Daniel v. Paul, 488

Citation395 U.S. 298,89 S.Ct. 1697,23 L.Ed.2d 318
Decision Date02 June 1969
Docket NumberNo. 488,488
PartiesDoris DANIEL and Rosalyn Kyles, Petitioners, v. Euell PAUL, Jr., etc
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

[Syllabus from pages 298-300 intentionally omitted] Conrad K. Harper, New York City, for petitioners, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court.

Jerris Leonard, Milwaukee, Wis., for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court.

James W. Gallman, Fayetteville, Ark., as amicus curiae, at the invitation of the Court, in support of the judgment below.

Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners, Negro residents of Little Rock, Arkansas, brought this class action in the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas to enjoin respondent from denying them admission to a recreational facility called Lake Nixon Club owned and operated by respondent, Euell Paul, and his wife. The complaint alleged that Lake Nixon Club was a 'public accommodation' subject to the provisions of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq., and that respondent violated the Act in refusing petitioners admission solely on racial grounds.1 After trial, the District Court, although finding that respondent had refused petitioners admission solely because they were Negroes,2 dismissed the complaint on the ground that Lake Nixon Club was not within any of the categories of 'public accommodations' covered by the 1964 Act. Kyles v. Paul, 263 F.Supp. 412 (D.C.1967). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, one judge dissenting. 395 F.2d 118 (1968). We granted certiorari. 393 U.S. 975, 89 S.Ct. 444, 21 L.ed.2d 437 (1968). We reverse.

Lake Nixon Club, located 12 miles west of Little Rock, is a 232-acre amusement area with swimming, boating, sun bathing, picnicking, miniature golf, dancing facilities, and a snack bar. The Pauls purchased the Lake Nixon site in 1962 and subsequently operated this amusement business there in a racially segregated manner.

Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 enacted a sweeping prohibition of discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin at places of public accommodation whose operations affect commerce.3 This prohibition does not et end to discrimination or segregation at private clubs.4 But, as both courts below properly found, Lake Nixon is not a private club. It is simply a business operated for a profit with none of the attributes of self-government and member-ownership traditionally associated with private clubs. It is true that following enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Pauls began to refer to the establishment as a private club. They even began to require patrons to pay a 25-cent 'membership' fee, which gains a purchaser a 'membership' card entitling him to enter the Club's premises for an entire season and, on payment of specified additional fees, to use the swimming, boating, and miniature golf facilities. But this 'membership' device seems no more than a subterfuge designed to avoid coverage of the 1964 Act. White persons are routinely provided 'membership' cards, and some 100,000 whites visit the establishment each season. As the District Court found, Lake Nixon is 'open in general to all of the public who are members of the white race.' 263 F.Supp., at 418. Negroes, on the other hand, are uniformly denied 'membership' cards, and thus admission, because of the Pauls' fear that integration would 'ruin' the 'business.' The conclusion of the courts below that Lake Nixon is not a private club is plainly correct—indeed, respondent does not challenge that conclusion here.

We therefore turn to the question whether Lake Nixon Club is 'a place of public accommodation' as defined by § 201(b) of the 1964 Act, and, if so, whether its operations 'affect commerce' within the meaning of § 201(c) of that Act.

Section 201(b) defines four categories of establishments as covered public accommodations. Three of these categories are relevant here:

'Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of this title if its operations affect commerce * * *.

* * *

'(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, including, but not limited to, any such facility located on the premises of any retail establishment; or any gasoline station;

'(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment; and

'(4) any establishment (A) * * * (ii) within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment, and (B) which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment.'

Section 201(c) sets forth standards for determining whether the operations of an establishment in any of these categories affect commerce within the meaning of Title II:

'The operations of an establishment affect commerce within the meaning of this title if * * * (2) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (2) [set out supra] * * *, it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it serves, or gasoline or other products which it sells, has moved in commerce; (3) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (3) [set out supra] * * *, it customarily presents films, performances, athletic teams, exhibitions, or other sources of entertainment which move in commerce; and () in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (4) [set out supra] * * *, there is physically located within its premises, an establishment the operations of which affect commerce within the meaning of this subsection. For purposes of this section, 'commerce' means travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States * * *.'

Petitioners argue first that Lake Nixon's snack bar is a covered public accommodation under §§ 201(a)(2) and 201(c)(2), and that as such it brings the entire establish- ment within the coverage of Title II under §§ 201(b)(4) and 201(c)(4). Clearly, the snack bar is 'principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises.' Thus, it is a covered public accommodation if 'it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it serves * * * has moved in commerce.' We find that the snack bar is a covered public accommodation under either of these standards.

The Pauls advertise the Lake Nixon Club in a monthly magazine called 'Little Rock Today,' which is distributed to guests at Little Rock hotels, motels, and restaurants, to acquaint them with available tourist attractions in the area. Regular advertisements for Lake Nixon were also broadcast over two area radio stations. In addition, Lake Nixon has advertised in the 'Little Rock Air Force Base,' a monthly newspaper published at the Little Rock Air Force Base in Jacksonville, Arkansas. This choice of advertising media leaves no doubt that the Pauls were seeking broad-based patronage from an audience which they knew to include interstate travelers. Thus, the Lake Nixon Club unquestionably offered to serve out-of-state visitors to the Little Rock area. And it would be unrealistic to assume that none of the 100,000 patrons actually served by the Club each season was an interstate traveler.5 Since the Lake Nixon Club offered to serve and served out-of-state persons, and since the Club's snack bar was established to serve all patrons of the entire facility, we must conclude that the snack bar offered to serve and served out-of-state persons. See Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 309, 85 S.Ct. 384, 388, 13 L.Ed.2d 300 (1964); see also Wooten v. Moore, 400 F.2d 239 (C.A. 4th Cir. 1968).

The record, although not as complete on this point as might be desired, also demonstrates that a 'substantial portion of the food' served by the Lake Nixon Club snack bar has moved in interstate commerce. The snack bar serves a limited fare—hot dogs and hamburgers on buns, soft drinks, and milk. The District Court took judicial notice of the fact that the 'principal ingredients going into the bread were produced and processed in other States' and that 'certain ingredients [of the soft drinks] were probably obtained * * * from out-of State sources.' 263 F.Supp., at 418. Thus, at the very least, three of the four food items sold at the snack bar contain ingredients originating outside of the State. There can be no serious doubt that a 'substantial portion of the food' served at the snack bar has moved in interstate commerce. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296-297, 85 S.Ct. 377, 379-380, 13 L.Ed.2d 290 (1964); Gregory v. Meyer, 376 F.2d 509, 511, n. 1 (C.A 5th Cir. 1967).

The snack bar's status as a covered establishment automatically brings the entire Lake Nixon facility within the ambit of Title II. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 201(b)(4) and 201(c)(4), set out supra; see H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 20; Fazzio Real Estate Co. v. Adams, 396 F.2d 146 (C.A. 5th Cir. 1968).6

Petitioners also argue that the Lake Nixon Club is a covered public accomodation under §§ 201(b)(3) and 201(c)(3) of the 1964 Act. These sections proscribe discrimination by 'any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment' which 'customarily presents films, performances, athletic teams exhibitions, or other sources of intertainment which move in commerce.' Under any accepted definition of 'entertainment,' the Lake Nixon Club would surely qualify as a 'place of entertainment.'7 And indeed it advertises itself as such.8 Respondent argues, however, that in the context of § 201(b)(3) 'place of entertainment' refers only to establishments where patrons are entertained as spectators or listeners rather than those where...

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