Daniel v. Goesl, A-7965
| Court | Supreme Court of Texas |
| Citation | 161 Tex. 490,341 S.W.2d 892 |
| Docket Number | No. A-7965,A-7965 |
| Parties | Noble Brasfield DANIEL et al., Petitioners, v. Andrew George GOESL, Respondent. |
| Decision Date | 07 December 1960 |
Page 892
v.
Andrew George GOESL, Respondent.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 25, 1961.
[161 Tex. 491]
Page 893
Raffaelli & Keeney, Texarkana, for petitioner.Atchley, Russell & Hutchinson, Texarkana, for respondent.
CULVER, Justice.
All of the parties before us in this cause are medical doctors and were members of a partnership formed for the practice of medicine. One of the provisions in the articles of partnership reads as follows:
'Restrictions on Retiring Partners. If any partner retires from the partnership, unless the partnership is dissolved by mutual consent of all partners, said retiring partner shall not for a period of three (3) years after so retiring from the partnership practice medicine, or in any way be connected with any other person in the practice
Page 894
of medicine, directly or indirectly, in either Bowie County, Texas, or Miller County, Arkansas.'Dr. Goesl retired from the partnership on August 11, 1958. On August 17, 1959, the doctor opened his office and began the practice of medicine in Texarkana, Miller County, Arkansas.
Dr. Daniel and other members of the partnership filed suit to enjoin Dr. Goesl from practicing medicine in violation of the terms of the partnership agreement. Upon a hearing temporary injunction was denied by the trial court. The Court of Civil Appeals has affirmed. 336 S.W.2d 890. We are of the opinion that the temporary injunction should have been granted.
[161 Tex. 492] The partnership agreement under which Dr. Goesl became a member of the partnership was executed by all of the partners on August 11, 1953. It provided that the partnership could be dissolved and terminated at any time by a vote of 75% of the partners. The restriction from the practice of medicine for a period of three years was applicable only to a partner retiring from the partnership and not where the partnership was dissolved. If the partnership were dissolved the partnership assets were to be divided among the partners, but if a partner retired the remaining partners were obligated to execute a note to him payable in 12 equal monthly installments. The amount of this note was to be determined from the book value of the partnership and the 'good will' which was to be valued at a sum equal to 75% of the accounts receivable. Accordingly, a note was executed by the remaining partners and delivered to Dr. Goesl in the sum of $20,306.02, secured by a lien on the partnership assets. Upon payment of the final installment on August 11, 1959, Dr. Goesl executed a release of the lien. He makes no complaint that he was paid less than was due. It is to be noted that six days later Dr. Goesl opened his office for the practice of medicine.
Dr. Goesl correctly contends that, in an appeal from an order either granting or denying an application for a temporary injunction, the sole question for determination is whether or not the trial court abused its discretion. So where the order of the trial court is based on conflicting evidence it will not be disturbed. Texas Foundries, Inc. v. International Moulders & Foundry Workers' Union et al., 151 Tex. 239, 248 S.W.2d 460.
There is evidence in the record of dissatisfaction and disagreement among the partners created in part by a charge that one of the partners was not devoting his full time to the partnership business and a dispute concerning the rent on the quarters occupied by the partnership in a building owned by two of the partners. Dr. Goesl thereupon sought a dissolution but was unable to secure the assent of the required majority. He then elected to retire and contends now that since the remaining partners contributed to the dissension which existed and refused to dissolve the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., C-4996
...of covenants not to compete: covenants specifying that the seller of a business will not compete with the buyer, Daniel v. Goesl, 161 Tex. 490, 341 S.W.2d 892 (1960), and covenants specifying that an employee, upon discharge, will not compete with the former employer, Justin Belt Co. v. Yos......
-
Pitman v. Lightfoot
...to recognize the contract as existing and binding, he thereby affirms the contract and waives his right to a rescission. Daniel v. Goesl, 161 Tex. 490, 341 S.W.2d 892, 895 (1960); Rosenbaum v. Texas Bldg. & Mortgage Co., 140 Tex. 325, 167 S.W.2d 506, 508 (1943); Spangler v. Jones, 797 S.W.2......
-
GXG, Inc. v. Texacal Oil & Gas, 13-96-368-CV
...Texacal acquired, GXG, as a matter of law, affirmed the contract and waived any recovery under a theory of fraud. Daniel v. Goesl, 161 Tex. 490, 341 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tex.1960) (party who became aware of fraudulent inducement after entering into contract but received and accepted benefits in......
-
Swanson v. Schlumberger Technology Corp., 06-93-00084-CV
...party is not held responsible for tender of the benefits under the contract until he has become aware of the fraud. Daniel v. Goesl, 161 Tex. 490, 341 S.W.2d 892 (1960); see also Guion v. Guion, 475 S.W.2d 865 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). To be entitled to the equitable re......
-
Protection of business interests
...buyer-seller noncompete covenant is breached after the sale of a business is enough to presume irreparable injury. See Daniel v. Goesl , 341 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. 1960). Similarly, where a former employee who possesses trade secrets is employed by a competitor, Texas courts have overlooked the r......
-
Survey of the Texas Antitrust Laws
...Inc. v. Mourlot, 410 S.W.2d 209,211 (Tex. Civ.App.-Houston1966,writref'dn.r.e.) (employmentcontract).240See, e.g., Daniel v. Goesl, 161 Tex. 490, 341 S.W.2d 892(1961); Williams v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 508 S.W.2d 665 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston[14th Dist.] 1974, no writ) ;Martinv. Hawley,50 S.W.......