Daniels v. Anderson
Decision Date | 22 September 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 76374,76374 |
Citation | 204 Ill.Dec. 666,642 N.E.2d 128,162 Ill.2d 47 |
Parties | , 204 Ill.Dec. 666 William L. DANIELS, Appellee, v. James ANDERSON et al., Appellants. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Stephen D. Libowsky and Mark L. Johnson, Katten, Muchin & Zavis, Chicago, for appellee.
Plaintiff, William L. Daniels, brought an action in the circuit court of Cook County against several defendants, including James Anderson, the estate of Stephen Jacula, and Nicholas Zografos. Daniels sought, inter alia, the specific performance of a real estate sales contract. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Daniels. The appellate court affirmed. (252 Ill.App.3d 289, 191 Ill.Dec. 773, 624 N.E.2d 1151.) We allowed Zografos' petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill.2d R. 315(a)), and now affirm the appellate court, with a minor modification.
The appellate court detailed the facts of this case. We repeat only those facts that are necessary for our disposition of the issues presented in this appeal.
In March 1977, Anderson and Jacula owned a 10-acre tract of real estate in what is now Burr Ridge. The property is divided into four lots. (See appendix.) Two of the four lots (the Daniels Property) are situated side-by-side, east and west, and face the south side of 79th Street at 11445 79th Street. Each lot is an acre. A single-family home was moved onto the western lot around 1950.
The third lot (the Contiguous Parcel) lies directly south of the Daniels Property. In other words, the south boundary of the Daniels Property is also the north boundary of the Contiguous Parcel. The Contiguous Parcel consists of approximately two acres and is vacant and landlocked.
The fourth lot (the Second Parcel) consists of approximately six acres of vacant land, most of which lies directly south of the Contiguous Parcel. A portion of the Second Parcel extends northward in a 60-foot-wide strip directly west and adjacent to the Contiguous Parcel and the Daniels Property until the strip reaches 79th Street. The strip provides the body of the Second Parcel, with the Contiguous Parcel and the Daniels Property, access to 79th Street.
A gravel driveway lies on a small section of the Second Parcel's strip. The 11-foot-wide driveway begins on the strip at 79th Street and runs southeast on the strip for approximately 60 feet and then enters the Daniels Property. The driveway has always served as the ingress to and egress from the single-family home on the Daniels Property.
In March 1977, Daniels contracted with Anderson and Jacula to buy the Daniels Property. The written contract consisted of a preprinted form and a rider, which provided in pertinent part
The rider also provided:
Daniels and his wife moved into the single-family home on the Daniels Property when they entered into the 1977 sales contract. In March 1979, the Daniels Property closed and the Danielses received a deed. This deed did not mention Daniels' easement or his right of first refusal of the Contiguous Parcel. Daniels did not record the 1977 sales contract at this time.
In June 1979, Jacula and his wife acquired sole ownership of the Contiguous Parcel and Anderson and his wife acquired sole ownership of the Second Parcel. Under a May 1985 easement agreement, the Jaculas acquired an easement in favor of the otherwise landlocked Contiguous Parcel for access to 79th Street. The easement covered the entire 60-foot-wide strip of the Second Parcel. The 1985 easement also gave the Jaculas the right to build a 20-foot-wide road on the strip.
In September 1985, Zografos contracted with the Jaculas to buy the Contiguous Parcel for $60,000. Daniels never received an offer to buy the Contiguous Parcel. Since Daniels had not recorded the 1977 contract by this time, a title search for this sale to Zografos reflected that Daniels did not have any interest in the Contiguous Parcel. Pursuant to the 1985 contract, Zografos paid the Jaculas $10,000 initially and delivered to them a judgment note on the balance. On February 18, 1986, Zografos paid $15,000 and, on March 22, he paid another $15,000. At the closing on August 22, Zografos paid the remaining $20,000. Shortly after that date, Zografos recorded a warranty deed to the Contiguous Parcel. Zografos also received from the Jaculas their rights under the 1985 easement agreement.
In October 1986, Zografos contracted with the Andersons to buy the Second Parcel. A title search for this sale reflected that Daniels did not have any interest in or easement over the Second Parcel. The sale of the Second Parcel closed on December 19, 1986. Daniels recorded the 1977 sales contract 11 days prior to this closing.
In December 1986, Anderson told Daniels that he could no longer use the gravel driveway that lies partly on the Second Parcel's 60-foot-wide strip. We note that the trial court subsequently entered an agreed order allowing Daniels to use the driveway.
Daniels brought this action in December 1989. Daniels sought the specific performance of his right of first refusal of the Contiguous Parcel. Daniels also sought damages from Jacula for breaching the 1977 contract and damages from Zografos for interfering with that contract. Daniels also sought a declaration granting him an easement in the gravel driveway, based on the 1977 contract, and an injunction preventing Zografos from interfering with that easement.
Zografos counterclaimed against Daniels. Zografos sought a declaration, based on the affirmative defense of merger, that Daniels did not have an easement over that part of the Second Parcel on which lies the driveway to the Daniels home. Zografos also sought an injunction preventing Daniels from using any part of the Second Parcel as a driveway.
At the close of a hearing, the trial court found as follows. Daniels' right of first refusal of the Contiguous Parcel, as provided by the 1977 sales contract, was legally enforceable. Zografos had actual notice of Daniels' right prior to Zografos' purchase of that parcel. Therefore, Zografos was not a bona fide purchaser of the Contiguous Parcel and he took title thereto subject to Daniels' right. Also, Jacula breached the 1977 sales contract by selling the Contiguous Parcel to Zografos without first offering it to Daniels.
Based on these findings, the trial court entered a judgment that provided as follows. Zografos was ordered to convey the Contiguous Parcel to Daniels on the same terms and conditions as Zografos received the property, including the easement rights that he received from the Jaculas. Daniels was ordered to pay Zografos the full purchase price and reimburse him for approximately $11,000 in property taxes that Zografos had paid on the Contiguous Parcel during his ownership.
The trial court also ruled against Zografos' counterclaim against Daniels regarding the gravel driveway. The court found that Daniels did not have a driveway easement based on the 1977 sales contract because the contract merged into the deed to the Daniels Property. However, the court found that Daniels had established a nonexclusive driveway easement by prescription for ingress to and egress from the Daniels home.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment in all material respects. (252 Ill.App.3d 289, 191 Ill.Dec. 773, 624 N.E.2d 1151.) However, the appellate court disagreed with the trial court's finding that Daniels had established an easement by prescription. Rather, the appellate court held that Daniels was entitled to an easement based on the 1977 contract. (252 Ill.App.3d at 307-10, 191 Ill.Dec. 773, 624 N.E.2d 1151.) We will refer to additional pertinent facts as they relate to the issues Zografos raises before this court.
Zografos presents three issues in this appeal. He contends: (1) he was a bona fide purchaser of the Contiguous Parcel; (2) the trial court's award of the Contiguous Parcel to Daniels should not have included the easement that Zografos received from the Jaculas; and (3) Daniels had no easement rights under the 1977 contract.
In discussing these issues, we remember that the historic function of a court of equity is to administer remedial justice. The sound discretion of the court is the controlling guide. Of course, the trial court's discretion must not be arbitrary. Rather, the court must exercise its discretion in accordance with the fixed principles and precedents of equity jurisprudence. Shatz v. Paul (1955), 7 Ill.App.2d 223, 233-34, 129 N.E.2d 348; accord 1 S. Symons, Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence §§ 47, 59 (5th ed. 1941).
Daniels sought, inter alia, the specific performance of his right of first...
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