Daniels v. Baer

• Decision Date: 23 March 2022
• Docket Number: 1:19-cv-01801-AWI-GSA-PC
• Court: United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Eastern District of California
• Parties: NORMAN GERALD DANIELS III, Plaintiff, v. A. BAER, et al., Defendants

NORMAN GERALD DANIELS III, Plaintiff,
v.
A. BAER, et al., Defendants

No. 1:19-cv-01801-AWI-GSA-PC

United States District Court, E.D. California

March 23, 2022

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, RECOMMENDING THAT THIS CASE BE DISMISSED, WITH PREJUDICE, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

(ECF No. 51.)

OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE IN 14 DAYS

GARY S. AUSTIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action was initiated by civil complaint filed by Plaintiff in the Kings County Superior Court on August 19, 2019 (Case #19CV-0717). On December 23, 2019, defendants Baer, Martin, Melina, and Smith (“Defendants”) removed the case to federal court by filing a Notice of Removal of Action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. (ECF No. 1.)

On June 1, 2021, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint as a matter of course. (ECF No. 30.) On July 9, 2021, the Court dismissed the First Amended Complaint for failure to state

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a claim, with leave to amend. (ECF No. 31.) On March 4, 2022, Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint which is now before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 51.) 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious, ” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To state a viable claim, Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.

III. SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS IN THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison (“SATF”) in Corcoran, California, where the events at issue in the Second Amended Complaint occurred. Plaintiff names as defendants Captain Baer, J. Melina, Martins,

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S. Smith (Associate Warden), Zamora (CCII), Shaw (CCII), Cisneros (Associate Warden), and K.J. Allen (Chief Appeals Examiner) (collectively, “Defendants”). A summary of Plaintiff's allegations follow:

The gravamen of Plaintiff's complaint is that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because prison officials used the wrong subsection of a California regulation to justify denying his request to correspond with an inmate at another prison. Plaintiff states that he does not challenge the regulation or the decisions that were made in response to his requests to correspond, but rather he challenges the improper use of a regulation by misinterpreting it. He alleges that Defendants failed to follow state regulations, and even after being informed of the error they failed to do anything about it. He claims that these violations caused discrimination against him and inconsistency in the decisions made by officials. The regulations at issue are Cal.Code Regs. tit 15, § 3139(b) and § 3139(f). Plaintiff alleges that officials improperly used § 3139(f) to deny his requests to correspond, when they should have used § 3139(b).

Plaintiff also alleges that officials are not properly following some regulations when managing prison appeals, as outlined in Cal.Code Regs. tit 15, § 3084. In some cases, officers have gone against regulations and heard their own misconduct complaints, which is not allowed. Some Defendants in supervisory positions are not properly supervising or training their employees, or acting to remedy the violation of regulations.

Plaintiff also complains that the ADA equipment he uses to prepare documents and litigate his claims is not up to date.

As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.

IV.PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS

A. Section 1983

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).

B. State Regulations

Plaintiff disagrees with the application of the state regulation at Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3139(f) by prison officials to deny his requests to correspond with an inmate incarcerated at another prison. He alleges that prison officials should use Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3139(b) instead. Plaintiff does not challenge the constitutionality of either of the regulations, but rather how prison officials apply § 3139(f).

Violation of state regulations, rules and policies of the CDCR, or other state law is not sufficient to state a claim for relief under § 1983. Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law. See Galen v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 662 (9th Cir. 2007). Moreover, Plaintiff cannot assert an independent cause of action based on the purported violation of § 3139 of the California Code of Regulations. “The existence of regulations such as these governing the conduct of prison employees does not necessarily entitle Plaintiff to sue civilly to enforce the regulations or to sue for damages based on the violation of the regulations.” K'napp v. Adams, No. 1:06-cv-01701-LJO-GSA (PC), 2009 WL 1292347, at *4, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38682, at *12 (E.D.Cal. May 7, 2009). There is no implied private right of action under title fifteen of the California Code of Regulations. Id. at *4-5, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38682 at *12-13. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under § 1983 for misapplication of state regulations.

C. First Amendment Freedom of Speech

The standards governing First Amendment claims of incarcerated persons were outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). A prisoner's First Amendment rights are necessarily “more limited in scope than

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the constitutional rights held by individuals in society at large.” Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001). Thus, an inmate retains only “those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (“[L]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979); Prison Legal News v. Cook, 238 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001).

Generally, prisoners have “a First Amendment right to send and receive mail.” Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam). However, a prison may adopt regulations or practices that impinge on a prisoner's First Amendment rights as long as the regulations are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.

There is no right for inmates at different institutions to correspond with each other, whether on legal matters or otherwise. McKinney v. DeBord, 324 F.Supp. 928, 932 (E.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. McKinney v. De Bord, 507 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1974) (citing Putt v. Clark (N.D.Ga.1969) 297 F.Supp. 27; Vida v. Cage (6th Cir. 1967) 385 F.2d 408; In re Harrell (1970) 2 Cal.3d 675, 690, modified at 2 Cal.3d 911a, 87 Cal.Rptr. 504, 470 P.2d 640).

Under Turner, prison officials may entirely prohibit correspondence between felons based on security concerns. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 93 (“Undoubtedly, communication with other felons is a potential spur to criminal behavior: this sort of contact frequently is prohibited even after an inmate has been released on parole. ...