Daniels v. Beryllium Corporation
Decision Date | 30 November 1962 |
Docket Number | No. 24953.,24953. |
Citation | 211 F. Supp. 452 |
Parties | Robert H. DANIELS and Mary Daniels, his wife, v. The BERYLLIUM CORPORATION. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
John S. Speicher, Reading, Pa., for plaintiffs.
Oscar Brown, George P. Williams, III, of Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.
Defendant has moved for complete or partial summary judgment under Rule 56. The question presented is the application of the statute of limitations to a so-called "continuing tort" by the defendant and the effect thereon of the plaintiffs' definitive ascertainment of a resulting disease during the continuance of the tort.
Plaintiffs are the injured wife and her husband. The facts before us, drawn from the complaint and answer, and answers to interrogatories, are these: As a result of defendant's contamination of the atmosphere in the vicinity of its manufacturing plant near Reading, Pennsylvania, the wife contracted beryllium poisoning. The wife resides a little more than two miles from the defendant's plant and has been constantly exposed to the poisoned atmosphere from some time prior to World War II until the present time.
In the fall of 1949, as a result of inhalation of beryllium dust the wife first became ill, manifesting symptoms such as shortness of breath, coughing, loss of weight and general loss of interest. In March, 1953, the illness was definitely diagnosed as beryllium poisoning. This suit was not filed, however, until July 1, 1958.
The defendant pleaded the bar of the statute of limitations in its answer and it clearly is entitled to summary judgment if the statute has run. 6 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed.), § 56.17 58, p. 2261. And since this is a diversity action in which all of the operative facts occurred in Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania law of limitation of actions, statutory and decisional, applies. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945). The relevant Pennsylvania statute of limitations is the Act of June 24, 1895, P.L. 236, 12 P.S. § 34, which provides: "Every suit hereafter brought to recover damages for injury wrongfully done to the person, in case where the injury does not result in death, must be brought within two years from the time when the injury was done and not afterwards * * *."
What is the date "when the injury was done" which marks the beginning of the statutory two-year period? Is it the fall of 1949, when the symptoms first appeared? Is it March, 1953, when the diagnosis of beryllium poisoning was made? Defendant contends that it is not important whether the date of manifestation of the symptoms or the date of diagnosis of the disease is taken as the beginning of the period, for in either case the two years would already have run before the suit was brought. Defendant, therefore, claims that the statute is a complete bar, or in the alternative at least a bar to that portion of the claim that existed in the period antedating the two years which preceded the suit. Plaintiffs take the opposite view. They contend that this is a "continuing tort", that the injury done to the wife has continued uninterruptedly to the present time and hence the statute of limitations had not even begun to run when the suit was filed in July, 1958.
Statutes of limitation have as their fundamental basis the elimination of stale claims and the discouragement of delay in seeking legal redress. Their simple provision of a chronological time limit, however, often involves more than a mechanical application of the statute. So it early came to be recognized that the lapse of time prescribed by the statute of limitations would not be applied to bar a suit if the plaintiff was diverted from bringing it by the fraud of his adversary (Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342, 88 U.S. 342, 22 L.Ed. 636 (1874); Smith v. Blachley, 198 Pa. 173, 47 A. 985, 53 L.R.A. 849, (1901)), or by the defendant's secreting himself or otherwise making service of process within the State impossible after the cause of action arose (Act of May 22, 1895, P.L. 112, 12 P.S. § 40; Hunter v. Bremer, 256 Pa. 257, 100 A. 809 (1917)).
In the immediate area of the present problem the decisions in various States are in conflict. See Annotation, When limitation period begins to run against cause of action or claim for contracting of disease, 11 A.L.R.2d 277 (1950). But since we are concerned with Pennsylvania law we turn to examine the view of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. In Plazak v. Allegheny Steel Company, 324 Pa. 422, 188 A. 130 (1936), a workman quit his employment because of an illness which a short time later was diagnosed as silicosis. The trial court granted a new trial on the ground that his evidence that his employment had ceased less than two years before the date of suit was against the weight of the evidence.1 On appeal the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the award of a new trial on the ground that there was no abuse of discretion and no certification that the reason given was the only reason for a new trial. The court also held that defendant was not entitled to judgment n. o. v. because on such a motion the evidence favorable to plaintiff had to be accepted and this brought the suit within two years from the date of his last employment. The case accordingly went back for retrial on the disputed issue of fact whether plaintiff last was employed and thus exposed to the silica dust before or during the two years preceding the suit. The opinion makes it clear that the statute would bar the suit if the last exposure was more than two years before the suit was brought, but not if the suit was brought within two years from the last exposure. Mr. Justice Linn said: (pp. 429-430 of 324 Pa., p. 133 of 188 A.).
In the Plazak case the facts show that the suit was brought within two years from the time of diagnosis.2 The court, however, made no reference to the date of diagnosis or the discovery of the existence of the disease as a datum point for the beginning of the statutory period. This, however, became the crucial element in the subsequent case of Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959). There the plaintiff had been operated on by the defendant in 1948. Nine years later plaintiff, who had been experiencing pain since the operation, underwent another operation which disclosed that a surgical sponge had been left in his body. Within two years from the discovery of the sponge, and ten years after the original operation, plaintiff sued the first surgeon for malpractice. The court held that the statute did not bar the suit. It adopted in effect the principle that injury is not done, under the statute, until it is known or is reasonably ascertainable.3
The Supreme Court of the United States in Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282 (1949), had earlier applied the rule adopted by Ayers to a factual situation similar to that of Plazak. It held that injury was not done under the Federal Employer's Liability Act until it was reasonably ascertainable and hence the statute of limitations did not begin to run until plaintiff, who was a victim of silicosis, knew or should have known of his illness. Mr. Justice Rutledge, speaking for the Court, said: ...
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