Daniels v. Chugach Gov't Servs., Inc.

• Decision Date: 07 March 2016
• Docket Number: Civ. Action No. 14-1667 (EGS)
• Citation: 149 F.Supp.3d 183
• Parties: John Daniels, Plaintiff, v. Chugach Government Services, Inc., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

149 F.Supp.3d 183

John Daniels, Plaintiff,

v.Chugach Government Services, Inc., Defendant.

Civ. Action No. 14-1667 (EGS)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed March 07, 2016

Richard Jay Hackerman, Baltimore, MD, for Plaintiff.

Attison L. Barnes, III, Wiley Rein LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINON

Emmet G. Sullivan, United States District Court Judge

Plaintiff John Daniels (“Mr. Daniels”) is a middle-aged man from Liberia, West Africa. Am. Compl. ¶ 4. A permanent resident of Maryland, Mr. Daniels worked for Defendant Chugach Government Services (“Chugach”) as a Systems Administrator from 2009 until 2011. Id. ¶ 4. In the fall of 2011, Chugach reorganized and Mr. Daniels was laid off. Id. ¶ 5. The position held by Mr. Daniels was combined with the position held by Mr. Daniels' middle-aged Ethiopian colleague. Id. Mr. Daniels interviewed for the new position, but a younger Caucasian male was hired instead. Id. ¶ 6. Mr. Daniels trained the new hire. Id. ¶ 10. After one month, the new hired was dismissed for poor performance. Id. ¶ 11. Mr. Daniels served as Acting Lead Systems Administrator for approximately four months. Id. ¶ 12. Mr. Daniels was never invited to apply for the permanent position, which was awarded to a younger African American candidate in March 2012. Id. ¶ 10. Based on these events, Mr. Daniels alleges that Chugach discriminated against him based on his national origin, age and race. Id. ¶¶ 10-13. Chugach moves to dismiss Mr. Daniels' Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim. Def.'s Mot. Dismiss, Docket No. 14. Upon consideration of the motion, the response and reply thereto, the applicable law, and the entire record, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Chugach Government Services

Chugach is a government contractor based in Alaska. Am. Compl. ¶ 3. Mr. Daniels was employed at Chugach's Washington, D.C. office. Id. At the time of the events alleged by Mr. Daniels, Chugach was a wholly owned subsidiary of Chugach Alaska Corporation, an Alaska Native Corporation created pursuant to the terms of the Alaska Native Claim Settlement Act (“ANCSA”). Def. Mem. Supp., Docket No. 14 at 7. The Alaska Native Settlement Claim Act of 1971 extinguished all Native claims to Alaskan land based on aboriginal use. Cook Inlet Region, Inc. v. Rude , 690 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir.2012)

. Native Alaskans were compensated monetarily and with title to forty million acres of land. Id. ANCSA transferred title of the settlement land to twelve regional corporations, including the Chugach Alaska Corporation, and other entities created by the Act. Id. ; see also

United States v. Atl. Richfield Co. , 435 F.Supp. 1009, 1020–21 (D.Alaska 1977)

aff'd , 612 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir.1980) (“The intent of Congress in the Settlement Act was to settle the claims of Alaska Natives and to compensate them without deciding the difficult and disputed question of the existence and extent of aboriginal title to Alaska lands.”).

B. Mr. Daniels' Employment at Chugach

Mr. Daniels was employed by Chugach's Washington, D.C. office as an IT professional. Am. Compl. ¶ 4. Mr. Daniels' employment with Chugach began in 2009 as a Systems Administrator. Id. At this time, Mr. Daniels was in his mid-fifties. The Lead Systems Administrator was an Ethiopian male in his sixties. Id. In 2011, Chugach announced a reorganization, including the consolidation of Mr. Daniels' position with the Lead Systems Administrator position. Id. ¶ 5. Mr. Daniels and his Ethiopian colleague applied for the new position, but Chugach hired a younger Caucasian male. Id. ¶ 6. Mr. Daniels alleges that the new hire did not possess the relevant education or work experience requirements that were posted in the job description. Id. ¶ 7.

Chugach asked Mr. Daniels' to work in a temporary capacity to assist the Caucasian male's transition into the newly-created senior IT position. Id. ¶ 10. After one month, the new hire was dismissed from his duties due to behavioral and performance issues. Id. ¶ 11. Chugach asked Mr. Daniels to serve as Acting Senior IT Administrator. Id. Mr. Daniels served in this capacity from approximately November 2011 to February 2012. Id. ¶ 12. In early March, 2012, Mr. Daniels received a letter informing him that his term as Acting Senior IT Administrator was over. Id. Mr. Daniels alleges that he was not invited to apply for the permanent position. Id. The person hired for the permanent position was a “much younger African-American male, who unlike Mr. Daniels or his former supervisor, had no direct African ancestry.” Id. ¶ 13. Chugach invited Mr. Daniels to work as a Substitute Instructor, but with few hours and only minimum wage, Mr. Daniels could not support his family and sought work at Walmart. Id. ¶ 14.

C. Mr. Daniels' Office of Federal Contract Compliance Program Complaint.

On May 30, 2012, Mr. Daniels filed a complaint with the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Program (“OFCCP”). Id. ¶ 15. Although the OFCCP findings are not attached to Mr. Daniels' Complaint, he alleges OFFCP concluded that Chugach violated Executive Order 11236

by “hiring the first Caucasian candidate over Mr. Daniels, a more qualified candidate, when the first candidate did not meet the minimum requirements of Senior IT Administrator.” Id.¹ Chugach offered Mr. Daniels $2,287.20 in back pay, an offer rejected by Mr. Daniels as “entirely unsatisfactory.” Id. Mr. Daniels requested a right-to-sue letter from OFCCP and now alleges racial discrimination under Section 1981 (Count I), national origin discrimination under Title VII (Count II), and age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (Count III). Id. ¶¶ 16-18. Mr. Daniels seeks over $700,000.00 in damages, plus pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Browning v. Clinton , 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C.Cir.2002). The pleading must contain a “short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ; Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 677–78, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The pleading standard does not require detailed factual allegations, but should be “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Naked assertions without factual enhancements or formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action will not suffice. Id. Rather, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter ... to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Id.

Plausibility entails that the plaintiff has pled factual content that is not merely consistent with liability but allows the Court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id.

In considering a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court should liberally view the complaint in the plaintiff's favor, accepting all factual allegations as true, and giving the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Redding v. Edwards , 569 F.Supp.2d 129, 131 (D.D.C.2008)

(citing Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp. , 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994) ).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Mr. Daniels states a claim for race discrimination under Section 1981.

Chugach argues that Mr. Daniels § 1981 claim for race discrimination fails because it is (1) a national origin claim filed under the pretense of race; (2) time barred under a three-year statute of limitations; and (3) barred based on federal immunity because Chugach is an instrumentality of the federal government. Def.'s Mem. Supp. at 9-14. Mr. Daniels acknowledges that national origin and race claims are distinct, but maintains that he has adequately pled a race discrimination claim under § 1981 because “Chugach was trying to rid its staff of Black Africans, who present a different culture and heritage from those of the unqualified Caucasian candidate Chugach hired—and then fired—before hiring an African American without informing plaintiff of the existence of the reposting of the position.” Pl.'s Mem. Opp. at 5. Mr. Daniels also asserts that a four-year statute of limitations applies and contends that Chugach does not qualify as an instrumentality of the federal government. Id. at 2–5.

1. Mr. Daniels has pled adequate facts to maintain a claim for race discrimination under § 1981.

Section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the “making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts” and protects classes of persons from intentional discrimination based on their ancestry or ethnic characteristics. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)

; St. Francis College v. Al

–

Khazraji , 481 U.S. 604, 613, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987) (defining race as used in § 1981 as including ancestry and ethnicity claims). To establish a claim under § 1981, a plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of a racial minority group; (2) the defendant intended to discriminate on the basis of race; and (3) the discrimination pertained to one of the activities enumerated in the statute. Dickerson v. District of Columbia, 806 F.Supp.2d 116, 119 (D.D.C.2011). A successful Section 1981 claim alleges discrimination based on ancestry or ethnic characteristics, not country of origin. Nyunt v. Tomlinson , 543 F.Supp.2d 25, 35 (D.D.C.2008) (“Race and national origin are ‘ideologically distinct categories.’ ”); see also Barbara T. Lindemann, et al., Employment Discrimination Law , 6-3, Equal Employment Opportunity Committee Section of Labor and Employment law American Bar Association, 5th ed., V1 (2012) (“Although ancestry can fall within the purview of § 1981, national origin does not.”).

The Supreme Court has “refused to narrowly define the concept of race.” Khair v. Campbell Soup Co. , 893 F.Supp. 316 (D.N.J.1995)

. As discussed in St. Francis College,

§ 1981

, “at a minimum,” reaches discrimination against an...