Daniels v. Coleman
| Decision Date | 05 September 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 18959,18959 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | J. D. DANIELS and Margaret R. Daniels, Respondents, v. Moseley C. COLEMAN, Appellant. |
William E. Jenkinson, Kingstree, for appellant.
Connor & Connor, Kingstree, for respondents.
This action was instituted by J. D. Daniels and Margaret R. Daniels, the respondents herein, against Moseley C. Coleman, the appellant herein, to recover actual and punitive damages on two causes of action, one based on fraud and deceit, and the other on trespass.
In the first cause of action, based on fraud and deceit, it is alleged that prior to April 19, 1965, an agreement was entered into by and between the respondents and the appellant, whereby they would execute a note in the amount of $20,000.00, secured by a mortgage on a certain tract of land containing 198 acres, in return for certain agreements on the part of the appellant which were to be reduced to writing and signed by him. It is then alleged that the respondents did, on April 19, 1965, sign the aforesaid note and mortgage with the understanding that delivery thereof was not to be made to the appellant until the agreements were signed by him. It is further alleged that on April 26, 1965, the appellant went to the office of the respondents' attorney, in his absence, and by false representations obtained the possession of the said note and mortgage without signing the agreements. It is further alleged that the appellant never had any intention of executing the agreements and his promise to do so was made solely for the purpose of inducing the respondents to execute the aforesaid note and mortgage, and because of this fraud and deceit on the part of the appellant, the respondents were induced to sign a note and mortgage which they would not have otherwise executed, thereby obligating themselves for the payment of the aforesaid sum of money and encumbering their property therefor. The complaint laso charges that the appellant has refused to return the note and mortgage and that as a result thereof they have been put to much trouble and expense in attempting to recover the same. It is also alleged that there was no valid delivery of the note and mortgage and they are void for this reason.
In the second cause of action it is alleged that the respondents are the owners and in possession of a tract of land containing 107 acres and that on April 26, 1965 they specifically forbade the appellant to go upon said premises for any purpose. It is then alleged that on April 27, 1965, that the appellant, against the express direction of said respondents, went upon said premises, thereby committing a willful trespass and damaging the property rights of the respondents.
The answer of the appellant was a general denial of the charges of fraud and deceit and trespass. He further alleged that he had repeatedly offered to return to the attorney for the respondents the said note and mortgage referred to in the complaint but he refused to accept the return of same. The answer also tendered the return of the aforesaid documents to the respondents.
This case came on for trial before The Honorable Frank Eppes, Presiding Judge, and a jury, at the November 1967 Term of the Court of Common Pleas for Williamsburg County. The appellant made timely motions for a nonsuit and a directed verdict and such were refused. The jury returned the following verdict:
When the verdict above quoted was published, counsel for the appellant objected to the form thereof upon the ground that it was not responsive to the charge of the trial judge. After further instructions, which will be hereinafter referred to, the jury retired and returned the same verdict as that above quoted. The appellant duly made a motion for judgment Non obstante veredicto, or in the alternative, for a new trial. These motions were refused and this appeal followed.
It appears from the record that L. M. Rogers was indebted to the appellant in the amount of approximately $77,000.00, represented by his notes and mortgages. L. L. Rogers, the father of L. M. Rogers and of Margaret R. Daniels, had either endorsed or cosigned some of the aforesaid notes and was liable thereon to the extent of approximately $35,000.00. While this liability was outstanding and subsisting, L. L. Rogers, on October 26, 1964, conveyed his farm aggregating 198 acres to the respondents who were his son-in-law and daughter. The consideration for such conveyance was the sum of $5.00, love and affection, and subject to the lien on a mortgage held by Lake City Building and Loan Association on which there was a balance due of $32,000.00. The farm so conveyed, according to the testimony, was worth from $75,000.00 to $100,000.00.
It is apparent from the record that a suit to set aside the aforesaid conveyance as a fraudulent one was threatened when the appellant discovered that L. L. Rogers had conveyed all of his property to the respondents. It was at this time that the parties to this action, each represented by counsel, commenced negotiations to settle the controversy existing between them so as to prevent the appellant from attempting to set aside the deed of L. L. Rogers to the respondents on the ground that such was a fraudulent conveyance. It was agreed that the respondents would execute a note to the appellant in the amount of $20,000.00, secured by a mortgage on the premises conveyed by L. L. Rogers to them. The appellant contends that the agreed that upon the execution of the aforesaid note and mortgage that he would release L. L. Rogers from his liability on the notes endorsed or cosigned by him for his son, L. M. Rogers. The respondents contend that in consideration of their executing a note and mortgage hereinbove referred to, that the appellant was to agree that the indebtedness of L. M. Rogers to him would bear interest from date at the rate of 5% Per annum, regardless of the interest rate set forth in any instrument evidencing his debt, and further that the appellant would release and discharge L. L. Rogers from any and all liability arising out of his endorsement or cosigning of notes on behalf of his son, L. M. Rogers. The respondents further contend that the appellant was to agree to 'take up' the indebtedness of L. M. Rogers to three of his other creditors, the amount thereof aggregating about $25,000.00.
The attorney for the appellant testified that he, with the appellant, went to the office of the attorney for the respondents early on the morning of April 26, 1965, concerning the settlement. He stated that the note and mortgage had been signed by the respondents and their attorney had also prepared a release for execution by the appellant. He was told that the appellant would not sign such release because 'this is not what we agreed on'; and thereupon he submitted a release that he had prepared. The attorney for the respondents looked it over and said, 'that was all right', and that he would take the mortgage to Kingstree that morning and have it recorded. The attorney for the appellant said that he would take his release and have it executed so that the transaction could be closed out. It appears from the testimony that later that morning the appellant checked the clerk of court's office in Kingstree and found that the mortgage had not been recorded. After learning this, the appellant returned to the office of the attorney for the respondents and obtained the possession of the note and mortgage and agreement from the secretary in said office, telling her, in effect, that everything was all settled and it was proper for him to take the papers with him. The appellant then returned to the office of the clerk of court for the purpose of having the mortgage recorded but because the mortgage was not properly witnessed and probated the clerk could not record the same. The appellant then took the note and mortgage and delivered the possession thereof to his attorney, who, on the same day telephoned the attorney for the respondents, advising him where the note and mortgage were and stated that he would deliver such to him or would keep the papers in his own office for him to pick up, at his convenience. This witness also testified that the respondents' attorney stated that he would contact his clients and see what they wanted done and would be back in touch with him. The witness testified that he heard nothing further from the attorney for the respondents until four days later when the present suit was brought. This witness testified that he tendered a return of the note and mortgage by letter and also by the answer of the appellant.
The attorney for the respondents gave his version of what took place on April 26, 1965, when he met with the appellant and his attorney. He stated that since the release prepared by him was not acceptable to the appellant 'I told him the whole deal was off and that as far as I was concerned that they could do what they wanted to.' He stated that until the release was executed as drawn by him he had no authority to deliver the note and mortgage. The witness testified that on the same day that he had a meeting with the appellant and his attorney he went by the clerk of court's office in Kingstree and he was there informed that the appellant had been inquiring if the mortgage had been placed on record. He said that he immediately called his secretary and told her under no circumstances was she to let the appellant have the mortgage. It was then that she informed him that the appellant had just left the office with the mortgage.
J. D. Daniels, one of the respondents, testified that he met the appellant as he left the attorney's office with the note and mortgage and his words to the witness were ...
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