Daniels v. Burt
Decision Date | 11 August 1995 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 94-71893. |
Citation | 895 F. Supp. 180 |
Parties | Kenneth Dwayne DANIELS, Petitioner, v. Sherry BURT, Warden, Ryan Regional Correctional Facility, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Anne Yantus, State Appellate Defender, Detroit, MI, for petitioner.
K. Hunter, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lansing, MI, for respondent.
This is a habeas corpus case. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner, Kenneth Daniels (Daniels), challenges his State of Michigan conviction for second degree murder and felony firearm use. The matter was referred to a magistrate judge, who filed a report and recommendation (MJRR) recommending that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied. Now before the Court are Daniels's objections to the MJRR. Respondent, Sherry Burt (Burt), Warden of Ryan Regional Correctional Facility, did not file a response to the objections. For the reasons that follow, the petition will be denied.
The background to this case is set out in the MJRR, and need not be repeated at length here.
Briefly, Daniels was tried in Detroit Recorders Court in May, 1988 for the 1987 killing of David Reese. Daniels was charged with first degree murder and felony firearm use. The jury was instructed on these charges, as well as the lesser-included offenses of second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter.1 After a four day trial, the jury began deliberating on June 1, 1988. The form of verdict was described by the trial judge as follows:
The jury was not given any instructions on how to structure its deliberations in light of the verdict form. On June 6, 1988, the jury sent a note which read:
Once again, Your Honor, we need to hear the law. Because we are "dead locked" 11 to 1, we really need to hear this for the benefit of one juror.
The trial court instructed the jury that it should not indicate how it is split in the future, reread the instructions, and sent them back to continue deliberating. Again, no guidance was offered as to how the jury should conduct its deliberations. Later in the afternoon of June 6 the jury sent another note, stating "We, the Jury, are not able to reach a unanimous verdict." The judge again instructed the jury to continue deliberating, advising them to:
give impartial consideration to one another's views and talk over differences of opinion in a spirit of fairness and frankness ... However, none of you should surrender your opinion of weight and effect of the evidence or the lack of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning with a verdict.
After the jury resumed deliberations, Daniels's counsel requested that the jury be polled as to the lesser-included offenses and that a partial verdict be taken, arguing that if the jury had reached an impasse as to a lesser-included offense, they had in effect acquitted Daniels of the greater charges.2 The judge denied the request and when the jury had not reached a verdict by the end of the day, he declared a mistrial and discharged the jury.3
Daniels was tried again beginning in late November, 1988. The jury found him guilty of second degree murder and felony firearm use. Daniels appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals, and his sentence was affirmed in December, 1991. People v. Daniels, 192 Mich.App. 658, 482 N.W.2d 176 (1991). The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Daniels, 440 Mich. 882, 487 N.W.2d 464 (1992).
Daniels then filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, raising the following six claims:
The magistrate judge recommended denying the petition. Daniels now objects to the magistrate judge's recommendations as to all six issues.
The Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause prohibits a retrial on charges for which a defendant has been acquitted. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896). Retrial after a mistrial does not offend the double jeopardy clause if the mistrial was the result of "manifest necessity." United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824). The determination of "manifest necessity" is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509-510, 98 S.Ct. 824, 832, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978). If the trial court fails to consider obvious and adequate alternatives to aborting a trial, it may not have exercised sound discretion in declaring a mistrial. Glover v. McMackin, 950 F.2d 1236, 1242 (6th Cir.1991). In the general case, "failure of the jury to agree on a verdict is an instance of `manifest necessity.'" Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 324, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 3085, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984).
Daniels characterizes the argument as to double jeopardy as follows:
The question presented to this Court is not whether declaring a mistrial is appropriate when a jury is deadlocked, but whether denial of a request to inquire of the jury for partial verdicts before such declaration, and in a situation where the possibility of partial verdicts has not been pursued, where the jury has been instructed on several lesser included offenses and the jury indicated that they are split 11 to 1, precludes a finding of manifest necessity. This Court should answer in the affirmative.
As the MJRR points out, a minority of courts have held that a judge should inquire whether a deadlocked jury has reached a partial verdict as to any included offenses before declaring a mistrial. See State v. Castrillo, 90 N.M. 608, 566 P.2d 1146 (1977); Stone v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 31 Cal.3d 503, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809 (1982); State v. Pugliese, 120 N.H. 728, 422 A.2d 1319 (1980); Whiteaker v. Alaska, 808 P.2d 270 (1991). However, Michigan is with the majority who have rejected such a rule. In specifically declining to follow the approach set forth in Castrillo, the Michigan Court of Appeals said:
People v. Hickey, 103 Mich.App. 350, 353, 303 N.W.2d 19 (1981).4 As the magistrate judge noted, the situation involved in Hickey and here is distinct from that involved in cases like Wallace v. Havener, 552 F.2d 721 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940, 98 S.Ct. 433, 54 L.Ed.2d 300 (1977), a case in which the jury announced it had agreed on some counts but not others, and the judge declared a mistrial without first taking the jury's verdict on the counts to which it had agreed.5
Daniels incorrectly characterizes the MJRR as ignoring "the facts of the matter" in determining whether the trial judge soundly exercised his discretion in finding manifest necessity to declare a mistrial. The fact of the matter is that the jury announced it was deadlocked.6 The jury did not announce that it had reached a verdict as to any charged offense. Daniels's counsel requested that the jury be polled as to the...
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