that appellants alleged in their bill that their business is the manufacturing, refining, and selling various food products, and more particularly manufacturing, blending, and selling of syrups used for food products; that their principal place of business is in Chicago, and that their business is 'commonly recognized and known as an honorable and legitimate commercial industry, and a legal and necessary adjunct to organized society;' and that they have large quantities of their products in Michigan, 'which, prior to the acts complained of, found a ready sale in that state, which sales resulted in fair and continuous profit' to them.

The court dismissed the bill, and recites in its certificate that the decree 'was made and entered by the court on its own motion and without notice to any of the parties to this suit or their attorneys, except that the question of jurisdiction was argued on the motion for a preliminary injunction, it appearing to the court from the face of the bill that this suit is, in effect, a suit against the state of Michigan within the meaning of the 11th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and that, therefore, this suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of a Federal court.'

The court expressed its reason for its action in an opinion as follows:

'Upon examination of the authorities cited upon the arguments had in this cause upon the matters above related, it is clear that the case of Arbuckle v. Blackburn, 65 L.R.A. 864, 51 C. C. A. 122, 113 Fed. 616, is conclusive against the jurisdiction of a court of equity over the matters set forth in the bill. It is argued in behalf of complainants that the case at bar is differentiated from that decision of the court of appeals in the case just cited. It is not perceived that there is any substantial difference in the facts of the two cases which would exclude the application of Arbuckle v. Blackburn. That case is conclusive that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit of this nature, and the only order which can be made in this case, notwithstanding the entry of the order pro confesso, is one for a dismissal of the bill for want of jurisdiction.'

Arbuckle v. Blackburn was appealed to this court, but the appeal was dismissed, on the ground that the jurisdiction of the circuit court was "dependent entirely upon the opposite parties to the suit or controversy being . . . citizens of different states,' and the decree of the circuit court of appeals was final.' The questions passed on by the latter court were not considered or decided. 191 U. S. 405, 48 L. ed. 239, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148.

The attorney general of the state, who appears as counsel for the appellee, does not contend that this is a suit against the state. He says: 'Counsel for defendant did not claim in the circuit court, and do not now claim, that this proceeding is a suit against the state. It is our contention that, under the de- cision of the circuit court of appeals in the case of Arbuckle v. Blackburn, supra, a Federal court of equity has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the bill of complaint; viz., that it has no jurisdiction to restrain the dairy and food commissioner of a state from issuing bulletins or circulars claiming that an article of food is in violation of the criminal laws of a state.'

And it is urged that such was the reason given by the court in its opinion and order dismissing the bill, and that, as the decision of the court was right, it should not be reversed because the reason given for it in the certificate was not the correct reason. But we cannot assume that there is inconsistency between the opinion and order of the court and its certificate. We, therefore, accept the latter as expressing the ground of the court's action. We would have no jurisdiction on this appeal unless the jurisdiction of the circuit court was in question as a Federal court; and whether the bill presented a case for equitable relief does not present a question of the jurisdiction of the court as a court of the United States. Blythe v. Hinckley, 173 U. S. 501, 43 L. ed. 783, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 497; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Adams, 180 U. S. 28, 35, 45 L. ed. 410, 412, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 251. Indeed, it is urged by appellants that whether a suit is one against a state is not a question of jurisdiction, but a question on the merits; and Illinois C. R. Co. v. Adams, supra, is cited.

That suit was brought by the railroad company against Adams, who was a revenue agent of the state of Mississippi, and the railroad commission of the state, to enjoin the latter from certifying an assessment for taxes on a railroad in which the Illinois Central had an interest, and to enjoin the revenue agent from beginning any suit, or advising any of the municipalities along the line of the road to bring suit, for the recovery of such taxes. The bill was dismissed for want of jurisdiction and the case was appealed to this court. One of the grounds for the dismissal was, as certified, 'that there was no jurisdiction in this matter, because the bill was a suit against the state of Mississippi, and in violation of the 11th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.' We said, by Mr. Jus- tice Brown, that such a question is 'one which we think belongs to the merits rather than to the jurisdiction.' And further: 'If it were a suit directly against the state by name, it would be so palpably in violation of that Amendment that the court would probably be justified in dismissing it upon motion; but the suit is not against the state, but against Adams individually; and, if the requisite diversity of citizenship exist, or it the case arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the question whether he is so identified with the state that he is exempt from prosecution, on account of the matters set up in the particular bill, is more properly the subject of demurrer or plea than of a motion to dismiss. This seems to have been the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 858, 6 L. ed. 204, 232, wherein he makes the following observation: 'The state not being a party on the record, and the court having jurisdiction over those who are parties on the record, the true question is not one of jurisdiction, but whether, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the court ought to make a decree against the defendants; whether they are to be considered as having a real interest, or as being only nominal parties." Again: ...