Daniel v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 37042

• Decision Date: 31 July 1968
• Docket Number: No. 37042,37042
• Citation: 213 So.2d 585
• Parties: C. Welborn DANIEL, Appellant, v. FLORIDA STATE TURNPIKE AUTHORITY, a body corporate and politic of the State of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 585

213 So.2d 585

C. Welborn DANIEL, Appellant, v. FLORIDA STATE TURNPIKE AUTHORITY, a body corporate and politic of the State of Florida, Appellee.

No. 37042.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 31, 1968.

Charles S. Ausley of Ausley, Ausley, McMullen, O'Bryan, Michaels & McGehee, Tallahassee, William H. Maness, Jacksonville, and Moore, Henderson, Buchanan & Moore, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Russell Troutman of Fishback, Davis, Dominick, Troutman & Salfi, Orlando, and Gurney & Skofield, Winter Park, for appellee.

ROBERTS, Justice.

This cause is before the court on an interlocutory appeal from an order denying to plaintiff, appellant here, a temporary injunction to halt the operation of so-called tandem trailers on the Sunshine State Parkway. The suit was filed against the defendant Florida State Turnpike Authority, appellee here ('the Authority' hereafter), as a class suit, attacking the validity of the Authority's Resolution, adopted on October 2, 1967, authorizing the operation of tandem trailers on the Sunshine State Parkway and adopting rules and regulations therefor, and of the statute, Sec. 340.23, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., under the authority of which said Resolution was adopted.

The Chancellor, in a well considered opinion, held that the Resolution was not, per se, susceptible to the attack thereon made by the plaintiff and that no showing was made as to the invalidity of Sec. 340.23, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. Noting that the Authority had disclaimed any intention to expend any funds in constructing facilities to be used primarily for the marshalling of tandem trailers before a final hearing in the cause, he denied the application for a temporary injunction. The interlocutory appeal directly to this court followed, as authorized by Section 4 of Article V, Fla.Const., F.S.A.

The plaintiff first contends that the statute, Sec. 340.23, supra, on its face violates Sec. 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it fails to provide for notice and a hearing by the Authority prior to the adoption of rules and regulations thereunder. The statute in question, Sec. 340.23, authorizes the Authority to adopt rules and regulations with respect to the use of the various turnpike projects in the state,

'* * * which rules and regulations shall relate to vehicular speeds, loads and sizes, safety devices, rules of the road and such other matters, * * * as may be necessary and proper to regulate traffic in the interest of safety, the maximum convenience of the persons using the project, preservation of a project from unwarranted damage and to carry out the purpose of this chapter. * * * In so far as such rules and regulations may be inconsistent with the provisions of the vehicle and traffic laws of (this state), such rules and regulations shall be controlling. * * *'

It has been settled by this court that the statute does not unlawfully delegate legislative power to the Authority. See State v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, Fla.1955, 80 So.2d 337, 346. But it cannot be doubted that the power to promulgate rules and regulations to effectuate the general public purpose of the statute is an administrative function that is quasi-legislative in nature, rather than quasi-judicial. This being so, a hearing before the administrative body is not necessarily a Sine qua non to the validity of rules and regulations adopted by it pursuant to legislative authority.

Here, the statute expressly provides that the rules and regulations promulgated by the Authority

'* * * shall not take effect until published in a newspaper of general circulation published in Dade County, and such other publications as the authority may determine, and duly filed in the office of the secretary of state.' Sec. 340.23(1), Fla.Stat., F.S.A.

and the judicial processes of this state were promptly availed of by the plaintiff to determine the validity of the administrative action Sub judice. The Chancellor held, and we agree, that there was nothing in plaintiff's complaint to show that resort to the ordinary processes of law, in the determination of this matter, will in fact amount to a denial of due process of law to the plaintiff. Cf. Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. State, 1920, 79 Fla. 66, 83 So. 708. Accordingly, the plaintiff's contention in this respect cannot be sustained.

Other Assignments of Error here argued by plaintiff have to do with the interpretation of the statute in question by the Authority. We think no useful purpose would be served by discussing them in detail. It suffices to say that it is well settled...