Daniel v. Commissioner of Correction

• Decision Date: 16 May 2000
• Docket Number: (AC 18250)
• Citation: 57 Conn. App. 651,751 A.2d 398
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: RONALD LEE DANIEL v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

57 Conn. App. 651

751 A.2d 398

RONALD LEE DANIEL v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

(AC 18250)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 25, 1999.

Officially released May 16, 2000.

Foti, Mihalakos and Healey, JS. Adele V. Patterson, deputy assistant public defender, with whom was Temmy Ann Pieszak, assistant public defender, for the appellant (petitioner).

Carolyn K. Longstreth, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Patricia A. Swords, state's attorney, and John Dropick, former assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).

Opinion

HEALEY, J.

The petitioner, Ronald Lee Daniel, has taken this appeal from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he made four claims challenging the legality of his confinement. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court acted improperly (1) in finding that the record established that his plea of guilty was knowing, intelligent and voluntary,¹ (2) in rejecting his claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel in the underlying criminal proceeding, and (3) in rejecting his claim that the trial court and the trial court clerk deprived him of his right to appeal.² We affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

The petitioner was arrested in March, 1988, and charged under General Statutes § 53a-54a with the March 19, 1988 murder of Marcel Malcolm. Attorney Michael A. Peck was retained on March 20, 1988, to represent him. On May 27, 1988, the petitioner was scheduled for a probable cause hearing on the murder charge. On that date, Peck informed the court that the probable cause hearing was being waived and requested the court to make a finding of probable cause preliminary to the petitioner's entering a plea to the murder charge. After the court, Kline, J., inquired of the petitioner concerning Peck's statement, the court made a finding that probable cause existed to prosecute the petitioner for murder under § 53a-54a. On May 27, 1988, the petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to the charge of murder and elected a jury trial. On July 14, 1989, however, the petitioner entered a plea of guilty, and, following a plea canvass, the trial court, Norko, J., accepted his guilty plea and made a finding of guilty. The petitioner's guilty plea was entered pursuant to an agreement that assistant state's attorney Warren Maxwell would recommend a sentence of forty years. At the time of his plea, the petitioner, upon inquiry of the court, stated that he felt Peck had been effective in representing his interests and that he knew of no reason why the court should not accept his plea. On August 31, 1989, the court imposed a total effective sentence of forty years.

I

We first take up the claim that the habeas court acted improperly in finding that the petitioner's plea canvass was adequate to demonstrate a knowing, intelligent and voluntary guilty plea.³ On appeal, the petitioner objects to the trial court's (1) dismissing as "insignificant" his objection to certain of the facts proffered by the prosecutor at the time of the plea, (2) statement that "the only thing that mattered, [was] the `gravamen' of the offense [which was] the act of pulling the trigger" and (3) failure to advise him of the intent element of the crime of murder under § 53a-54a.

"A guilty plea ... that is not both voluntary and knowing is in violation of due process and thus void. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1969); State v. Lopez, 197 Conn. 337, 341, 497 A.2d 390 (1985). For a guilty plea to be truly voluntary, the defendant must understand the law in relation to the facts. McCarthy v. United States, supra, 466. Moreover, since a defendant waives several constitutional rights when he elects to plead guilty to a criminal offense, the choice of a guilty plea is of profound significance. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969); State v. Childree, 189 Conn. 114, 120, 454 A.2d 1274 (1983). In pleading guilty, a defendant waives his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury and his right to confront his accusers. Boykin v. Alabama, supra [243]; State v. Lopez, supra [341]; State v. Childree, supra [120]; see Practice Book § 711 (5) [now § 39-19 (5)]. A guilty plea, therefore, is constitutionally valid only if the record affirmatively discloses that the plea was entered voluntarily and intelligently. Boykin v. Alabama, supra, 242; State v. Lopez, supra [342]; State v. Marra, 174 Conn. 338, 340, 387 A.2d 550 (1978); Blue v. Robinson, 173 Conn. 360, 373, 377 A.2d 1108 (1977)." Oppel v. Lopes, 200 Conn. 553, 556, 512 A.2d 888 (1986). A guilty plea may satisfy constitutional requirements even in the absence of literal compliance with the prophylactic safeguards of Practice Book §§ 31-19 and 31-20, respectively. State v. Badgett, 200 Conn. 412, 418, 512 A.2d 160, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940, 107 S. Ct. 423, 93 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1986); State v. Alicea, 41 Conn. App. 47, 55, 674 A.2d 468 (1996). "A `determination as to whether a plea has been knowingly and voluntarily entered entails an examination of all of the relevant circumstances.' State v. Wright, 207 Conn. 276, 287, 542 A.2d 299 (1988)." State v. Garvin, 242 Conn. 296, 310, 699 A.2d 921 (1997).

A

We do not agree that at the time of taking⁴ the petitioner's guilty plea, the trial court dismissed as "insignificant" his objection to certain facts proffered by the prosecutor. When the prosecutor presented the factual basis for the plea, he recited the following: "The [petitioner] and the victim had been engaged in illegal business activities, and a dispute erupted over the—a debt of four hundred dollars, which the victim claimed [the petitioner] owed him.... What happened was there was a prearranged meeting between [the petitioner] and the victim to meet on Lyme Street in Hartford. The victim arrived there in a white Nissan. In the car with him was one of the state's witnesses [Robert Gordon].... Earlier that day, [the petitioner] had called another state's witness by the name of Mark Osborne. Now, Mr. Osborne was the owner—and I believe legitimate owner—of a shotgun.... [The petitioner] called Mr. Osborne, told him he wanted to borrow his rifle. [When] Osborne inquired why he wanted it, [the petitioner] responded that he wanted to—he was going to meet with the victim and he wanted to scare him. There was no indication it was going to be used other than to scare the victim. Osborne consented to its use for that purpose. [The petitioner] went to Tower Avenue, where Osborne lived, and was greeted by Osborne, who had the shotgun in a box in the first floor of that apartment [with] some twelve gauge shotgun shells. And he delivered possession of that weapon and the—some shells to [the petitioner], who promptly put it into the pant leg of a sweat suit he was wearing. He invited Osborne to join him, and Osborne said he would. The two of them proceeded to walk west of Tower Avenue toward Lyme Street. As they were walking on Lyme Street, an RX-7 Mazda pulled up—stolen. Another man by the name of [Robert Grant] was driving that car. Both of these parties got into the Mazda and proceeded ... to Lyme Street. When they got there, they saw the white Nissan parked and they knew the victim was in it. Both Osborne and [the petitioner] exited the Mazda and proceeded to walk toward the white Nissan. The RX-7, with [Grant] driving it, left. At this point, the passenger in the victim's car got out of the white Nissan, went around to the passenger side, off to the side of it. The other two continued to approach the car. At this point, [the petitioner] went to the car window. Both witnesses... then saw [the petitioner] unzip his jacket, remove the shotgun from the pant leg, point it into the window, [make] some threatening comment, and [say] he had five seconds and proceeded to count a down count— five, four, three, two and then fired point blank at close range with that shotgun, striking the victim in the face. He racked the shotgun, fired a second time, striking the trachea, racked the shotgun, fired a third time, striking the left shoulder area. The body was torn apart. The witnesses were shocked, they never thought this was going to happen. Right after the shooting occurred, the Mazda returned. Now all three of them get into the Mazda and they leave the scene."

Upon inquiry by the trial court, the prosecutor also informed the court that the $400 debt referred to arose out of an ongoing arrangement whereby the petitioner would sell drugs for the victim, and the petitioner failed to remit $400 to the victim. At that time, the prosecutor also informed the court that Osborne and the passenger in the Nissan were available to testify against the petitioner, but that Grant was unavailable because criminal charges were pending against him arising from the same incident.⁵

At that point, the trial court made the following inquiries of the defendant and received the following responses:

"The Court: Thank you, Mr. Maxwell. Mr. Daniel, the facts indicated by the state on the record—you've [pleaded] guilty to murder before this court, based upon the recitation of Mr. Maxwell of the facts, do you dispute any of the facts as indicated by the state on the record?

"The [Petitioner]: What I just heard?

"The Court: Yes.

"The [Petitioner]: Yes, I do.

"The Court: Which facts do you dispute, sir?

"The [Petitioner]: That's not what happened.

"The Court: Now, you're being charged with murder, you've just [pleaded] guilty to murder. And the gravamen obviously is the moment when, according to the state, you shot the victim here on three—three different occasions. Are those facts accurate?

"The [Petitioner]: Yes.

"The Court: So you did have the shotgun in your hand, the facts as far as the state has alleged on the record of shooting the victim here, [racking] the gun...