Daniels v. Brooks

• Decision Date: 17 June 1941
• Docket Number: No. 26109.,26109.
• Citation: 377 Ill. 44,35 N.E.2d 362
• Parties: DANIELS et al. v. BROOKS et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

377 Ill. 44

35 N.E.2d 362

DANIELS et al.

v.BROOKS et al.

No. 26109.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 17, 1941.

Suit in equity by William Daniels and others against Earl C. Brooks and others to construe certain devises made in a will void for uncertainty and for other relief. From a decree dismissing the complaint for want of equity, plaintiffs appeal.

Affirmed.Appeal from Circuit Court, Marion County; James G. Burnside, judge.

Alfred L. Grattendick and Eugene L. DeGuire, both of St. Louis, Mo., and Wilbert J. Hohlt, of Nashville, for appellants.

Green & Palmer, of Urbana, Walter E. Will, of Mattoon, Basil Wilson and Russell Wilson, both of Centralia, and Lloyd Sloan and Ward P. Holt, both of Salem (Henry I. Green, Oris Barth, and Enos L. Phillips, all of Urbana, of counsel), for appellees.

GUNN, Chief Justice.

Appellants, William Daniels, W. A. Wetherford, Elmer L. Wetherford and Frances Lawhorn, filed their complaint in equity in the circuit court of Marion county, claiming to own certain real estate in said county, as heirs-at-law of Stephen E. Daniels, deceased. The object of the complaint is to construe the devises made in his will to the Salvation Army void for uncertainty, and to declare the title in the heirs of Stephen E. Daniels.

The essential portions of the will of Stephen E. Daniels, which was admitted to probate April 28, 1930, are as follows: ‘First: It is my will that all my just debts and funeral expenses shall be paid as soon after my decease as shall be found convenient by my executor hereinafter named. Second: It is my will that my executor sell all of my property, real, personal and mixed, of every nature and kind, and convert the same into money, and after paying all my just debts and funeral expenses, and the costs of probating my will and administering said estate, that he pay the balance to the proper officers of the Salvation Army as its sole and exclusive property forever.’ The deceased was at the time of his death the owner of real estate described in the complaint.

The complaint alleges there were four different corporations of different States known as the ‘Salvation Army,’ and that each of said corporations claims an interest in the real estate; that on February 16, 1935, the executor of said last will conveyed the real estate involved in this suit to J. Carl Hall, who later conveyed it to Earl C. Brooks, and that the other appellees claim interests in said real estate under certain oil or gas leases, but there is no allegation by or through whom they derive their interest or title. The complaint prays for a decree finding the gift to the Salvation Army to be ambiguous and void and a cloud upon plaintiffs' title, and that the executor's deed be declared to be null and void and the title to the real estate be confirmed in plaintiffs, as heirs-at-law of the said Stephen E. Daniels. A motion to dismiss was sustained and a decree entered dismissing the complaint for want of equity. As a freehold is necessarily involved, the appeal comes directly to this court.

The only point made by appellant is that the circuit court erred in dismissing the complaint because it did not state a cause of action. It is to be observed that the will is complete and disposes of the entire estate of Stephen E. Daniels, and that the relief demanded is that the will be so construed that appellants shall be declared the owners of the land in question as against the title acquired by the grantees in the conveyance of the same real estate by the executor. Ordinarily, the probate of a will is an adjudication of its legality and binding effect which cannot be collaterally attacked. Kemmerer v. Kemmerer, 233 Ill. 327, 84 N.E. 256,122 Am.St.Rep. 169. It is sought to avoid this general principle by the argument that the devise to the proper officers of the Salvation Army is void because of the allegation that there are four corporations of that name, and it is not certain which one was intended by the testator.

There are two complete answers to the contentions of appellants: First, it is not made to appear that the particular Salvation Army beneficiary, intended by the testator, cannot be established by extrinsic proof; and second, a conveyance by the executor passed good title to the land as against appellants, because he was required by the will to sell and convey the real estate, not only for the purpose of paying the legacy to the Salvation Army, but also for the purpose of paying the debts of the decedent,...