Daniel v. Gielty Trucking Co.

• Decision Date: 31 January 1936
• Docket Number: No. 78.,78.
• Citation: 182 A. 638
• Parties: DANIEL v. GIELTY TRUCKING CO. et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

182 A. 638

DANIEL

v. GIELTY TRUCKING CO. et al.

No. 78.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Jan. 31, 1936.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The facts examined; the causal connection between the original wrong and the resulting injury was not broken.

2. A, lawfully crossing a highway, compelled by B's negligence to quickly step forward, may recover damages suffered by being tortuously struck by C, where the proofs showed that the injury was the natural and probable consequence of B's wrong and a result that might reasonably have been foreseen.

Appeal from Supreme Court.

Action by Charles E. Daniel against the Giclty Trucking Company, Nicholas Zarrillo, and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, named defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Green & Green and David Green, all of Newark, for appellants.

Stuhr & Vogt, of Hoboken, and John W. McGeehan, Jr., of Newark, for appellee.

BODINE, Justice.

The defendant Trucking Company appeals from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. Error is predicated upon the failure to nonsuit or direct a verdict. The plaintiff was struck by the Sages & Bcrberian truck while crossing Central avenue, East Orange. There are traffic lights at the place of injury. These lights indicated, at the time of the occurrence, that eastbound traffic should stop and that it was safe for the plaintiff to proceed in the direction in which he was going.

The Traffic Act (P.L.1928, c. 281; art. 5, § 1, as amended by c. 247, P.L.1931, §' 7 [ N.J.St.Annual 1931, §' 179—715R (501)]) provides as to intersections where traffic is controlled by a traffic signal, as follows: "A pedestrian crossing or starting across any such intersection on a 'Go' signal shall have the right of way over all vehicles, including those making turns, until such pedestrian has reached the opposite curb or place of safety, and it shall be unlawful for the operator of any vehicle to fail to yield the right-of-way to any such pedestrian."

The plaintiff had passed in front of two standing cars. The Trucking Company's vehicle was moving moderately fast in an easterly direction. However, it did not stop as it should have done for the red light, and the plaintiff, in order to avoid injury, took a quick step forward and was struck by a truck owned by the other defendant. The testimony showed that the driver of this vehicle was proceeding at a terrific rate of speed. The proofs clearly indicate that the driver of the truck, the property of the appellant Gielty Trucking Company, failed to observe a duty owed to the plaintiff and that he, while attempting to avoid injury, was struck by the other defendant, who was also negligent in failing to observe due care. It is argued that as a matter of law causal connection between the negligent act of the driver of the Gielty Trucking Company's truck and the injury suffered was broken. It would seem that causal connection was not broken as a matter of law and that the issue was for the jury under the instructions given.

The American Law Institute, in its Restatement of the Law of Torts, states the applicable rule of law as follows: "Failure of a third person to perform a duty owing to another to protect him from harm threatened by the actor's negligent conduct is not a superseding cause of the other's harm." Am. Law Institute, Torts, ch. 16, § 452.

"The mere fact that another person concurs or cooperates in producing the injury or contributes thereto, in any degree, whether large or small, is of no importance, * * * It is immaterial how many others have been in fault, if the defendant's act was an efficient cause of the injury." 1 Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, § 31.

"The connection between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's injury may be broken by an intervening cause. In order to excuse the defendant, however, this intervening cause must be either a superseding or a responsible cause. It is a superseding cause, whether intelligent or not, if it so entirely supersedes the operation of the defendant's negligence that it alone, without his negligence contributing thereto in the slightest degree, produces the injury. It is a responsible one, if it is the culpable act of a human being, who is legally responsible, for such act. The defendant's negligence is not deemed the proximate cause of the injury, when the connection is thus actually broken by a responsible intervening cause. But the connection is not actually broken, if the intervening event is one which might, in the natural and ordinary course of things, be anticipated as not entirely improbable, and the defendant's negligence is an essential link in the chain of causation. Of course, the very definition of a superseding cause implies that the defendant's negligence cannot be the cause of the injury." 1 Shearman & Redfield on...