Daniel v. City of Colo. Springs, Mun. Corp.

• Decision Date: 19 May 2014
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 12SC908
• Parties: Marilyn DANIEL, Petitioner, v. CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS, a Colorado municipal corporation and home rule city, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

327 P.3d 891

Marilyn DANIEL, Petitioner,

v.CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS, a Colorado municipal corporation and home rule city, Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 12SC908

Supreme Court of Colorado.

May 19, 2014

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals, Court of Appeals Case No. 11CA1772

Attorneys for Petitioner: Carter Law Group, LLC, Michael J. Carter, Denver, Colorado, Burg Simpson Eldredge Hersh & Jardine, P.C., Nelson Boyle, Englewood, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent: Christopher J. Melcher, City Attorney/Chief Legal Officer, W. Erik Lamphere, Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Trial Lawyers Association: Cross & Bennett, L.L.C., Joseph F. Bennett, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Municipal League: Light, Kelly & Dawes, P.C., Sophia Hua Tsai, Kelly L. Kafer, Denver, Colorado

En Banc

CHIEF JUSTICE RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 We granted certiorari to consider an issue of first impression: whether a party injured in a public golf course's parking lot can fulfill the requirements of the “recreation area waiver,” section 24–10–106(1)(e), C.R.S. (2013), of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”).¹ To resolve this issue, we specifically analyze whether a parking lot serving a public golf course qualifies as a “public facility” and whether such a parking lot is “located in” a “recreation area.”

¶ 2 We hold that a parking lot that serves a public golf course is a “public facility” under the recreation area waiver. Such a parking lot is “public” if it is accessible to and operated for the benefit of the general public; it is also a “facility” in light of the CGIA's history and its purposes. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, as the court of appeals erred in categorically holding that the recreation area waiver did not apply to this type of public parking lot.

¶ 3 Additionally, we hold that a three-step analysis should be employed to determine whether a public facility is “located in” a “recreation area.” First, we look to the underlying piece of contiguous public property to determine which specific portions of that property should be considered a “putative recreation area.” Second, we determine if the public entity's primary purpose in building or maintaining that recreation area was the promotion of recreation. Third, we determine if the public facility at issue was located within the boundaries of that recreation area. Applying that analysis here, we conclude that the golf course grounds—including the parking lot—is a “recreation area” and that the parking lot at issue was “located in” this area.

¶ 4 Because we lack sufficient facts, however, to determine if the other requirements of the recreation area waiver are met, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶ 5 In August of 2009, Respondent, Marilyn Daniel, drove to the Valley Hi Golf Course (“Valley Hi”), a public golf course located in Colorado Springs, Colorado. She planned to see Congressional Representative Doug Lamborn speak at a community event that was scheduled to take place at Valley Hi's clubhouse. Instead of parking her vehicle in the parking lot that was located next to the clubhouse, Daniel parked on a street about a block away from the golf course. As Daniel crossed through the Valley Hi parking lot en route to the clubhouse, she stepped in a hole, fell, and fractured her hip. As a result of her injuries in the Valley Hi parking lot, Daniel sued Petitioner, the City of Colorado Springs (“City”), in a premises liability action.

¶ 6 Thereafter, the City filed a Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”) pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Valley Hi was owned by the City, a public entity that is immune from liability under the CGIA. See§ 24–10–102, C.R.S. (2013) (stating that public entities should be held liable “only to such an extent and subject to such conditions as are provided by this article”); § 24–10–103(5), C.R.S. (2013) (defining “public entity” in relevant part as “any ... city”). In response, Daniel argued that the City had waived its immunity under the CGIA's recreation area waiver, which subjects public entitiesto liability for injuries resulting from a “dangerous condition of any ... public facility located in any park or recreation area maintained by a public entity.” § 24–10–106(1)(e). According to Daniel, the hole in the parking lot was a “dangerous condition” and the parking lot was a “public facility” “located in” the “recreation area” that was the golf course grounds.

¶ 7 In a July 13, 2011 Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (“Order”), the trial court summarily denied the City's Motion “for the reasons and analysis (and the legal authorities) contained in [Daniel's] Response.” Importantly, the trial court conducted no fact finding to guide its immunity determination.²

¶ 8 The City subsequently brought an interlocutory appeal pursuant to section 24–10–108, C.R.S. (2013), arguing that the trial court erred in denying its Motion. A division of the court of appeals agreed with the City and unanimously reversed the trial court's Order. SeeDaniel v. City of Colo. Springs, 2012 COA 1772, ¶ 16, 328 P.3d 234. The court of appeals relied almost exclusively on Jones v. City & County of Denver, 833 P.2d 870 (Colo.App.1992), to determine that the City did not waive immunity. See id. at ¶¶ 12–14. The court of appeals noted that Daniel's injury occurred in a parking lot and, per Jones, parking lots are not covered by the recreation area waiver. ¶¶ 13–14.

¶ 9 We granted certiorari review and now reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

II. Standard of Review

¶ 10 Governmental immunity implicates issues of subject matter jurisdiction, which are determined in accordance with C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). Swieckowski v. City of Ft. Collins, 934 P.2d 1380, 1383–84 (Colo.1997). If the relevant facts underlying a trial court's jurisdictional findings are undisputed and the issue presents a question of law, then appellate review is de novo. Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443, 452 (Colo.2001). Here, our review is de novo because the court of appeals' holding turns on its interpretation of the CGIA's recreation area waiver, a question of law. SeeFogg v. Macaluso, 892 P.2d 271, 273 (Colo.1995) (noting that the construction of a statute is a question of law subject to independent review by the appellate court).

III. Analysis

¶ 11 This case requires us to construe the CGIA's recreation area waiver. In interpreting statutes, our primary task is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent, the polestar of statutory construction. State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493, 506 (Colo.2000). We seek to effectuate legislative intent by construing the statute as a whole, giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of the statute's parts. SeeElginv. Bartlett, 994 P.2d 411, 416 (Colo.1999).

¶ 12 If a statute is unambiguous, we give effect to the statute's plain and ordinary meaning and look no further. SeeSpringer v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 799 (Colo.2000). In contrast, if the statutory language is ambiguous (i.e., if it lends itself to alternative constructions or if its intended scope is unclear), we may look beyond the statute's plain language and examine pertinent legislative history to discern legislative intent. SeePeople v. Terry, 791 P.2d 374, 376 (Colo.1990); see also§ 2–4–203, C.R.S. (2013) (stating that the court may consider several things when a statute is ambiguous, including the legislative objective of a particular statute, former statutory provisions, and the consequences of a particular construction).

¶ 13 Before analyzing Daniel's claim, it is important to highlight the overarching purposes of the CGIA. The CGIA serves as a general shield from tort liability for public entities. See§ 24–10–108 (“Except as provided in sections 24–10–104 to 24–10–106, sovereign immunity shall be a bar to any action against a public entity for injury which lies in tort or could lie in tort....”). Despite the CGIA's protective function, the legislature has carved out several waivers that, when applicable, automatically render public entities vulnerable to tort liability. See§ 24–10–106(1)(a)–(h) (providing that public entities are immune in tort actions “except as provided otherwise in this section” and thereafter listing the immunity waivers); § 24–10–107, C.R.S. (2013) (noting that when an immunity waiver applies, “liability of the public entity shall be determined in the same manner as if the public entity were a private person”). Because governmental immunity under the CGIA is in derogation of Colorado's common law, we narrowly construe the CGIA's immunity provisions, and as a logical corollary, we broadly construe the CGIA's waiver provisions. Springer, 13 P.3d at 798 (discussing the history of this Court's abrogation of Colorado's common law of governmental immunity in 1971, the legislature's subsequent enactment of the CGIA in response to this abrogation, and the rule to broadly construe the CGIA's waiver provisions). Broadly construing the CGIA's waiver provisions permits parties to seek redress for injuries caused by a public entity, “one of the basic but often overlooked” purposes of the CGIA. State v. Moldovan, 842 P.2d 220, 222 (Colo.1992).

¶ 14 With the principles of statutory construction and the purposes of the CGIA in mind, we now turn to the recreation area waiver outlined in section 24–10–106(1)(e), which subjects public entities to liability when an injury is the result of a “dangerous condition of any ... public facility located in any ... recreation area maintained by a public entity.” § 24–10–106(1)(e). To successfully waive immunity under the recreation area waiver, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that his or her injury occurred in or on a “public facility”; (2) that the public facility...