Daniel v. State

• Decision Date: 23 December 2021
• Docket Number: 03-20-00519-CR
• Citation: 641 S.W.3d 486
• Parties: Bernard DANIEL, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

641 S.W.3d 486

Bernard DANIEL, Appellant

v.The STATE of Texas, Appellee

NO. 03-20-00519-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Austin.

Filed: December 23, 2021

Justin Bradford Smith, Assistant District Attorney, P. O. Box 540, Belton, TX 76513, for Appellee.

Erika Copeland, Copeland Law Firm, P. O. Box 399, Cedar Park, TX 78613, for Appellant.

Before Justices Goodwin, Triana, and Kelly

OPINION

Gisela D. Triana, Justice

Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, appellant Bernard Daniel pleaded guilty to the felony offense of driving while intoxicated and was placed on community supervision for four years. In a single issue on appeal, Daniel contends that the district court should have granted the motion to suppress. We agree and will reverse the judgment of conviction.

BACKGROUND

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, former Killeen Police Department Officer John Todd testified that on the night of April 15, 2017, he stopped Daniel's vehicle for failing to maintain a single lane of traffic. Todd first observed Daniel's vehicle stopped at the intersection of Central Texas Expressway and Stan Schlueter Loop in Killeen. There were two left-turn lanes at the intersection. Daniel's vehicle, which was in the outer turn lane, turned left onto Stan Schlueter Loop. As the vehicle made the turn, "approximately half the vehicle" crossed the dotted white line separating the outer turn lane from the inner turn lane, before returning to the outer lane. After completing the turn, Daniel's vehicle continued driving on Stan Schlueter Loop in the outer westbound lane of the four-lane divided roadway, followed by Todd's patrol vehicle. Todd testified that he observed Daniel's vehicle cross the dotted white line dividing the outer and inner westbound lanes on two other occasions before initiating the traffic stop. Todd acknowledged that the only reason he stopped Daniel's vehicle was for failure to maintain a single lane of traffic. Todd also acknowledged that at the times he observed Daniel's vehicle cross the line, there were no other cars near his vehicle.¹

A video recording of the stop, taken from Todd's patrol-car dash camera, was also admitted into evidence. In the recording, Daniel's vehicle can be seen clearly crossing the line dividing the outer and inner turn lanes as Daniel turned left, but, as Todd acknowledged in his testimony and as the State concedes in its brief, it is difficult to see on the video the other two times that Daniel's vehicle crossed the line.

During the traffic stop, Todd spoke with Daniel, observed signs that he was intoxicated, and subsequently arrested him for driving while intoxicated. Prior to trial, Daniel filed a motion to suppress evidence of his intoxication, asserting that Todd lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. At the hearing on the motion, Daniel argued that to violate the failure-to-maintain-a-single-lane statute, see Texas Transportation Code § 545.060(a), a motorist must have failed to maintain his lane under circumstances that were unsafe. Daniel contended that because there was no evidence that he had crossed the line in an unsafe manner, there was no violation of Section 545.060(a). The State argued in response that the video showed "a very clear failure to maintain a single lane during a left turn. [Daniel's] car went almost entirely into the inside lane as he made it into the roadway. That's a clear violation of the law." The district court took the matter under advisement and later denied the motion to suppress. On its docket sheet, the district court made findings of fact and conclusions of law, including the following:

[Daniel] turned left and did not remain within his single marked lane; Officer Todd followed to make an investigatory stop; he indicated that he saw two more instances of not maintaining a single marked lane before the stop which were not unsafe[.]

A warrantless stop was made upon probable cause which [led] to [Daniel]'s arrest and detention for DWI[.]

Daniel subsequently pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated, was sentenced to four years' imprisonment, but had his sentence suspended and was placed on community supervision for four years. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"We review a ruling on a motion to suppress using a bifurcated standard of review." Sims v. State , 569 S.W.3d 634, 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (citing Guzman v. State , 955 S.W.2d 85, 87-91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ). "A trial court's findings of historical fact and determinations of mixed questions of law and fact that turn on credibility and demeanor are afforded almost total deference if they are reasonably supported by the record." Id. "That same deferential standard of review ‘applies to a trial court's determination of historical facts [even] when that determination is based on a videotape recording admitted into evidence at a suppression hearing.’ " State v. Duran , 396 S.W.3d 563, 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (quoting Montanez v. State , 195 S.W.3d 101, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ). "We review a trial court's determination of legal questions and its application of the law to facts that do not turn upon a determination of witness credibility and demeanor de novo." Id.

DISCUSSION

Reasonable suspicion

In his sole issue on appeal, Daniel argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because Officer Todd lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. "When a police officer stops a defendant without a warrant, the State has the burden of proving the reasonableness of the stop at a suppression hearing." State v. Cortez , 543 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). "An officer may make a warrantless traffic stop if the ‘reasonable suspicion’ standard is satisfied." Jaganathan v. State , 479 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (citing Guerra v. State , 432 S.W.3d 905, 911 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ). "Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has ‘specific articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably suspect that a particular person has engaged or is (or soon will be) engaging in criminal activity.’ " Id. (quoting Abney v. State , 394 S.W.3d 542, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ). "The standard requires only ‘some minimal level of objective justification’ for the stop." Hamal v. State , 390 S.W.3d 302, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Foster v. State , 326 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ). "We review a reasonable suspicion determination by considering the totality of the circumstances." Cortez , 543 S.W.3d at 204. "Whether the facts known to the officer amount to reasonable suspicion is a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review." Hamal , 390 S.W.3d at 306 (citing State v. Mendoza , 365 S.W.3d 666, 669–70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) ); State v. Colby , 604 S.W.3d 232, 237 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020, no pet.) ; see also State v. McMahan , No. 03-19-00824-CR, 2020 WL 6533661, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 6, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

In this case, the only basis for the traffic stop was Section 545.060(a) of the Texas Transportation Code, which provides that "[a]n operator on a roadway divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic: (1) shall drive as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane; and (2) may not move from the lane unless that movement can be made safely." Tex. Transp. Code § 545.060(a). Daniel does not dispute that he failed to drive as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane but contends that because there was no evidence that his movement from that lane was unsafe, Todd had no reason to suspect a violation of Section 545.060(a). The State concedes in its brief that "the evidence does not suggest any unsafe circumstances" and that "Todd's testimony tends to suggest there was nothing unsafe about Appellant's driving." The State contends, however, that Section 545.060(a) creates two separate offenses: (1) failure to drive as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane, and (2) moving from the lane in an unsafe manner. Thus, in the State's view, evidence of Daniel's failure to stay within his lane is sufficient, by itself, to support Todd's reasonable belief that Daniel had violated Section 545.060.

This Court rejected that argument in Hernandez v. State , 983 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. ref'd). In that case, the State contended that a driver's "drift" across a lane marker into another lane of traffic traveling in the same direction, without any evidence that the drifting was unsafe, gave an officer reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver had violated Section 545.060(a). Id. at 869–70. The Court concluded that it did not. Id. at 871. This Court began its analysis by observing that "the history of the relevant statutory provision seems to indicate that, with respect to a vehicle's straying over a lane marker, a traffic violation occurs only when the vehicle's movement is in some way unsafe." Id. This Court explained:

In 1947 the legislature first enacted a traffic regulation regarding "driving on roadways laned for traffic," which provided as follows:

Whenever any roadway has been divided into two (2) or more clearly marked lanes for traffic the following rules in addition to all others consistent herewith shall apply:

(a) The driver of a vehicle shall drive as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.

This provision remained unchanged until the legislature enacted the Transportation Code in 1995. The replacement provision provides: "An operator on a roadway divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic: (1) shall drive as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane; and (2) may not move from the lane unless that movement can be made safely." The enactment of the Transportation Code made no substantive change in the law.

Id...