Daniel v. State
| Decision Date | 19 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 5D21-237 |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Jeffrey Thomas DANIEL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, and Nancy Ryan, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allison L. Morris, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
Jeffrey Thomas Daniel ("Daniel") was charged with making a written threat to kill or cause bodily harm in violation of section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2020). The State is holding Daniel without bond based upon the trial court's interpretation of Florida's pretrial detention and release statute found in section 907.041(4)(c) 2., Florida Statutes (2020). Because the trial court's construction of section 907.041(4)(c) 2. is contrary to its plain and ordinary meaning, we grant Daniel relief.
In February 2020, the State charged Daniel with one count of making a written threat to kill or cause bodily harm, a violation of section 836.10. The criminal charge pending against Daniel is based on a document threatening law enforcement officers that he authored and published.
After charging Daniel, the State filed a motion for pretrial detention and objected to Daniel's motion for bond. The State argued unsuccessfully that Daniel should be held without bond under section 907.041(4)(c) 5., because his offense qualified as a dangerous crime. Because the enumerated crimes designated in the statute did not include the crime for which Daniel was charged, the trial court rejected the State's argument.1 Nonetheless, the trial court sua sponte found an alternate ground in the statute to grant the State's request.
Relying on section 907.041(4)(c) 2., the trial court granted the State's motion for pretrial detention after determining that "law enforcement officers" can qualify as a "judicial officer" for the purpose of the statute. Thereafter, Daniel filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court arguing that the trial court's expansive interpretation of the term judicial officer was in error. The trial court denied Daniel's petition for writ of habeas corpus, prompting him to file this appeal.
Under the principle previously explained by this Court in Dollar v. State , 909 So. 2d 399, 401 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005), the trial court's order here denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus is arguably a nullity because that petition should have been filed in this Court. Alternatively, the trial court should have transferred the petition to this Court instead of undertaking a review of its own orders. Id . Accordingly, we deem it best to treat this appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in this Court. Id.
The narrow issue before this Court is whether Daniel's written threat against law enforcement officers qualifies as a threat to a judicial officer under section 907.041(4)(c) 2. It is an issue of pure statutory interpretation and thus is subject to de novo review. Kumar v. Patel , 227 So. 3d 557, 558 (Fla. 2017). When the issue presented is one of statutory interpretation, we examine the text of the statute for its plain and ordinary meaning. Lopez v. Hall , 233 So. 3d 451, 453 (Fla. 2018).
The statute at issue, section 907.041(4)(c) 2., states as follows:
In analyzing the statute, we ask whether reasonable readers would understand the term judicial officer to include law enforcement officers acting outside of the confines of a courthouse and direction of a judge. See L.C. v. State , 283 So. 3d 442, 444 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (). They would not.
In both common parlance and common legal usage, there is a distinction between law enforcement officers and judicial officers. The State has not provided a single example, and this Court can think of none, where a reasonable user of the English language would use the terms interchangeably. The Legislature certainly could have included law enforcement officers when drafting the statute at issue here, but it did not do so. As this Court has long recognized, it is not our place to add words to a statute. Brook v. State , 999 So. 2d 1093, 1097 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) ().
Daniel's argument as to the plain and ordinary meaning of the term judicial officer is further supported by the dictionary. When considering the plain and ordinary meaning of terms used in a statute, Florida courts look to the terms’ ordinary definitions, which may be derived from dictionaries. Debaun v. State , 213 So. 3d 747, 751-52 (Fla. 2017) ; see also Nunes v. Herschman , 310 So. 3d 79, 82 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (). Black's Law Dictionary offers three definitions for judicial officer, none of which naturally apply to law enforcement officers.
judicial officer. (17c) 1. A judge or magistrate. 2. Any officer of the court, such as a bailiff or court reporter. 3. A person, usu. an attorney, who serves in an appointive capacity at the pleasure of an appointing judge, and whose actions and decisions are reviewed by that judge.—Also termed magistrate ; referee ; special master ; commissioner ; hearing officer .
Judicial Officer , Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
In addition to a dictionary, the plain and ordinary meaning of a term can also be gleaned from the term's use in case law and related authority. See Debaun , 213 So. 3d at 753 (). As Daniel noted, when the Florida Supreme Court uses the term judicial officers it is referring to justices, judges, and magistrates. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Sibley , 995 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 2008) ; In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge , J.Q.C. No. 77-16 , 357 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1978); Farish v. Smoot , 58 So. 2d 534, 537 (Fla. 1952). Likewise, when Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.131 regarding pretrial release uses the term judicial officer, it is clearly not referring to a law enforcement officer. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.131 ().
Instead of making arguments based upon the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute, the State invites this Court to issue an affirmance based upon the general intent of the Legislature. We reject that invitation, and instead look to what a reasonable reader of the statute would understand it to mean. We conclude that a reasonable reader of the statute would not understand the term judicial officer to include law enforcement officers and thereby reject the trial court's interpretation of section 907.041(4)(c) 2.
Alternatively, the State argues for the first time on appeal that law enforcement officers are potential witnesses and therefore, still fall within the ambit of 907.041(4)(c)2. Because the trial court did not make the factual findings necessary to support this alternate theory, we decline to adopt the State's suggestion that Daniel's petition should be denied pursuant to the tipsy coachman rule. See Bueno v. Workman , 20 So. 3d 993, 998 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) ().
For the reasons set forth above, we grant Daniel's petition for writ of habeas corpus and remand to the trial court to set an expedited hearing to determine the issue of pretrial release or his further detention. See Jacobs v. Rambosk , 239 So. 3d 647 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) ; see also Bratton v. Ryan , 133 So. 3d 1158, 1159 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014).
PETITION GRANTED.
EVANDER, C.J., concurs specially, with opinion.
LAMBERT, J., concurs specially, with opinion.
I agree that Daniel's request for review is properly treated as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, that a police officer is not a "judicial officer" under section 907.041(4)(c) 2., Florida Statutes (2020), and that remand for an expedited hearing to determine the issue of pretrial release or detention is appropriate. I write to address the State's tipsy coachman argument that Daniel's petition should be denied on the grounds that Daniel threatened a potential witness with the intent to obstruct the judicial process.
The Legislature has stated that "[i]t is the policy of this state that persons committing serious criminal offenses, [and] posing a threat to the safety of the community or the integrity of the judicial process, ... be detained upon arrest." § 907.041(1), Fla. Stat (2020). In determining whether pretrial detention is appropriate, the Legislature has also decided that the primary consideration is "the protection of the community from risk of physical harm to persons." Id .
A pretrial detention order must be based solely upon evidence presented at a pretrial detention hearing and shall contain findings of fact and conclusions of law to support it. § 907.041(4)(i), Fla. Stat. (2020).
Pretrial detention is authorized where "[t]he defendant, with the intent to obstruct the judicial process, has threatened, [or]...
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