Daniel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

• Decision Date: 30 January 2023
• Docket Number: 1:21-cv-01527-SAB
• Parties: TIMOTHY DANIEL, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

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TIMOTHY DANIEL, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

No. 1:21-cv-01527-SAB

United States District Court, E.D. California

January 30, 2023

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S SOCIAL SECURITY APPEAL

(ECF NOS. 17, 18, 19, 20)

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Timothy Daniel (“Plaintiff”') seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying his application for Social Security benefits pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act. The matter is currently before the Court on the parties' briefs, which were submitted without oral argument, to Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone.^[1] For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's appeal shall be denied.

II.

BACKGROUND^[2]

Plaintiff filed the instant application for Social Security benefits under Title II on February 6, 2019, alleging disability beginning March 11, 2018. (See Admin. Rec (“AR”) 21, 175-81, 186-91, ECF Nos. 15-1, 15-2.) Plaintiff's claim was initially denied on May 6, 2019, and denied upon reconsideration on August 29, 2019. (AR 96-101, 103-108.) On December 1, 2020, Plaintiff, represented by non-attorney representative Andrew S. Youngman,^[3] appeared via telephonic conference, for an administrative hearing before Administrative Law Judge Debra J. Denney (the “ALJ”). (AR 35-65.) Vocational expert (“VE”) Daniel B. Best also testified at the hearing. Following the hearing, Plaintiff was permitted an additional 30 days to submit a posthearing brief (AR 280-81 (Ex. 14E)) and supplemental records from Visalia Health Center AR 1094-1121 (Ex. 20F)). (See AR 21.) On January 19, 2021, the ALJ issued a decision denying benefits. (AR 18-34.) On August 17, 2021, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (AR 1-7.)

Plaintiff initiated the instant action in federal court on October 15, 2021, and seeks judicial review of the denial of his applications for benefits. (ECF No. 1.) The Commissioner lodged the administrative record on March 14, 2022. (ECF No. 15.) On April 25, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 17, 18.) On June 8, 2022, Defendant filed a brief in opposition. (ECF No. 19.) Plaintiff filed a reply to Defendant's briefing on June 15, 2022. (ECF No. 18.) The matter is deemed submitted.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. The Disability Standard

To qualify for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must show he is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment^[4] which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential evaluation process to be used in determining if a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520;^[5] Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004). The five steps in the sequential evaluation in assessing whether the claimant is disabled are:

Step one: Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial gainful activity? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step two.

Step two: Is the claimant's alleged impairment sufficiently severe to limit his or her ability to work? If so, proceed to step three. If not, the claimant is not disabled.

Step three: Does the claimant's impairment, or combination of impairments, meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1? If so, the claimant is disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

Step four: Does the claimant possess the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform his or her past relevant work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

Step five: Does the claimant's RFC, when considered with the claimant's age, education, and work experience, allow him or her to adjust to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.

Stout v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006). The burden of proof is on the claimant at steps one through four. Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 2020). A claimant establishes a prima facie case of qualifying disability once he has carried the burden of proof from step one through step four.

Before making the step four determination, the ALJ first must determine the claimant's RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e); Nowden v. Berryhill, No. EDCV 17-00584-JEM, 2018 WL 1155971, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2018). The RFC is “the most [one] can still do despite [his] limitations” and represents an assessment “based on all the relevant evidence.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). The RFC must consider all of the claimant's impairments, including those that are not severe. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(e), 416.945(a)(2); Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p, available at 1996 WL 374184 (Jul. 2, 1996).^[6] A determination of RFC is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (RFC is not a medical opinion); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c) (identifying the ALJ as responsible for determining RFC). “[I]t is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant's physician, to determine residual functional capacity.” Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001).

At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner, who must then show that there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform given his RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(g); Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006). To do this, the ALJ can use either the Medical Vocational Guidelines (“grids”), or call a VE. See 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P, App. 2; Lounsburry, 468 F.3d at 1114; Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001). “Throughout the five-step evaluation, the ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.' ” Ford, 950 F.3d at 1149 (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)).

B. Standard of Review

Congress has provided that an individual may obtain judicial review of any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security regarding entitlement to benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In determining whether to reverse an ALJ's decision, the Court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). Further, the Court's review of the Commissioner's decision is a limited one; the Court must find the Commissioner's decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1153 (2019). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Thomas v. Barnhart (Thomas), 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Flaten v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153 (1999) (comparing the substantial-evidence standard to the deferential clearly-erroneous standard). “[T]he threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Biestek, 139 S.Ct. at 1154. Rather, “[substantial evidence means more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is an extremely deferential standard.” Thomas v. CalPortland Co. (CalPortland), 993 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). Even if the ALJ has erred, the Court may not reverse the ALJ's decision where the error is harmless. Stout, 454 F.3d at 1055-56. Moreover, the burden of showing that an error is not harmless “normally falls upon the party attacking the agency's determination.” Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009).

Finally, “a reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). Nor may the Court affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which she did not rely; rather, the Court may review only the reasons stated by the ALJ in her decision. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003). Nonetheless, it is not this Court's function to second guess the ALJ's conclusions and substitute the Court's judgment for the ALJ's; rather, if the evidence “is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ's conclusion that must be upheld.” Ford, 950 F.3d at 1154 (quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)).

IV. THE ALJ'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The ALJ conducted the five-step disability analysis and made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law as of the date of the decision, January 19, 2021 (AR 23-29):

At step one, the ALJ determined Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2023, and Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 11, 2018, the alleged onset date. (AR 23 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571 et seq.).)

At step two, the ALJ determined Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis of the hip, and morbid obesity. (Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)).)

At step three, the ALJ determined Plaintiff does not...