Daniel v. Rewerts
| Decision Date | 26 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:22-cv-797 |
| Parties | JOHN EDWARD DANIEL, Petitioner, v. RANDEE REWERTS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Petitioner consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No 6.) Section 636(c) provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case ....” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the petition. Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.
Service of the petition on the respondent is of particular significance in defining a putative respondent's relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court's authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351.
Rule 4, by requiring courts to review and even resolve the petition before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding-the petitioner. Because Respondent has not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that Respondent is not presently a party whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review of the petition. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) ().[1] Petitioner's consent is sufficient to permit the undersigned to conduct the Rule 4 review.
The Court conducts a preliminary review of the petition under Rule 4 to determine whether “it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be summarily dismissed. Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (). A dismissal under Rule 4 includes those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual allegations that are palpably incredible or false. Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir. 1999). After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the Court will dismiss the petition for failure to raise a meritorious federal claim.
Petitioner John Edward Daniel is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections at the Carson City Correctional Facility (DRF) in Carson City, Montcalm County, Michigan. On June 8, 2021, Petitioner pleaded nolo contendere in the Kent County Circuit Court to operating while intoxicated, third offense, in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.625. On July 22, 2021, the court sentenced Petitioner as a second habitual offender to a prison term of 5 years to 7 years, 6 months. Petitioner's minimum sentence was an upward departure from the minimum sentence range that would apply if the Michigan sentencing guidelines were followed. Petitioner's sentence was made concurrent with another sentence for operating while impaired that had been imposed about one year earlier following his guilty plea in the Kalamazoo County Circuit Court.
Dissatisfied with his sentence, Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals. In the court of appeals, Petitioner raised a claim that the trial court's upward departure minimum sentence was unreasonable and disproportionate. (ECF No. 1, PageID.1; Pet'r's Mich. Ct. App. Appl. for Leave to Appeal, ECF No. 2-1, PageID.29.) That claim appeared to encompass two distinct arguments: first, the imposed minimum sentence was more than double the guideline range based on the trial court's improper and speculative surmise that Petitioner would eventually kill himself or someone else; and second, the trial court based the departure on the number of times Petitioner had been convicted of drunk driving which was already taken into account in the guidelines. (Pet'r's Mich. Ct. App. Appl. for Leave to Appeal, ECF No. 2-1, PageID.32.) Petitioner does not identify any other issues he raised in the court of appeals.
By order entered February 24, 2022, the court of appeals denied leave to appeal “for lack of merit in the grounds presented.” (Mich. Ct. App. Order, ECF No. 2-1, PageID.28.)
Petitioner then sought leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court. Petitioner reports that he again raised the issue regarding the trial court's unreasonable and disproportionate upward departure, but he also added a new issue: “[t]rial judge abused his discretion by sentencing Defendant under the assumption Defendant was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol.” (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2; Pet'r's Mich. Appl. for Leave to Appeal, ECF No. 2-1, PageID.36, 40, 41.) The crux of that argument appears to be that officers saw video that showed Petitioner driving the vehicle in a parking lot, but Petitioner was not intoxicated at that time; instead, he only became intoxicated after he parked the vehicle and then he never drove. (Pet'r's Mich. Appl. for Leave to Appeal, ECF No. 2-1, PageID.42.)
On June 29, 2022, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. (Mich. Order, ECF No. 2-1, PageID.35.) Shortly thereafter, Petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition raising one ground for relief, as follows:
The Court will address all of the habeas grounds Petitioner has raised.
The AEDPA “prevent[s] federal habeas ‘retrials'” and ensures that state court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under the law. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-94 (2002). An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a state conviction cannot be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “Under these rules, [a] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Stermer v. Warren, 959 F.3d 704, 721 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011)). This standard is “intentionally difficult to meet.” Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The AEDPA limits the source of law to cases decided by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In determining whether federal law is clearly established, the Court may not consider the decisions of lower federal courts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 381-82 (2000); Miller v. Straub, 299 F.3d 570, 578-79 (6th Cir. 2002). Moreover, “clearly established Federal law” does not include decisions of the Supreme Court announced after the last adjudication of the merits in state court. Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 37-38 (2011)...
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