Daniels v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 04 March 1847
• Citation: 7 Pa. 371
• Parties: DANIELS <I>v.</I> The COMMONWEALTH.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

7 Pa. 371

DANIELS v. The COMMONWEALTH.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

February 12, 1847.

March 4, 1847.

Feb. 12.

IN error from the Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia.

Barton and D. P. Brown, for plaintiff in error.—The act authorizes a fine and imprisonment in the penitentiary or county jail, at the discretion of the court. There is no authority to add the punishment of hard labour, and beyond the act we cannot go. It is, therefore, a clear case of excess: Commonwealth v. Kræ;mer, 3 Binn. 584; for which the judgment must be reversed entirely: Bourne v. The King, 2 Nev. & Per. 248.

H. M. Phillips, and Attorney-general, contrà.—The discretion to imprison in the penitentiary, proves that the punishment of hard labour is allowable, since that is part of the penitentiary system, the third section of the act of 1829 directing that all convicts there imprisoned shall be kept at labour. [BELL, J. — Suppose there was no such discipline in some counties.] We admit that in such case it could not be inflicted in the county jail. [Did the legislature, then, intend different modes of punishment in different parts of the state?] But this court may, in such case, alter or modify the sentence: it having power, under the act of June 1836, to remit or modify all sentences: Drew v. The Commonwealth, 1 Whart. 279.

Reply. — The discipline of the jails is not the question; but whether an additional punishment can be inflicted at the pleasure of the court.

This point being admitted, the judgment must be reversed; for the court cannot undertake to modify a criminal sentence: 5 Barr, 64, where the cases are cited; 7 Ad. & Ell. 58.

March 4. ROGERS, J.

The 21st section of the act of the 12th July, 1842, directs, that every person convicted of fraud as therein prescribed, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary or in the county jail, at the discretion of the court, not exceeding one year, or by fine, not exceeding three times the value of the money, or property, or other thing so obtained; or by both fine and imprisonment. To the punishment awarded by the act there is superadded, in the sentence, "hard labour," which, as the defendant contends, is not warranted by the statute. That there may be imprisonment without labour, is a proposition which need only be stated; and whether it be a less punishment, as is contended, or a greater punishment, would seem to be immaterial. In The King v. Bourne, 7 Adol. & El. 58, a judgment was reversed, because the court sentenced the offender to transportation for seven years, in a case punishable only with death. The courts proceed on the safe principle, that the punishment only which the statute awards can be inflicted — the court having no power to alter or vary it, and, consequently, it would be a usurpation of an authority not delegated, which cannot be tolerated in a government of laws. Is, then, the sentence illegal? This is a question which we think is virtually decided in The Commonwealth v. Kræmer, 3 Binn. 584. In that case the judgment was reversed. The crime of which the defendant was convicted was perjury, punishable by fine and imprisonment at hard labour; yet, as the act prescribed no particular kind of treatment as to diet or discipline, a sentence which adjudged that the convict shall be confined, fed, clothed, and treated as the law directs, was reversed as erroneous. In the argument an exception was taken, that the defendant was sentenced to "hard labour," the word "hard" going beyond the letter of the act. On inquiry, it was found that the exception was not well taken, as these words appeared in the original roll. But had it been as was assumed, we are warranted in saying, the judgment would have been reversed on that ground alone. The reasoning of the judges, who delivered their opinions seriatim, applies with full force to the present case. But as repetition adds no additional force to an argument, I shall content myself with referring generally to the cases cited. But it is denied that the case of The Commonwealth v. Kræmer applies; because, as is said, it was ruled on the construction of the act of 1792, and that the question now raised depends on various acts subsequently passed, constituting one entire system. That it is a rule of construction that statutes are not to be taken according to their very words, but their provisions may be extended beyond, or restrained within the words, according to the sense and meaning of the legislature, apparent from the whole statute, or from other statutes created before or after the one in question. That the intention of the legislature must govern, and to this intention, a literal construction of any statute must yield; and to discover the true meaning of a statute, it is the duty of the court to consider other statutes, made in pari materia, whether they are repealed or unrepealed: Church v. Crocker, 3 Mass. Rep. 21; Holbrook v. Holbrook, 1 Pick. 254. These principles are not denied, and in the application of them, the counsel for the Commonwealth insist that the act under which sentence was passed, authorized the court to imprison the defendant in the penitentiary or county jail; that by that act, for the establishment of penitentiaries, labour is made part of the sentence of every person confined therein; and that it is an important branch of the penitentiary system. That the courts have power to sentence the defendant to imprisonment in the penitentiary, and that labour would have been...