Daniel v. Bremen-Bowdon Inv., Co., A18A1764

• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
• Writing for the Court: Pipkin, Judge.
• Citation: 360 Ga.App. 716,860 S.E.2d 229
• Parties: DANIEL v. BREMEN-BOWDON INVESTMENT, COMPANY et al.
• Decision Date: 14 July 2021
• Docket Number: A18A1764

360 Ga.App. 716
860 S.E.2d 229

DANIEL
v.
BREMEN-BOWDON INVESTMENT, COMPANY et al.

A18A1764

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

July 14, 2021
Reconsideration Denied July 14, 2021

860 S.E.2d 230

Perkins Studdard, Christopher Jason Perkins, Meredith F. Thompson, for Appellant.

Bovis Kyle & Burch, Adam Clay Grafton, Philip B. Hairston, Atlanta, for Appellee.

Pipkin, Judge.

360 Ga.App. 716

In Daniel v. Bremen-Bowdon Investment Co. , 348 Ga. App. 803, 824 S.E.2d 698 (2019) (" Daniel I ") (physical precedent only), this Court, relying on our decision in Frett v. State Farm Employee Workers' Compensation , 348 Ga. App. 30, 36, 821 S.E.2d 132 (2018) (" Frett I "), affirmed the superior court's order upholding the decision of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation denying Sheryl Daniel's claim for benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act ("the Act"), OCGA § 34-9-1 et seq. Our Supreme Court subsequently reversed our decision in Frett I , see Frett v. State Farm Employee Workers' Compensation , 309 Ga. 44, 844 S.E.2d 749 (2020) (" Frett II "), and then granted the petition for certiorari in Daniel I , vacated our judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Frett II . Accordingly, we now vacate our earlier opinion and, as set forth more fully below, reverse the decision of the superior court.

The facts in this case are undisputed. As stated in Daniel I , at the time of the accident, Daniel was employed as a seamstress at Bremen-Bowdon Investment Company (the "Employer"). On the day of the accident, Daniel left her work station for a regularly scheduled lunch break and planned to drive home. Daniel was parked in a lot owned by her Employer, but it was necessary for her to walk down a public sidewalk and across the street to access the lot. As Daniel walked to her car, she tripped on the sidewalk and was injured. 348 Ga. App. at 803, 824 S.E.2d 698.

360 Ga.App. 717

Relying on this Court's decision in Rockwell v. Lockheed Martin Corp. , 248 Ga. App. 73, 545 S.E.2d 121 (2001), an Administrative Law Judge with the trial division of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation ("ALJ") concluded that Daniel was entitled to income benefits because she was injured while egressing the premises for a scheduled lunch break.¹ The Appellate Division of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation (the "Board") reversed the ALJ's award, concluding that while Daniel's injury occurred during the course of her employment, the injury did not arise out of her employment because it occurred while she was on a regularly scheduled lunch break. The superior court affirmed the Board's denial of benefits, and this Court, relying on Frett I , affirmed the superior court in a non-precedential opinion in which Presiding Judge Miller dissented. As directed by our Supreme Court, we must now reconsider our opinion in light of Frett II .

The Workers’ Compensation Act provides for compensation for injuries that occur "in the course of" employment and "arise out of" employment. See OCGA § 34-9-1 (4). These two prerequisites to compensation, which have remained unchanged since the original adoption of the Act in 1920, are "independent and distinct," and any claim for compensation under the Act must satisfy both prerequisites.

(Punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Frett...